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Foreword 
The swift expansion of developing Asia is probably the most significant 
structural change in the world economy of the twenty-first century. 
Some economies in this region —including Japan, Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan Province of China— had already undergone a rapid growth process in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Over the past decade, the economies 
of China and other developing nations of Asia have also expanded rapidly 
and turned this region into the main growth pole of the world economy. Even 
amid the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, China and 
most other developing Asian economies continued to post positive growth, 
whereas the rest of the world economy was in recession. For the remainder of 
this second decade of the twenty-first century, developing Asia will probably 
continue to be the growth engine of the world, in a context of weak growth 
prospects for the developed countries. 
Latin America, and in particular South America, have strongly 
benefited from developing Asia’s surge. A decade ago, the region’s trade 
and investment ties with Japan were already well developed, but links 
with China and other developing countries in Asia were still incipient. This 
changed rapidly afterwards, as Latin America’s exports to, and imports 
from, China and the rest of developing Asia grew at double digit rates until 
the outbreak of the financial crisis and resumed their vigorous growth in 
2010. As a consequence, China has become one of the region’s main trade 
partners. In particular, it is now the largest export market for Brazil, Chile 
and Peru, and the second largest for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Cuba and Uruguay. China is also the main origin of imports 
for Panama and Paraguay, and the second for nine other Latin American 
countries. The fast rebound of Asian imports after 2009 has supported Latin 
America’s own economic recovery from the recent global economic crisis.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between the two regions, 
while smaller than trade flows, are growing rapidly. FDI from Asia to 
Latin America has risen significantly over the past decade, while flows in 
the opposite direction are smaller but also increasing. Latin America has 
become an increasingly important destination for Asian multinationals, 
as traditional investments from Japan have been followed more recently 
by those from the Republic of Korea, China and India. In the particular 
case of China, the bulk of the country’s FDI in the region is still directed 
towards off-shore financial centres such as the British Virgin Islands and 
the Cayman Islands. However, in recent years Chinese FDI elsewhere in 
the region has gathered momentum. 
The growing trade and FDI relations between the two regions 
reflect the ongoing shifts in the world economy, in which developing 
countries increasingly trade and invest with each other. Thus it is expected 
that South-South trade will overtake trade among industrialized countries 
(North-North trade) by 2020.
Despite their benefits, strengthened trans-Pacific economic relations 
have also become a cause for concern in Latin America, due to major 
imbalances of different kinds. First, bilateral trade flows have expanded much 
faster than bilateral FDI flows, suggesting a possible lack of complementarity 
and synergies between the two types of links. Second, China and the rest 
of Asia are running a growing surplus in trans-Pacific trade flows. Third, 
biregional trade is of an inter-industry nature, meaning that Latin America 
(especially South America) exports a limited range of commodities, whereas 
China and other developing Asian countries export mainly manufactures. 
The commodity export boom which started during the last decade contributed 
to currency appreciation in South America, reducing the competitiveness of 
non-commodity exports. Simultaneously, the surge in manufactured imports 
from developing Asia has intensified competition with Latin American 
manufactures in both domestic markets and abroad. Fourth, Asian FDI flows 
to Latin America have been far larger than Latin American FDI flows to Asia, 
which may be related to Asia’s more competitive environment as compared 
to Latin America and to the fact that Asian multinationals outnumber Latin 
American ones. Fifth, some analysts consider that most Asian investments 
in Latin America are of the enclave type, characterized by limited links with 
the local economy in host countries. Lastly, Latin American countries have 
not yet agreed upon a regional institution or forum that may represent the 
region in discussions and negotiations with Asia-Pacific on trade, investment 
and economic cooperation.
To shed more light on the aforementioned issues, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) of the Republic of Korea and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
organized the joint research project “Changing nature of Asia-Latin America 
economic relations”. This project consisted of four studies by international 
The changing nature of Asian-Latin American economic relations 11
experts in the field of trade and investment relations between the two 
regions. Draft versions of these studies were discussed in two seminars. The 
first of these was hosted by ECLAC in Santiago on 28 July 2011. The second 
was hosted in Seoul by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT), the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), the 
Korea Brazil Society and Kyung Hee University on 4 October 2011.
This book captures the outcome of the research project. Its purpose 
is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to document the growing investment 
and trade relations between Latin America and Asia, as well as some 
of their imbalances. On the other hand, it provides several examples on 
how to upgrade trans-Pacific economic relations. First, the book provides 
an in-depth analysis of the participation of Asian multinationals in Latin 
American and global value chains in agriculture, manufacturing and 
services, and how these firms have contributed to the transfer of knowledge 
and technology to domestic producers. Second, it looks into the experience 
of selected Latin American multinationals in Asian markets, and provides 
some lessons for other firms in the region considering following suit.
It is concluded that increasing biregional trade and FDI flows 
can play a crucial role in upgrading the performance of Latin American 
producers and increasing their participation in Asian and global value 
chains. The promotion of bilateral investment and intra-industrial trade 
between Asia and Latin America will deepen trade integration and 
contribute to more balanced economic relations.
This book is offered to the Asian and Latin American policymaking, 
academic and business communities, as a contribution to bridging the 
gaps in our knowledge of economic relations between the two regions. 
It is also hoped that the recommendations contained in this volume may 
contribute to the upgrading of biregional trade and investment flows in 
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Introduction
Over the past decade, Asia and Latin America have become the new drivers 
of world growth. As a indication of their dynamism, their participation in 
the world economy, global trade and investment has increased markedly 
over the past ten years. Together, Asia and Latin America were responsible 
for roughly one third of global economic activity in 2011, which is more 
than the European Union or the United States, which contributed 25% 
and around 8%, respectively. Their cumulative share in world trade is 
about 30%, with Latin America contributing 5% and Asia the remainder. 
However, their participation in global FDI flows is much smaller: Asia 
accounts for 11% and Latin America for around 7%. Nevertheless, all these 
shares were substantially lower one decade ago.
The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 hit the growth 
potential of industrialized economies hard, yet the emerging economies 
have continued to perform well. They showed remarkable resilience and 
emerged stronger than developed economies from the crisis. Growth in 
the latter group will remain subdued for several years to come, owing 
to stringent fiscal policies to rein in public debt and persistently high 
unemployment, meaning that the economies of the South will continue to 
be the engine of the world economy in the near future. The South’s growth 
prospects depend in part on its internal dynamics, in other words, the 
links forged between developing and emerging economies through South-
South trade, investment and cooperation. Within the South, developing 
Asia accounts for four fifths of total trade. The centre of gravity of world 
trade has, in short, shifted from North to South and from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific over the past decade.
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This book reviews how economic relations between Latin America 
and Asia have changed over time. For many years the two regions had 
little contact: geographical distance, cultural barriers and information 
gaps created a lack of mutual understanding and hindered political and 
economic cooperation between the two continents. Asia lacked expertise on 
Latin America, as did Latin America on Asia. However, this has changed 
beyond recognition over the last decade, and economic ties between Latin 
America and Asia-Pacific have recently undergone rapid expansion and 
diversification. Biregional trade and, to a lesser extent, investment flows 
have grown at double-digit rates over the past decade. Complementary 
demand may explain many of these strengthened trans-Pacific links. Asia is 
important to Latin America as a source of manufacturing products, forming 
the basis of the latter’s rapid export growth. Latin America, meanwhile, is a 
strategic partner for Asia, in particular for China, Japan, Korea and India, 
providing the commodities needed to sustain its economic expansion. 
Bilateral investment relations have also expanded, although most investment 
has come from Asian multinationals in Latin America, with little investment 
by Latin American multinationals (trans-Latins) in Asia.
This introductory chapter documents general trends in bilateral 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and presents the main messages 
of the book. It is followed by three chapters presenting detailed analyses 
of Asian investment in Latin American agriculture, manufacturing and 
services, respectively. The final chapter deals with the activities of selected 
trans-Latins in Asia.
A. Trans-Pacific trade
During the past decade, the region’s trade with the Asia-Pacific region 
showed much stronger growth than its trade with other major partners. 
For example, between 2006 and 2010, Latin American and Caribbean 
exports to Asia-Pacific countries expanded at more than three times the 
rate of the region’s exports to the rest of the world. To a large extent, this 
was the result of a steep rise in exports to China, which grew at five times 
the rate of total exports to the rest of the world (see figure 1). The region’s 
imports from the Asia-Pacific countries, in particular from China, have 
also grown more rapidly than total imports. Imports outweigh exports 
in the region’s trade relationship with the Asia-Pacific region, which has 
generated a widening trade deficit with that region. Only a decade ago 
Asia represented just over 10% of all external trade with the region; now 
Asia’s share is over 20%. This increasing relevance coincides with Asia 
Pacific’s rising influence in world trade.1
1 While in 1985 Asia-Pacific was responsible for 23% of global exports and 19% of imports, 
by 2010 it accounted for 34% and 31% of world exports and imports, respectively (United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE)).
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Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH OF TRADE WITH MAIN 































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of national statistics.
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The overall expansion of bilateral trade over the past quarter-
century hides major shifts in the relative importance of each trading 
partner in the Asia-Pacific region. While in 1985 Japan was the 
destination for 50% of Latin American and Caribbean exports to the 
Asia-Pacific region and the source of 70% of the region’s imports, its 
share in both has fallen steadily. By contrast, China’s share of Latin 
American and Caribbean exports to the Asia-Pacific region has risen 
steadily (from the mid-1990s), as have its exports to the region (from 
the early 1990s). Consequently, between 2000 and 2005, China overtook 
Japan as the region’s leading Asia-Pacific trading partner (see figure 
2). India, meanwhile, in spite of strong growth over the past two 
decades, receives only 6.4% of Latin American and Caribbean exports 
to the Asia-Pacific region and supplies 3.4% of its imports. This places it 
behind the Republic of Korea as a trading partner for the region.
China is likely to overtake the European Union as the region’s 
second trading partner around 2014-2015. Assuming that demand for 
the region’s products in the United States, the European Union and the 
rest of the world continues to grow at the current pace, and demand 
from China grows at just half the rate recorded during the past decade, 
China may overtake the European Union in 2014 and become the 
second-largest market for the region’s exports. A similar outcome is 
projected for imports, and China is expected to surpass the European 
Union in 2015.
The relative importance of Asia as a market for Latin American 
and Caribbean exports varies significantly from country to country. 
While on average Asia accounted for slightly over 16.5% of the region’s 
exports on average between 2007 and 2010, it receives almost 40% of 
Chilean and Peruvian exports and over 24% of Brazilian exports. At the 
other extreme, Asia receives 10% or less of total exports from Mexico, 
Central America (except for Costa Rica) and most Caribbean countries 
(see table 1).
Asia is even more important to the region as a source of imports 
than as a destination for exports, with strong differences among countries. 
Asia’s share of total imports is equal to or greater than 20% for the South 
American countries (except for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) 
and Mexico, but is generally smaller for the Central American and 
Caribbean countries. 
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Figure 2 
ASIA-PACIFIC (SELECTED COUNTRIES AND GROUPS): SHARE OF TRADE WITH 






































































































































Rep. of Korea ASEAN (6)b
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations Commodity Database (COMTRADE) and Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS) database for Viet Nam (1985-1996 and 2011) and Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam (2010).
a These statistics were obtained from Asian countries and may not coincide with national data reported 
by Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
b Includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF MAIN TRADING PARTNERS IN EXPORTS, 2007-2010
(Percentages of total)
 Region / country United States European Union Asia
Latin America and 
the Caribbean







a Argentina 7.7 17.6 17.5 40.8
Brazil 12.9 22.7 24.1 22.4
Paraguay 2.6 7.2 17.1 61.1






State of) 9.1 8.4 17.1 61.0
Colombia 36.0 13.5 7.9 25.4
Ecuador 35.3 11.9 8.4 40.2






Costa Rica 33.1 13.6 15.8 27.1
El Salvador 44.3 5.4 5.0 42.9
Guatemala 39.2 6.0 6.1 40.0
Honduras 39.4 15.8 6.2 35.0
Nicaragua 26.6 11.0 8.6 43.5
Chile 12.8 19.4 39.3 21.6
Mexico 72.7 7.0 10.3 6.1
 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 47.4 10.1 11.9 18.6
>30 >10<30
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) data.
a Southern Common Market.
b Andean Community.
c Central American Common Market.
The situation with China is analogous. China has become a key 
export market for Cuba, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Argentina and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, in decreasing order. In contrast, less than 3% of 
exports from Paraguay, Ecuador, the Central American countries (except 
for Costa Rica) and most Caribbean countries go to China. When ranked 
against other export markets, China was fairly insignicant in 2000, but 
by 2011 it had become the main market for Brazil, Chile, Perú and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the second market for Argentina and 
Uruguay and the third for Mexico. China’s rise as a source of imports has 
been even more dramatic, as it was one of the top three sources of imports 
for all Latin American countries in 2011 except for El Salvador, Honduras 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (see table 2). China is the main 
source of their imports. China is the main source of imports for Panama 
and Paraguay, and the second source for Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico and Peru.
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHINA’S RANKING AMONG IMPORT 
AND EXPORT PARTNERS, 2000 AND 2010
Exports Imports
2000 2010 2011 2000 2010 2011
Argentina 6 2 2 4 2 2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 18 10 8 7 4 3
Brazil 12 1 1 11 2 2
Chile 5 1 1 4 2 2
Colombia 36 2 4 9 2 2
Costa Rica 30 10 13 15 2 2
Ecuador 18 12 17 10 3 2
El Salvador 49 34 38 23 4 4 
Guatemala 43 27 28 19 3 3
Honduras 54 10 12 21 7 5 
Mexico 19 3 3 7 2 2
Nicaragua 35 24 19 20 3 3
Panama 31 30 32 25 1 1
Paraguay 15 25 23 3 1 1
Peru 4 2 1 9 2 2
Uruguay 4 3 2 7 3 3 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 35 3 1 18 2 2 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
figures provided by the central banks and national statistical institutes of the respective countries.
The Latin American and Caribbean region was China’s most 
dynamic trading partner during the second half of the last decade, and 
Japan’s second most dynamic partner. Between 2005 and 2010, China’s 
exports to Latin America and the Caribbean and its imports from the 
region grew at almost double the rate of total imports and exports. The 
region’s share of trade with China has increased gradually, rising from a 
very low starting point to a 6% share of total Chinese exports and imports 
in 2010. Japan’s exports to Latin America and the Caribbean grew faster 
than its exports to any other destination, while Japanese imports from 
the region were surpassed only by those from the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. 
All in all, Latin America posted a burgeoning deficit in its trade 
with Asia during the last decade, mostly due to the growing trade deficit 
of Mexico and Central America. As mentioned earlier, only a small 
proportion of those countries’ exports go to Asia, while an increasing 
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percentage of their imports come from that region. The result is a 
widening trade deficit with China and the rest of Asia. Meanwhile, the 
South American economies, many of which send a high proportion of 
their exports to Asia, registered a more even trade balance with China and 
the rest of Asia during the last decade. That outcome is largely attributable 
to higher prices for the commodities exported to Asia by South American 
countries during much of the decade.
The composition of trade flows is another relevant factor when 
analysing trade between the two regions. Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s trade with Asia-Pacific is mostly inter-industry, consisting 
primarily of commodity exports and high and medium-tech imports. 
Except in the cases of Costa Rica and Mexico, the export mix of the 
countries of the region to Asian countries remains concentrated in a 
few commodities. In almost every country except for Mexico, the three 
main export products represent over 80% of the value of total exports 
to the main destinations in Asia. It is worth noting that high-tech 
products figure among the main products exported by Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Mexico. 
More recently, Asia has begun to import new products from Latin 
America, although these do not generally feature among the top three 
export products. They include poultry, vegetable oils, fresh fruit, frozen 
fish, crustaceans and molluscs, fruit and vegetable juices, wine and 
processed woods. Some fall into the category of primary products, but 
are not considered commodities because there may be some qualitative 
differentiation among them. 
B. Trans-Pacific investment
Inward foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 
has not increased by the same margin as that in Asia. While the share of 
the former in global FDI inflows almost doubled from 7% to 14% during 
the first decade of this century, the share of the latter almost tripled 
from 11% to 28% (see figure 3). In both regions, the share in global FDI 
outflows was smaller than the share in global FDI inflows. However, 
the contrast between Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in 
FDI outflows is even more marked than in FDI inflows: Latin America’s 
share has stayed roughly constant over time, whereas the Asian share 
reached over 23% in 2011.
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Figure 3 
ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA: SHARE IN GLOBAL FDI INFLOWS 
AND OUTFLOWS, 2000-2011
A. Global FDI inflows







































B. Global FDI outflows






































World (right scale) Latin America and the Caribbean Asia
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
UNCTADSTAT, Foreign direct investment statistics. 
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The main investors in Latin America are developed countries. 
According to ECLAC data, during the period 2006-2010 the United 
States’ investment amounted to around 23% of total inward FDI, the 
Netherlands’ share was 7%, Spain’s was 9% and Canadian investment 
represented 5%. Intraregional investment constituted only 9% of total 
inward FDI (see gure 4). 
Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA: FDI INFLOWS BY GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN, 





























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2012. 
Asian FDI was very limited during this period, representing only 
3% of FDI inflows from 2006 to 2010, but its share has increased recently.2 
In 2011 Japan’s FDI share jumped to 8%, following some major acquisitions. 
China’s share likewise surged in 2010, but fell back in 2011. Korean 
companies are also active in the region, particularly in vehicle assembly 
operations and the iron and steel sector. Brazil and Mexico remain the 
largest recipients of Asian FDI in Latin America, although both countries 
experienced a decrease in Asian FDI ows from 2008 to 2009, which then 
recovered in 2010 and 2011.
2 In Argentina, for instance, it represented only 1.7% of the total FDI received in 2008. In 
Brazil, Asian countries invested an amount corresponding to 4.6% of the total inflow of 
2008 —although 4.4% came from Japan alone, with the rest of the countries contributing in 
negligible numbers. In several Latin American countries, Asian investments are so small 
that they are included in the “other countries” category.
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Most FDI in Latin America has traditionally gone to the services 
sector (telecommunications, nance and public utilities), although 
natural resources have been capturing a larger share in recent years. 
In fact, according to ECLAC (2010), while in 2000 about 60% of total 
inward FDI went to the services sector and 10% to the exploitation of 
natural resources, these percentages were 45% and 18%, respectively 
in 2011. The manufacturing share increased from 20% to 38% over the 
whole period. 
Latin America became a destination of some importance for 
Asian multinationals around a decade ago, starting with investments 
from Japan, followed later by those of Korea and China. For China, 
Korea and Japan, the region accounted for approximately 38%, 7% and 
13%, respectively, of their overseas FDI stock in 2009-2010. In the case 
of China, the bulk of its investment was directed towards nancial off-
shore centres in the region (British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands), 
but in 2010 the conrmed investments outside these off-shore centres 
jumped from a cumulative amount of US$ 7.3 billion during the period 
1990-2009 to US$ 15.2 billion in 2010, while investments in 2011 were 
somewhat smaller. 
Figure 5 
CHINA, JAPAN AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA: GEOGRAPHICAL 
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Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 2011 JETRO Global Trade and Investment Report, Tokyo, 
2010, Figure III-32, p. 91, on the basis of ofcial gures from the respective countries.
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Asian FDI in Latin America is motivated mainly by three factors: 
(1) access to natural resources in order to meet domestic demand, such 
as Japanese industrial conglomerate Mitsui’s investment in Brazil’s 
ethanol production operations, and investments by the Chinese energy 
company CNPC in the exploration and development of the oil capabilities 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; (2) increased efficiency for 
exporting to the United States market, including investments in Mexico’s 
manufacturing sector by firms such as Toyota (Japan), Samsung and LG 
(Republic of Korea), and textile companies investing in Central America 
and the Caribbean; and (3) access to large local markets, mostly taking the 
form of investments by multinational corporations in Brazil.
Asian firms have clear preferences when it comes to the investment 
destination, depending on the host economy’s advantages. Mexico’s strong 
points are electronics, steel, automobiles and textile retailing. Central 
American countries attract textile manufacturers and Costa Rica, high-tech 
firms. Firms interested in mining and/or petroleum are drawn to Chile 
and Peru. Brazil is the destination for electronics, automobile, mining, 
petroleum and steel activities (see table 3).
Table 3 







Mexico Electronics Efficiency-seeking / Market-seeking
Automobile Efficiency-seeking / Market-seeking
Steel Market-seeking
Central America Textile Efficiency-seeking
Chile and Peru Mining Natural-resource-seeking
The Caribbean Tourism Market-seeking
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Aside from in Brazil and Mexico, Asian investment in Latin 
American countries does not demonstrate a wide sectoral diversity. 
Smaller economies focus on attracting Asian investments in areas where 
they have a comparative advantage, such as textiles in Central America 
or mining in Chile. Asian FDI in Latin America also reflects some 
home-specific characteristics. Japanese firms are withdrawing their strong 
presence in the region. The number of operations of electronic companies 
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is shrinking in terms of direct involvement. Most Chinese FDI is 
State-driven, and tends to centre on the natural-resource sector. However, 
actual investments were very small until 2010. There are also some 
examples of market-seeking and efficiency-seeking investments by 
Chinese firms in Latin America’s manufacturing sector, including those 
by Huawei, Lenovo and Chery Automobile.
C. Summary of chapters
The four chapters in this volume deal with investment and trade 
relations between Latin America and Asia. Chapters one to three 
analyse the activities of Asian multinationals in the Latin American 
agribusiness, manufacturing and services industries, respectively. 
Chapter four looks at the activities of the few Latin American firms 
operating in Asia. 
The first chapter by Ruth Rama and John Wilkinson examines trends 
and determinants of Asian investment in Latin American agribusiness. 
First, the authors survey global inward flows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in agriculture, forestry and fishing. These expanded rapidly after 
1990, but continue to account for a tiny share of global FDI inflows. 
Within these global flows, developing countries and transition countries 
increased their share from 56.5% to 62.5% between 1990 and 2010, taking 
advantage of the availability of land and the importance of agriculture. 
Within Latin America, Brazil is by far the largest recipient of FDI, followed 
by Chile, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Peru. Inward FDI in the food 
and beverages industry also expanded rapidly over the past two decades. 
Accordingly, the share of developing economies increased from 13% of 
total in 1989-1991 to 16% in 2010, owing to the decrease of inward FDI from 
developed economies. World leaders in this industry, mostly from Western 
Europe and the United States, operate in Latin American markets and 
often consider the region as important. The largest Japanese transnational 
companies which are active in this sector are highly concentrated in Asia 
and in the home country.
There have been three waves of Asian investment in Latin 
American agribusiness. During the first wave, starting in the 1970s, Japan 
contributed to the opening up of the Brazilian savannah region to soy 
and later to horticulture production, as part of the Programme for the 
Development of the Brazilian Savannah (PRODECER). In particular, the 
Japanese government and firms aimed to develop competitive farms for 
the export of key crops to satisfy their country’s surging demand. Bilateral 
cooperation took the form of a public-private partnership executed 
by a bi-national firm —CAMPO— created for this purpose, while the 
26 ECLAC
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided financing 
and supervised the programme. Bilateral cooperation was also facilitated 
by the role of Japanese immigrants in the modernization of Brazilian 
agriculture and their direct involvement in the different phases of the 
programme. Despite its success in terms of grain and soy exports, the large 
farms developed under PRODECER gave rise to serious environmental 
problems and suffered from huge debts, which were in part responsible 
for the Programme’s discontinuation in 2001.
The second wave occurred in the 1990s, when Asian logging firms 
began to explore the Amazon in response to the substitution of the humid 
tropical forests of Asia by palm oil plantations. These investments were led 
by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and China through joint ventures with 
local firms or direct acquisitions. As these undertakings grew rapidly in 
the early 1990s, they were held responsible for the Amazon’s deforestation, 
and a number of powerful NGOs pressured the Brazilian government 
to take measures. Some years later, attention on these firms subsided as 
their activities expanded less rapidly than foreseen, and because it turned 
out they were more likely to abide by existing regulations on logging 
and forestry management than domestic firms. In the Peruvian Amazon, 
a Dipteryx timber supply chain was developed for the Chinese market. 
Initially, ethnic Chinese timber firms in Peru started to export to China. By 
the end of the decade, however, multinationals from China had assumed 
control over this trade, in part because they were better able to comply 
with the complex international and domestic logging regulations.
The third period concerns recent investments in biofuels and food 
by Asian countries with few natural resources. Although other Asian 
actors have also entered the field, in particular China, Japan has developed 
the most systematic investment programme. As Japan largely depends on 
imports for its energy needs, it has formed a strategic cooperation with the 
Brazilian Agroenergy Programme. The Japan Development Bank (JBIC) 
has provided financing for various initiatives within this Programme. 
Moreover, several Japanese firms have established joint ventures with 
Brazilian enterprises to develop and produce biofuels. However, Japan has 
held back from large direct investments and has become a leading voice 
opposing large-scale land purchases, a common practice among other 
cash-rich and resource-poor countries. It has promoted the Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI), which aim to curb the global 
movement towards large-scale land acquisitions.
The chapter by Jae Sung Kwak assesses the changing nature of Asian 
FDI in Latin American manufacturing, with a focus on the position of 
Latin America within Asian global value chains. Most Asian investments 
in Latin American manufacturing are concentrated in four sectors: steel, 
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automobiles, electronics, and textiles. In the case of steel, Japanese firms’ 
involvement in the production of steel products in Latin America started 
in the mid-1950s, Korean firms have also recently invested in this regional 
industry. The steel industry’s value chain includes the transformation of 
natural resources into steel by-products for the production of automobiles, 
home appliances, industrial machinery and other devices. Latin America’s 
participation is concentrated in natural resources and markets for steel by-
products. Three major Asian producers have entered the Latin American 
steel industry, but only two have survived: POSCO (Republic of Korea) 
and NIPPON (Japan). Both operate in Brazil and Mexico. More recently, 
Chinese and Indian companies have started exploiting iron ore mines in 
Bolivia and Peru.
With regard to automobiles, rising demand and the strengthened 
global competiveness of Chinese, Korean and Japanese firms have led 
to large-scale investment projects in Latin America. Japanese companies 
such as Toyota, Honda and Nissan paved the way for their Korean and 
Chinese peers to follow. The automobile sector’s value chain comprises 
four sections: transformation of raw materials (including steel and rubber 
by-products); the production of parts and components; research and 
development (R&D) and assembly; and marketing, sales and after-sales 
activities. Latin America is an attractive location not only for companies 
seeking to export outside the region, but also for firms selling within the 
region, given its growing market.
Asian brands are leading the global market as principal innovators 
in the field of electronics. Asian firms have made efficiency-seeking 
investments in Mexico for the United States market and market-seeking 
investments in Brazil. The electronics value chain includes several layers 
of parts and components producers, selling not only among themselves, 
but also directly to the brand or company in charge of final assembly. 
Another vital part of the chain is R&D and design, which is closely related 
to the manufacturing of components and final assembly lines. Brand 
marketing is also important in a highly competitive market and given the 
rapid pace of technological change. Most Asian investors in Latin America 
have integrated their operations throughout the entire value chain, except 
for the production of raw materials and the creation of R&D centres. One 
exception is LG Brazil, which underwent a complete internationalization 
of its operations and relies heavily on local human resources for the 
development of its regional business. Another exception is the Chinese 
group Huawei, which has a production plant for telecommunication 
products in Brazil, together with a manufacturing management support 
centre, a training centre for its employees, a spare parts centre and a 
logistics centre.
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Central America has become an export platform of the textile 
and garment industry for the United States market, and some of the 
main investors are Korean firms. Over the past two decades, Korean 
companies have focused on the mass production of pre-ordered designs 
for their customers. However, large producers such as Sae-A, Hansoll and 
Hansae have recently started to enter the original design manufacturing 
(ODM) business, whereby companies participate in the entire production 
process, including fabric development, fashion design and creation of 
their own collection.
The author concludes that the most successful examples of Asian 
subsidiaries and domestic suppliers in Latin America that have upgraded 
in the four industries analysed were not the result of microeconomic 
incentives and regulations (such as local content requirements), but rather 
related to broader efforts to improve macroeconomic stability and promote 
competitive markets. 
The chapter by Joaquín Piña deals with the off-shore services 
industry, which may play a key role in strengthening economic 
integration between Asia and Latin America. Off-shoring (offshore 
sourcing) is an international business strategy that enables companies 
to shift manufacturing or service activities overseas, sourcing highly 
skilled human resources with cost advantages. Services off-shoring is 
a by-product of software off-shoring in the early 1990s and has evolved 
since then to include a wider range of services. One of its key drivers has 
been the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
New communication platforms and automation tools have allowed 
vertically integrated companies to break up value chains through 
process outsourcing and remote operation (off-shoring). The off-shoring 
industry is a by-product of economic globalization, and has experienced 
unprecedented growth in terms of specific segments, market size, and 
corporate country strategies of multinational companies.3 
Latin America entered the global services arena only recently 
through a follow-the-sun model, which allows services providers to 
leverage geographically distant (off-shore) operations with closer (near-
shore) ones. Companies can thus access language skills and cultural 
affinities, while reducing operational risk and benefiting from time-zone 
differences to accelerate project-cycle development. Operations in medium 
to high-cost countries (such as Canada, the United States and Western 
Europe) can be combined with others in low-cost regions such as Asia-
3 India, Ireland and Eastern European countries are the main off-shoring services providers 
today. Recent data and estimates lend support to the notion of a new stage of slower 
growth rates and consolidation within the industry. 
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Pacific, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Following in the footsteps of 
the first two regions, Latin America has a unique opportunity to become a 
major player in a context of industry and business model reconfiguration 
by international providers.
Available data show significant asymmetries in the development of 
the off-shoring industry between Asia and Latin America, as well as weak 
integration between the two regions. According to WTO estimates, Asian 
countries accounted for almost one quarter of global services exports in 
2008, while Latin America as a whole accounted for only 3%. Six Asian 
countries are among the top 10 services exporters in the world (Japan, 
India, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea). Only one Latin American country 
figures in the top 20 (Brazil, at number 14). 
Export of services is a relatively new area for Latin American 
commodity-based, export-oriented economies. In trade negotiations Latin 
American governments still consider merchandise exports as a priority 
issue, and are extending this pattern to their negotiations with Asian 
countries. Only a handful of public institutions responsible for trade 
promotion and negotiation have realized the importance of global services 
industries. Trade agreements that facilitate services trade between the two 
regions are scarce; only 12 agreements between Latin America and Asia 
cover this area. Chile has the largest number of agreements that include 
services chapters, followed by Mexico, Panama and Peru.
Global services centres in Latin America are mainly subsidiaries 
of European and United States companies. Around 60 projects in few 
countries concern off-shore centres of Asian companies from India, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. Limited in number as they are, these centres are 
examples of possible services integration between Asia and Latin America.
Latin America has a newly-gained role as a near-shore services 
provider for the United States market and an increasing one as a support-
centre hub for Japanese and Korean hardware manufacturers. Competitive 
advantages have been built up to offset historical prejudices and 
perceptions of Latin America as a politically and economically high-risk 
region. Some global services firms see Latin America not as a competitor 
to Asia, but rather as a complementary provider.
To take advantage of the current scenario, Latin American countries 
need to consolidate a set of advantages and skills. Current off-shoring 
providers are not necessarily forced to choose between Asia, Europe or 
Latin America; instead, they seek a well-balanced mix of operations on 
the three continents, allowing them to develop a truly global services 
supply in at least three time-zones. In the case of R&D, this combination 
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of different teams working simultaneously shortens access-to-market for 
knowledge-based goods and services, from Internet search engines to 
chip-design software and biotech applications.
The final chapter by Andrés López, Daniela Ramos and Iván Torre 
analyses the experiences of four Latin American multinational companies 
that have invested in Asia. The first is the Techint Group, an Argentine 
multinational which in 2011 employed more than 57,000 people worldwide 
and had revenues of over US$ 24 billion. One of this company’s core 
activities is the seamless tube business of its subsidiary Tenaris, which now 
has 10% to 15% of its total production capacity in Asia. Tenaris’ deployment 
in Asia has been slow, as it took almost three decades for the company to 
go from remote exporting to its first greenfield project. The second case 
study is that of Industrias Metalúrgicas Pescarmona S.A. (IMPSA), which 
is the flagship of the Pescarmona Group from Argentina, with assets of 
US$ 700 million and 5,000 employees. The first activities undertaken by 
IMPSA in Asia were the manufacturing and installation of port cranes 
and the execution of hydroelectric projects in Indonesia, Thailand, India, 
China, Philippines and Taiwan Province of China. By 2004, Asia accounted 
for about 30% of the company’s revenues. During the years that followed, 
the firm’s focus shifted to the renewable energy business, with major on-
going investments in Malaysia and Viet Nam. 
The third case study is that of Bimbo, a Mexican multinational 
selling bakery products. In 2010 it had more than 96,000 employees 
and 103 facilities distributed in 17 countries throughout Latin America 
and Asia, plus the United States. The company is highly product-
diversified and vertically integrated  —including transport, packaging, 
raw materials production and machinery manufacturing. It began to 
expand internationally in the 1990s, with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) providing an opportunity for joint ventures 
to penetrate the United States market. To enter the Asian market, it 
purchased a subsidiary of its main competitor in Spain, Panrico. Bimbo 
Asia has 800 workers and a production plant in Beijing. The final case 
study concerns Embraer, a Brazilian company, which is the third-
largest aircraft maker in the world and employs around 17,000 workers 
(excluding its subsidiaries OGMA and HEAI). It has produced more 
than 5,000 aircraft that operate in 92 countries on five continents. It is 
the market leader for commercial jets with up to 120 seats. Embraer is 
strongly internationalized, with sales offices and distributions centres 
located worldwide, and production facilities in the United States and 
China. The company first opened sales and spare parts distribution 
centres in Asia in 2000, in Beijing and Singapore. In December 2002, 
Embraer signed an agreement to build a production unit in China as 
part of a joint venture with two subsidiaries of AVIC II (China Aviation 
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Industry Corporation II). By 2010, the Asia-Pacific region represented 
22% of the company’s revenue.
The experiences of these four Latin American companies in Asia 
over the past 20 years are similar in a number of ways. All were leaders in 
their business sector back home. Investing in Asia requires the expertise 
and financial backing that only a solid position in home markets can offer. 
Investment in Asia comes only after the companies have successfully 
expanded in neighbouring countries. Tenaris, for instance, did not open 
its first manufacturing plant in Asia until 2008, more than 20 years after 
the company’s holding group (Techint) had set up its first plants outside 
Argentina. IMPSA opened its Lumut plant after it had well-established 
subsidiaries in Brazil. Investing in Brazil is an almost indispensable step 
for a firm seeking to expand its operations outside its borders. Brazilian 
companies have the advantage of being the incumbents in such a large 
market. Deployment in Asia was a lengthy process. Tenaris and IMPSA 
started their first commercial operations in Asia in the 1980s, but it was 
not until the 1990s that they went beyond that stage, and manufacturing 
plants were only built in the last decade. 
In order to successfully adapt to the Asian market, these firms had 
to adapt their micro-business practices. Strong interpersonal relationships 
are vital for a successful blending into Asian markets. The presence 
of local executives in top managerial positions at foreign subsidiaries 
is another condition for any kind of operation in Asia. Moreover, even 
when there are no restrictions, local authorities particularly welcome 
export-oriented investments and those that seek the development of 
linkages with domestic suppliers. Latin American companies need to 
understand these informal practices that are so different from Western-
style business practices.
From the analysis of these cases, it is clear that investment in Asia 
cannot be handled in a simple and conventional manner. In general, local 
governments are keen to attract foreign investors. The difficulties lie 
mainly in establishing successful links with local agents, such as suppliers, 
workers and universities. To overcome this, companies should support 
their operations with policies oriented to building solid ties with the local 
environment both inside the firm (by hiring local executives and involving 
them in key decision-making) and outside the firm (by investing time 
and resources in cultivating interpersonal relationships). It is clear that 
companies that enjoy a good position in their home market are best suited 
to carry out investments in Asia, not only because they may have more 
expertise in their business but also because the deployment strategy may 
take several years, something that requires a continuous flow of resources 
towards a project that will take a long time to produce healthy profits.
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Chapter I
Asian agribusiness investment in 





Over the past two decades, there has been a boom in natural-resource-
based exports from Latin America to Asia and, in particular, to China. 
The demand for commodities in these markets has increased on an 
unprecedented scale. This trend is part of a geographic shift in global 
economic interdependencies. Latin America’s agro-industrial sector, is 
not simply returning to a traditional tropical-commodities export pattern 
(although the demand for these products is certainly booming), but is 
experiencing a fundamental paradigm shift which began in the 1970s 
under the influence of the first Asian giant: Japan.1 
1 In 1973, the Nixon Administration imposed an embargo on soy exports to protect 
domestic demand. In response, Japan, which at that time depended entirely on supplies 
from the United States, developed a long-term cooperation plan for the promotion of an 
alternative supply base in Brazil in order to meet the demand generated by its population’s 
increasingly soy-dependent diet.
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At the same time, the main corridor of trade, investment and 
global agro-industrial value chains is shifting from a North-South to 
a South-South orientation (UNCTAD, 2006). In the global agrifood and 
agro-industrial sectors, Asian multinationals are playing an increasingly 
important role, in part thanks to the support they receive from their 
respective governments. The global agro-industrial strategy and policy 
first launched by Japan, then by the Republic of Korea and, more 
recently, by China has been motivated primarily by concerns about food 
and natural-resource security. The State’s strategic role in this effort 
goes beyond the protection of domestic markets and the promotion of 
domestic actors to encompass long-term policies on access and supply. 
At the same time, access to Asian markets has been constrained by the 
emergence and consolidation of Asian traders, while current supply 
strategies are also driven by the desire to counter the economic power 
of global Northern traders. These factors, together with the rapid growth 
of the Asian economies, have contributed to the expansion of Asian 
agrifood transnationals both in trading (Wilmar, Noble) and in product 
chains (Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group of Thailand and Salim Group 
of Indonesia). Asian firms have also attained global competitiveness in 
fermentation-based activities and associated biotechnologies (Ajinomoto, 
Yokult, Kirin, Snow Brand). 
This chapter looks into the determinants of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the Asian agrifood industry based on a literature 
review and an analysis of data on leading agrifood firms. It highlights 
the distinctive features of Asian FDI, especially in terms of the role 
of government and cultural variables. The part played by vertical 
integration strategies and natural-resource-seeking FDI strategies will 
also be discussed. The analysis then turns to general trends affecting 
Asian FDI in Latin America before focusing on the specific importance 
of FDI in agriculture, forestry and fishing and in the food and beverage 
industry. It concludes with a country review of Asian FDI in Latin 
America that takes a particularly close look at Japan and China, but that 
also includes other Asian investors.
Large-scale Asian involvement in Latin America can be divided 
into three different periods. The first started in the 1970s when Japan 
began to open up the Brazilian savannah region to soy production and 
later to horticulture. This drive included large-scale infrastructure 
projects and the development of key mineral resources. As part of this 
process, private firms moved in alongside and in synergy with broader 
cooperation programmes (e.g., Mitsui and Mitsubishi in trading, 
Campo in the promotion of agricultural production and Cenibra in the 
forestry sector). The second period was the 1990s, when Latin America 
received a wave of investment, particularly from Asian logging firms in 
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the Amazon as palm oil plantations encroached on the humid tropical 
forests of Asia. These investments were led by Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand, but China was also involved. In contrast to what occurred with 
the State-level cooperative effort to open up the savannah region, these 
investments gave rise to negotiations and conflict with civil society actors 
and to a parliamentary inquiry. A case study of Chinese investment in 
this sector in the Peruvian Amazon will be included in the discussion 
in order to shed light on the more recent dynamic of Asian investment 
in this sector. The hallmark of the third period is recent investment in 
biofuels and the food industry by capital-rich, resource-poor countries. 
While other Asian actors are certainly involved and China, in particular, 
has begun to play a strategic role in this period, the discussion will focus 
on Japan’s involvement, since it is the country that has developed the 
most systematic investment programme to date and has, in addition, 
positioned itself in relation to the controversial issue of the role of land 
acquisitions in such investments. 
Many of the studies that have been done on the internationalization 
of agrifood markets have focused on the interrelated dynamics of trade 
and FDI and, in particular, on the conditions under which one or the 
other strategy has tended to prevail and the complementarities between 
the two. These studies have drawn heavily upon Dunning ś eclectic 
model, with its mix of ownership, location advantages and internalization 
variables (Rama and Wilkinson, 2008). This type of analysis has proved 
to be useful when considering the strategies used by individual firms, 
but current globalization trends involving complex interdependencies 
across different activities and geographic locations have shifted the unit 
of analysis from individual firms to value chains, clusters and global 
production networks. In this context, key questions revolve around 
opportunities for dynamic re-positioning within the value chain and the 
challenges that this poses, as well as around the dangers of a negative 
lock-in, especially for those actors and countries whose initial entry into 
these activities was based on natural-resource advantages. 
These questions have been widely studied in Latin America in 
the wake of the move away from import-substitution growth strategies 
(Pietrobello and Rabelotti, 2003). Initially, hopes were pinned on the East 
Asia model based on light manufacturing and subsequent upgrading. 
After a decade of structural reforms, however, it became apparent that 
few Latin American countries had succeeded in shifting away from 
natural-resource-based activities. The focus then turned to the potential of 
development strategies that build upon natural-resource competitiveness. 
The examples of resource-rich countries in widely differing contexts 
—Australia, Canada and the Nordic countries— suggest that effective 
development strategies based on diversification across activities involving 
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natural-resource advantages are possible (Lederman and Maloney, 2007). 
In agriculture, the discussion has focused on the opportunities opened 
up by the shift from traditional tropical commodities to “non-traditional 
exports” that fit in with emerging demand patterns in the Northern 
countries, in which fresh products, particularly horticulture and seafood, 
play a prominent role. 
Asia’s involvement in Latin America’s agro-industrial value chains 
raises the issue of the role of State policy.2 A number of Asian countries 
are concerned with food security, renewable energy and broader access 
to natural resources. In Japan, this has led to the development of a long-
term cooperation programme that has helped private-sector investment 
to step in as public programmes reach maturity. Cooperation was 
initially directed towards traditional commodity exports, but now 
also involves technology transfers focusing on upstream value-
added activities. Examples include Japan’s role in opening up Brazil’s 
savannah region to soy production and its recent entry into biofuels 
in Brazil, as well as the cooperation programme launched by Japan, 
Brazil and Mozambique for the development of the latter’s large 
savannah regions.
A. Asian transnational agrifood corporations 
This section reviews the literature dealing with Asian transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in the agrifood sector in order to shed light on the 
motivating forces and the modus operandi of these firms, as well as their 
potential role as sources of FDI in Latin American agro-industries.3
1. Investment, trade and trade agreements between 
Asia and Latin America
The first major event to have an impact on trade and investment 
relations between Latin America and Asia was probably the pilfering of 
rubber plants from the Brazilian Amazon so that rubber production could 
be relocated to Indonesia and Malaysia. Within a few decades, Brazilian 
rubber production went into decline, and Asian plantations became the 
main sources of global supply. A few decades later, the recruitment of 
2 So far, most of the literature on value chains has focused on private forms of governance 
or coordination, on the shift in global value chains from a producer- to a buyer-driven 
dynamic and on the different modalities for coordination, which open up different 
development opportunities (Gereffi, Sturgeon and Humphrey, 2005).
3 For the purposes of this discussion, agro-industries are defined as including agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry, aquaculture, silviculture, bioenergy industries and food-processing and 
food and beverage industries.
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Japanese workers to work on the São Paulo coffee plantations opened the 
way for the establishment of a Japanese presence in Brazil’s agricultural 
sector. Japanese farmers played a decisive role in the development of 
horticulture and the promotion of cooperative forms of organization, and 
they proved to be key players in the Japanese cooperation programmes 
that helped to open up the Brazilian savannah region.
While Japan and the Republic of Korea are highly dependent 
on food and fibre imports, this is not the case for other parts of Asia. 
Thailand, for example, now competes with the Southern Cone as a white 
meats exporter, is a major rice exporter and has been a key supplier of 
feedstock to Europe. Malaysia and Indonesia have huge forestlands and 
are world leaders in the palm oil market. India and China, for their part, 
have vibrant agricultural sectors which have allowed them to achieve 
high levels of self-sufficiency and, particularly in the case of China, to 
become large-scale exporters as well. Nevertheless, these two countries 
have become major importers of specific crops, with India buying up 
large volumes of sugar for circumstantial reasons and China importing, 
as a result of structural conditions, large quantities of soy, pulp and other 
items whose production requires large inputs of land and water. Import-
dependent countries have largely sourced their demand from within 
Asia, which also includes the agro-industrial powerhouses of Australia 
and New Zealand. The main source of extraregional trade has been 
the United States.
Until the rise of China, the main Asian food importers were Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. In 2000, Japan’s total food imports amounted 
to US$ 50 billion, as against a mere US$ 2.3 billion of food exports. These 
imports were mostly supplied by subsidiaries of Japanese multinationals. 
Unlike European and United States subsidiaries, for which the home 
market has often been the principal attraction, Japanese FDI has largely 
focused on the development of offshore production for the Japanese 
market. Only 22% of the total sales of Japanese food subsidiaries overseas 
were in the host market. In 1970, Australia was the leading exporter to 
Japan, followed by the United States, Taiwan Province of China, China 
and Thailand. By the turn of the millennium, the United States was first, 
followed by China, Taiwan Province of China, Australia and Thailand 
(Wilkinson, 2004).
The Republic of Korea’s levels of food self-sufficiency (30%) and 
dependence on imports are similar to Japan’s, although its population is 
much smaller. Like Japan, the Republic of Korea has traditionally been 
heavily dependent on the United States for a range of products (maize, 
meat, wheat, soybean meal and cotton), while its remaining imports have 
been supplied regionally. In recent years, two developments have led to 
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changes in this import profile. On the one hand, like Japan, the Republic 
of Korea has boosted its imports of soy from the MERCOSUR countries, 
and its imports from the European Union have shifted to increasingly 
processed products. By the turn of the millennium, both Japan and the 
Republic of Korea were converging with the developed countries in terms 
of their food consumption patterns. This has heightened their trade 
dependence on the European Union and the United States, whose share in 
those countries’ total trade in processed foods has been climbing since the 
1980s and now stands at 75% of total trade in that category. 
At the same time, the share of developing countries’ total 
agricultural commodity exports that were sold to other developing 
countries rose from 31% to 44% between 1985-1990 and 1996-2000 (FAO, 
2004). Most of this increase, however, was accounted for by the upswing 
in intraregional trade triggered by the establishment of regional trade 
agreements as part of these countries’ adoption of structural reforms 
(UNCTAD, 2006).
2. Emerging-market transnational corporations
Are TNCs based in emerging Asian markets different from Triad-
based TNCs? As noted by Sim (2007): “theories and explanations on 
the internationalization (or expansion across national boundaries) of 
firms were largely based on Western MNEs.” Burch and Goss (2005) 
endorse this point of view. They argue that most of the current literature 
characterizes globalization as a process driven by large corporations 
based in the Triad,4 a view which fails to consider TNCs based in 
developing countries. Even less research has been done on the role 
of agrifood TNCs based in such countries, in spite of their significant 
regional and even international operations. Ranked by foreign assets 
in millions of United States dollars as of 2007, data compiled by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 
2009) show that 10 of the world’s 25 largest TNCs based on agriculture 
and plantations were from developing Asia in 2007, with the Malaysian 
Sime Darby Berhad company ranking first (total assets amounting to 
US$ 10.9 billion, of which US$ 4.7 billion were foreign assets). By the 
same token, 8 of the world’s 50 largest food and beverage TNCs were 
based in developing Asia. 
Banalieva and Sarathy (2006) characterize TNCs based in emerging 
markets as follows: (i) they are latecomers to internationalization; 
(ii) they suffer from significant competitive disadvantages as compared 
4 The “Triad” refers to Europe, Japan and the United States.
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to Triad-based TNCs; (iii) they may face institutional constraints (e.g., 
inefficient justice systems) in their home countries that may increase 
the risks and costs of doing business; and (iv) they may suffer from a 
home-region disadvantage, since their neighbours are often very poor 
nations (Banalieva and Sarathy). On the other hand, however, emerging-
market TNCs often enjoy advantages such as access to low-cost natural 
resources and labour in their home country and government support for 
their internationalization strategies.
The three main factors which may account for the behaviour 
of Asian agrifood TNCs are the role of government, the role of cultural 
linkages and the role of vertical integration.
3. The role of government
The so-called “Western theories” regarding TNCs have neglected 
the role played by government support, which, in some Asian economies 
(Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand), has 
made a major contribution to the success of companies based in those 
countries (Sim, 2007). Emerging in an influential institutional context, 
in the 1980s and 1990s Chinese outward FDI was largely driven by the 
government’s attempts to ensure a stable supply of domestically scarce 
natural resources (Buckley and others, 2007). In their case studies of two 
large agrifood TNCs (the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group of Thailand 
and the Salim Group of Indonesia), Burch and Gross (2005) emphasize 
these companies’ close ties to the State and the political system as a 
major reason for their successful international expansion. Luo and Tung 
(2007) also consider that home-government support for companies’ 
internationalization campaigns is characteristic of TNCs based in 
emerging economies such as Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, a 
hefty share of China’s outward investment is accounted for by State-
owned enterprises, since private firms were not allowed to go global 
prior to 2003.5 The Chinese government may also influence the amount 
and location of FDI, especially when the project involves the supply of 
domestically scarce natural resources (Buckley and others, 2007). As 
noted by these authors, China has “built” some of its TNCs, as have 
Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia. State-owned or State-
associated firms, they argue, may obtain capital at below-market rates. 
Capital-market imperfections “may account for the ease with which both 
natural-resource FDI (typically in energy and raw materials) and strategic 
5 In 2005, 81% of Chinese outward FDI stock was still in the hands of State-owned companies. 
See Nicolas and Thomsen, 2008, “The rise of Chinese firms in Europe: Motives, strategies 
and implications.” in Asia Pacific Economics Association Conference, Beijing.
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asset-seeking FDI might be undertaken by Chinese MNEs” (Buckley and 
others, 2007, p. 502). Based on previous research, these authors point to 
some key sectors, such as timber, fisheries and agriculture, where this 
may occur.
Though the State continues to play a substantial role, things may 
be changing in China. Since October 2004, under the policy espoused by 
the National Development and Reform Commission, Chinese firms that 
are going global are empowered to make their own investment decisions 
(Nicolas and Thomsen, 2008). Local governments have been given more 
authority than in the past, while the central government is seen to be 
simply a guide and a service provider. According to these authors, the 
ownership structure of Chinese State-owned firms is also changing as 
new types of shareholders, such as township firms, private firms and 
even foreign TNCs, play an increasingly important role. 
4. The role of cultural linkages
As predicted by theories of international corporate expansion 
such as those put forward by the Uppsala school of thought, cultural 
aspects have been an essential factor in the spread of Asian TNCs (Sim, 
2007). Chinese social and ethnic networks, for example, play a key role 
in this sort of expansion, especially in the case of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Augustin-Jean (2006) emphasizes the role of 
common values, trust, networks, social capital, and ethnic and cultural 
ties in the expansion of Japanese agrifood firms in China. The Japanese 
companies build strategic alliances with “overseas Chinese” in order to 
better understand the dietary preferences of Chinese consumers. The 
internationalization strategies of South-East Asian and Taiwanese firms 
have also often been founded on cost-based competencies and other 
location-based advantages, all of which are brought together within 
an extensive web of ethnic networks. As will be seen below, cultural 
linkages and ethnic networks have also played some role in the spread 
of Chinese and Korean companies in Latin America, especially in the 
case of SMEs.
5. The role of vertical integration
The capacity to integrate vertically along the entire commodity 
chain “in a way that no Western agrifood multinational has been able to 
do” is key to an understanding of the regional and global expansion of 
large South-East Asian agrifood TNCs (Burch and Goss, 2005, p. 277). In 
these authors’ opinion, vertical integration has enabled these companies 
to avoid the types of conflicts that have marked the relationship between 
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the food processing industry and retailers in Western countries. The use 
of conglomerates as a tool for penetrating foreign markets also seems to 
have been of crucial importance for some Japanese agrifood companies 
(Agustin-Jean, 2006). Other studies seem to confirm the idea that vertical 
integration plays some role in the successful growth of Asian agrifood 
companies. Analysing four Asian TNCs, Sim (2007) notices that they have 
mainly relied on cost advantages and have moved vertically along the 
food chain towards food processing, packaging and retailing. At the same 
time, they have also attempted to create their own brand names. These 
studies seem to suggest that the internalization of markets (i.e., the use 
of internalization or “I” advantages, in Dunning’s (2000; 1980) eclectic 
paradigm) is a salient feature of Asian TNCs which may help to account 
for their successful international expansion.6
Another I advantage of Asian agrifood conglomerates could be the 
internalization of financial markets (Buckley and others, 2007).7 Asian 
conglomerates, these authors argue, may operate an inefficient internal 
capital market which can subsidize FDI. Market imperfections may 
become ownership advantages for firms based in emerging markets. This 
strategy may also be adopted by smaller Asian firms; for instance, family-
owned companies are able to gain access to cheap capital from family 
members. As will be seen below, SMEs have played a role in FDI in Latin 
American agrifood industries. While in early versions of the theory of 
international production, vertical integration was viewed as a monopoly 
device for providing extra profits, in more recent works this strategy 
is regarded as a competitive weapon used by integrated firms against 
non-integrated ones (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). In short, support 
from home-country governments, cultural linkages and internalization 
strategies may have contributed to the successful internationalization of 
some Asian agrifood companies. 
As institutional, cultural and corporate embeddedness may have 
greatly contributed to the international expansion of Asian agrifood 
TNCs, it stands to reason that Latin American governments should 
adopt two types of policies to attract those companies. First, they need 
to adopt a proactive role vis-à-vis such investments (much more so than 
6 In Dunning’s eclectic OLI paradigm, the likelihood that an enterprise will engage in 
international production depends on its O (ownership) advantages, such as brand 
names, the L (location) advantages of different countries and the I (internalization) 
advantages which enable a company to internalize imperfect (e.g., technology) markets.
7 Vertical integration with agricultural or retailing activities is a strategy in decline among 
large Western food and beverage TNCs (Rama, 1992; 1998). Integration with agricultural 
activities and foreign trade was an important strategy for British and United States 
agrifood firms in the early stages of their internationalization, however (Stopford and 
Dunning, 1983). 
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in the case of Triad-based investments, which, generally speaking, are 
not especially encouraged or guided by home-country governments). 
Second, they need to improve the domestic institutional environment. 
TNCs based in developing Asian economies will be more attracted to 
those Latin American countries which can offer stable rules of the game 
with regard to FDI and an institutional environment that is conducive 
to doing business (e.g., independent and rapid court settlements). These 
firms may be faced with institutional constraints in their home countries 
(Banalieva and Sarathy, 2006). 
6. Is outward Asian FDI resource-seeking?
It has often been claimed that outward Asian FDI is resource-
seeking, as Japan is one of the world’s largest food importers. However, 
current Japanese food-security policy is less based on self-sufficiency than 
on the control of imports by Japanese companies and the diversification of 
suppliers (Agustin-Jean, 2006). Nowadays, self-sufficiency is the objective 
only in the case of certain staples, such as rice.
The nature of Asian FDI has been examined in several empirical 
studies. Fung and others (2009) use data for four Asian countries to test 
the hypothesis that outward Asian FDI is resource-seeking. One variable 
in their econometric model refers to the host country’s agricultural 
resources, proxied by the share of its food exports in its total exports. 
Their hypothesis that Asian FDI is driven by the availability of food 
resources in host countries holds for Japan and the Republic of Korea 
but does not hold up for Taiwan Province of China, which mainly 
invests in economies that do not have particularly large endowments of 
food resources.8 Finally, they found that firms based in China tend to 
invest in countries that are rich in agricultural resources, although great 
geographic distances seem to be a deterrent for them. Even within the 
same national group, Asian agrifood TNCs may use widely differing 
market strategies, and not all of them target the home market (Augustin-
Jean, 2006).
Asian investors’ motivations may have changed over time. Securing 
natural resources and acquiring raw materials may have become less 
important reasons to internationalize than they once were (Fung and 
others, 2009). According to this study, developing local markets and 
utilizing local labour have become much more powerful reasons for the 
internationalization of Korean companies.
8 Other variables in their model include the GDP of the home and host economies and the 
physical distance between the home country and the host country.
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Finally, the business cycle may have some influence on the types 
of FDI undertaken by Asian agrifood investors. According to UNCTAD 
(2009, p. 88), “the global financial crisis could to some extent promote more 
natural-resource-seeking investments by Asian firms”, a circumstance 
which may be making Latin America more attractive to such companies. 
Second, according to this same source, Chinese and Indian companies 
may be drawn to acquire devalued assets, brand names and distribution 
networks that may be currently available. This strategy may stimulate 
FDI in the food and beverage industry and in retailing. However, 
according to the report, such investors are more likely to target developed 
economies. This would seem to support the view that companies based 
in emerging markets, such as China and India, are seeking to acquire 
foreign technology and brands through internationalization as a means 
of compensating for their insufficient resource endowments. Luo and 
Tung (2007) argue that there is a key difference between TNCs based in 
newly industrializing economies (NIEs) and TNCs based in emerging 
markets: while the former have been driven by “push” factors, such 
as appreciating currencies and escalating costs at home, the latter are 
driven by “pull” factors, such as the need to secure critical resources and 
new technology. 
A final target for resource-seeking Asian FDI is often the home 
market. The fact that Japanese consumers expect food supplies to 
meet very high quality and safety standards (Rama, 1992) could pose 
a challenge to Latin American countries that aim to attract Japanese 
investment in agrifood industries as a means of expanding their 
agrifood exports. However, some Asian resource-seeking companies 
have broadened the geographic scope of their objectives, as illustrated 
by some of the Japanese agrifood companies which operate in China 
(Agustin-Jean, 2006). The Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group of Thailand 
has invested in China not only to serve the local market for value-
added agrifood products, but also to take advantage of low costs there 
to produce agrifood products for export to Japan and other international 
markets (Burch and Goss, 2005). One typology of TNCs from emerging 
markets classifies CP as a “world stage aspirant” which has not yet 
acquired the size and scope of the largest TNCs in this sector but which, 
nevertheless, has a great potential for global competition in areas where 
cost advantages are critical (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
As noted earlier, some Asian agrifood TNCs also target the host-
country market. Japanese agrifood investors located in the Shanghai 
region and in southern China target both the urban markets of the host 
country and their home market (Agustin-Jean, 2006). The methods of 
governance adopted by these Japanese TNCs for these two markets differ, 
however. According to this study, Japanese investors remain in control 
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of food supplies to their home country, but often need to collaborate 
with Western firms and with regional investors (e.g., Taiwanese firms) 
in their food and beverage processing and distribution activities in the 
host-country market. Alliances with “overseas Chinese”, who are more 
aware of local dietary preferences, and with local institutions and State-
run enterprises are also important parts of the strategy used by Japanese 
investors in Chinese agrifood industries. These examples suggest that 
there may be a potential for domestic companies to partner with Asian 
agrifood investors in order to meet local demand in Latin American 
countries. The possibility of setting up joint ventures with local partners 
is already being explored by the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) as an additional attraction for Japanese investors willing 
to invest in Latin America (Girado, 1999).
B. FDI trends worldwide and in Latin America
1. FDI in agriculture, forestry and fishing
Global inward FDI flows in agriculture, forestry and fishing have 
expanded rapidly, jumping from US$ 721 million in 1990-1992 to US$ 6.3 
billion in 2008-2010, with more than US$ 5 billion of that amount being 
directed towards developing economies. The inward flows for this sector 
continue to account for no more than a tiny share of total global FDI 
inflows, however (0.4% in 2008-2010) (UNCTAD, 2012). 
From 1990 to 2010, inward FDI stock in this sector increased from 
US$ 8.5 billion to US$  55.7  billion (see table I.1). In spite of this recent 
growth trend, however, it accounted for only 0.3% of total inward stock 
in 2010. During this period, there was a switchover in the relative levels 
of inward FDI stock in developed and developing economies since, for the 
first time, developing nations received more investment (US$ 34.8 billion) 
than developed nations did (US$ 17.5 billion).9 UNCTAD attributes this 
situation to the availability of land and the importance of agriculture in 
developing nations. According to this source, FDI in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing represents a fairly large proportion of total inward FDI in 
several developing countries of Asia and Africa; however, the only Latin 
American country reported to be in this position is Ecuador, although 
Paraguay’s food and beverage industry has also received a relatively large 
share of agricultural FDI.
9 The remaining US$ 3.4 billion were invested in south-eastern European and other 
transition economies.
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Table I.1 
ESTIMATED INWARD FDI STOCK WORLDWIDE, BY SECTOR AND 
INDUSTRY, 1990 AND 2010













































854 899 3 499 677 
(71.4%)
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Source: UNCTAD, author’s calculations on data from Web table 24. Estimated world inward FDI stock, 
by sector and industry, 1990 and 2010.
Note: Data should be interpreted with caution. The world total was extrapolated on the basis of data 
covering 57 countries in 1990 and 97 countries in 2010, or latest year available. They account for over 
four-fifths of world inward FDI stock in 1990 and 2010. Only countries for which data for the three 
main sectors were available were included. The distribution share of each industry of these countries 
was applied to estimate the world total in each sector and industry. As a result, the sum of the sectors 
for each group of economies is different from the totals shown in annex table 3. In the case of some 
countries where only approval data were available, the actual data was estimated by applying the 
implementation ratio of realized FDI to approved FDI to the latter (19% in 2007 for China, 15% in 1997 for 
Indonesia, 56% in 1994 for Japan, 10% in 1990 and 8% in 1999 for Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
91% in 2010 for Mongolia, 9% in 1990 and 34% in 2005 for Myanmar, 41% in 1990 and 35% in 1999 
for Nepal, 62% in 1995 for Sri Lanka, 73% in 1990 and 58% in 2010 for Taiwan Province of China). The 
world total in 1990 includes the transition economies, although data by sector and industry are not 
available for that region.
Most outward FDI stock in this sector came from developed 
countries both in 1990 and 2010, though their share sharply decreased 
during the period (see table I.2). The increasingly important role 
played by investors based in developing countries is attributable to 
the presence of investors from China, the Republic of Korea and the 
Gulf States in Africa, Pakistan and some transition countries. Data on 
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Source: UNCTAD. Author’s calculations on data from Web table 24. Estimated world outward FDI stock, 
by sector and industry, 1990 and 2010.
Note: Data should be interpreted with caution. The world total was extrapolated on the basis of data 
covering 29 countries in 1990 and 55 countries in 2010, or latest year available. They account for 82% 
and 92% of world outward FDI stock, respectively, in 1990 and in 2010. Only countries for which data 
for the three main sectors were available were included. The distribution share of each industry of these 
countries was applied to estimate the world total in each sector and industry. Approval data were used for 
India (2005 instead of 2010) and Taiwan Province of China. For 1990, the world total includes the transition 
economies although data by sector and industry are not available for that region. Moreover, as major 
home developing economies were not covered due to lack of data, the respective shares for developing 
economies were underestimated in that year.
Table I.3 displays data on inward FDI flows and stock in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing by income group. The share of FDI infows for 
developed economies fell from 6.9% to 1.2%, in 2002-2007, then increased 
to 8.4% in 2008-2010. At the same time, the share of transition economies 
fluctuated between 3.9% at the beginning of the period (2002-2004) to 
9.3% by 2005-2007 and 8.8% in 2008-2010. During 2002-2007 the share of 
developing economies in inward FDI flows was stable at about 89% of 
global flows. However, at the end of the period, these economies’ share rose 
strongly to 8.4% at the expense of the developing economies, which saw 
their share in total FDI inflows in agriculture fall to 82.8%. Within Latin 
America, Brazil is by far the largest recipient of FDI, with inflows climbing 
from US$ 153 million in 2002-2004 to US$ 421 million in 2005-2007. Chile, 
Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Peru also receive substantial FDI 
inflows. Foreign investors have been attracted by the business potential in 
Latin America of products such as cereals, soybeans, sugar cane, fruits, cut 
flowers, meat and poultry. Some projects in the sugar-cane industry are 
oriented towards the production of biofuels (UNCTAD, 2009).
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Table I.3 
INWARD FDI IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING, VARIOUS YEARS a
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Host region/
economy
Millions of dollars Percentage share in total













World 2 287 3 328 6 290 18 970 32 010 55 688 100 100 100 100 100 100
Developed 
economies 157 39 529 6 695 11 830 17 468 7 1 8 35 37 31
Transition 
economies 89 309 552 297 2 183 3 431 4 9 9 2 7 6
Developing 
economies 2 041 2 980 5 208 11 978 17 997 34 789 89 90 83 63 56 62
Latin America:
Brazil 153 421 - 392 384 - 7 13 - 2 1 -
Chile 5 50 - 790 950 - 0 2 - 4 3 -
Ecuador 46 32 - - - - 2 1 - - - -
Honduras 49 36 - - - - 2 1 - - - -
Mexico 42 31 - - - - 2 1 - - - -
Source: UNCTAD. Authors’calculations based on data from World Investment Report, 2009, 2012; “Web 
table 24. Estimated world inward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990 and 2010”, and “Web table 26. 
Estimated world inward FDI ows, by sector and industry, 1990-1992 and 2008-2010”.
a Including the hunting industry.
b Or closest year available.
c Or latest year available.
Note: The world totals, as well as totals for developed economies, developing economies and south-
eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, were extrapolated from data for countries 
for which detailed statistics on FDI in agriculture were available. The coverage of the available data was as 
follows: about 100 countries for inward ows, accounting for over 90% of inward FDI ows worldwide, and 
around 90 countries for inward stock, accounting for over 85% of FDI inward stock worldwide. Data should 
be interpreted with caution. The world total was extrapolated on the basis of data covering 57 countries 
in 1990 and 97 countries in 2010, or latest year available. They account for over four-fths of world inward 
FDI stock in 1990 and 2010. Only countries for which data for the three main sectors were available were 
included. The distribution share of each industry of these countries was applied to estimate the world total 
in each sector and industry. As a result, the sum of the sectors for each group of economies is different 
from the totals shown in annex table 3. In the case of some countries where only approval data were 
available, the actual data was estimated by applying the implementation ratio of realized FDI to approved 
FDI to the latter (19% in 2007 for China, 15% in 1997 for Indonesia, 56% in 1994 for Japan, 10% in 1990 
and 8% in 1999 for Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 91% in 2010 for Mongolia, 9% in 1990 and 34% 
in 2005 for Myanmar, 41% in 1990 and 35% in 1999 for Nepal, 62% in 1995 for Sri Lanka, 73% in 1990 
and 58% in 2010 for Taiwan Province of China). The world total in 1990 includes the transition economies, 
although data by sector and industry are not available for that region. Data should be interpreted with 
caution. The world total was extrapolated on the basis of data covering 79 countries in 1990-1992 and 113 
countries in 2008-2010, or the latest three-year period average available. They account for 83 and 90 per 
cent of world inward FDI ows respectively in the periods 1990-1992 and 2008-2010. Only countries for 
which data for the three main sectors were available were included. The distribution share of each industry 
of these countries was applied to estimate the world total in each sector and industry. As a result, the sum 
of the sectors for each group of economies is different from the totals shown in annex table 1. Approval 
data were used for the Islamic Republic of Iran (1994-1996 instead of 1990-1992 and 2002-2003 instead of 
2008-2010), Jordan (2001-2003 instead of 2008-2010) and Mongolia (1991-1993 instead of 1990-1992). In 
the case of some countries, the actual data was estimated by applying the implementation ratio of realized 
FDI to approved FDI to the latter : Bulgaria (54% in 1992-1994), China (25% in 1990-1992), Indonesia (16% 
in 1990-1992), Islamic Republic of Iran (8% in 1994-1996), Japan (51% in 1990-1992), Kenya (7% in 1992-
1994), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (1% in 1990-1992), 
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The relative position of developing countries as source countries for 
investment in agriculture and related primary industries has also changed, 
and outward FDI flows have therefore also undergone considerable 
changes in recent years. Outward FDI flows from developing countries, 
which had amounted to only US$ 45 million in 1989-1991, reached US$ 495 
million in 2005-2007: an amount comparable, for the first time ever, to the 
FDI originating in developed nations (US$ 599 million). 
The UNCTAD report (2009) lists a group of Asian companies among 
the top 25 TNCs in agribusiness industries in 2007. These firms include, 
in decreasing order of the level of parent-company assets: Sime Darbi Bhd 
(Malaysia), which has invested in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Africa 
and the Middle East; Charoen Popkhand Foods Public Company Ltd. 
(Thailand), which has chiefly invested in China and other Asian countries; 
Kuala Lumpur Kapong Bhd (Malaysia), which has expanded its operations 
into other Asian countries and Europe; Kulim (Malaysia) Bhd, which has 
mainly invested in Singapore, Brunei and the Salomon Islands; PPB Group 
(Malaysia), which has businesses in China, India and Indonesia, in addition 
to its home country; Carsons and Cumberbatch PLC (Sri Lanka), which owns 
plantations in Malaysia and Indonesia, in addition to a joint venture with 
Carlsberg, a Danish brewer, in India; THS resources (Malaysia), which is 
involved in the production of vegetable oil and cocoa and owns plantations 
in Indonesia, as well as exporting to several other countries (e.g., a number 
of European countries, the Russian Federation, Egypt); Multi Vest Resources 
Bhd (Malaysia), which owns plantations and is involved in the production 
of palm oil both in its home-country market and in Indonesia; and Karuturi 
Global Ltd. (India), which owns greenhouses (for floriculture) in several 
African countries. As far as is known, none of these firms has yet invested 
in Latin America.10 By contrast, a number of Indian agrochemical TNCs have 
invested in Argentina, Brazil and Peru (Nazareth, 2011).
2. FDI in the food and beverage processing industry
Between 1990 and 2007, the geographic patterns of FDI in the food 
and beverage industry also changed substantially. Inward FDI flows in 
this industry increased from US$ 7 billion in 1989-1991 to US$ 41 billion in 
2005-2007. Surprisingly, the share of developing economies fell from 33% 
of the total in 1989-1991 to only 12% in 2005-2007 owing to the steeper rise 
of inward FDI flows in developed economies; FDI trends in south-eastern 
Europe and other transition economies (Chobanova, 2007) may also have 
played some role. The inward FDI stock grew, in this industry, from 
US$ 87 billion to US$ 565 billion, while the share of developing economies 
increased from 12% of the total in 1990 to 16% in 2010 (see table I.1).
10 Information on the companies was obtained from their web pages and from secondary 
sources.
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Outward FDI flows rose from US$ 13 billion in 1989-1991 to US$ 48 
billion in 2005-2007. Evidencing the expansion of food and beverage TNCs 
based in such countries, outward FDI flows from developing economies 
increased tenfold during the period. However, the share of these countries 
in total outward FDI flows fell from 2% to 0.4% owing to the even sharper 
growth of outward FDI flows from developed nations. Regional integration 
in the European Union and the accession of new member countries in 2004 
and 2007 have led European food and beverage companies to generally 
confine their expansion plans to their own region.
As comprehensive country data for FDI stocks or flows in the food 
and beverage industry are not available, a scope measure, i.e., the location 
of the affiliates owned by major food and beverage TNCs, will be used to 
analyse the geographic patterns prevailing in this international industry. 
Unpublished information for 2002 is the most recent data available. In 2002, 
the world’s 100 largest food and beverage companies controlled around 
8,000 affiliates worldwide, of which 830 were located in Latin America. 
Map I.1 shows the geographical distribution of these affiliates, by home 
country of the parent company. A variety of European food and beverage 
investors operate in Latin America, especially in the dairy industry. 
Companies operating in this subsector include, for instance, Arla, a Danish 
TNC, and Friesland, a Dutch TNC. Danone, a French dairy producer, 
which has diversified into bottled water and other foodstuffs, has located 
its affiliates mainly in the MERCOSUR area, Mexico and Colombia. In the 
Latin American and Caribbean region, other European TNCs operate in 
lines of business such as alcoholic drinks, mineral water and sugar. Nestlé 
(Switzerland) and Unilever (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) are 
two of the big European conglomerates which control a large number of 
affiliates in a variety of Latin American markets. 
In the Latin American and Caribbean region, United States food and 
beverage TNCs mainly operate in non-alcoholic beverages, animal feed, 
pet food, grain milling, breakfast cereals, biscuits, snacks and aviculture. 
Examples include Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, two global producers of non-
alcoholic beverages which have sometimes forged alliances with Latin 
American TNCs (ECLAC, 2005). Two large United States conglomerates, 
Procter & Gamble and Sara Lee, are active in a variety of Latin American 
industrial markets, such as those for food, toiletry and household care 
products, and textiles. Regional TNCs include Latin American companies 
such as Grupo Modelo and Grupo Bimbo; both of these Mexican 
companies have expanded into South American countries. Finally, the 
“other countries” group shown in map I.1 includes companies based in 
other source nations for FDI in the food and beverage industry (e.g., South 
Africa and New Zealand).
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Map I.1 
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS IN LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN FOOD 
AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRIES, 2002


















Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AGRODATA database.
The location of afliates can also be used to gauge differences 
between the spatial behaviour and strategies adopted by foreign investors 
based in Asia and foreign investors based elsewhere. From 1974 to 2000, 
the increased presence of Japanese TNCs in the top 100 rms in this sector 
signalled a major change in this industry (Tozanli, 2005). According to 
Tozanli, the emergence of very large Japanese TNCs in this sector may 
be attributable to the changes made in international trade rules in the 
1970s and 1980s, since the new international norms prompted Japanese 
companies to go global for the rst time. As one example of how this 
new strategy worked, she cites the investments made by Japanese 
shing companies in Latin America to bypass the provision in the 1974 
International Law of the Sea which had changed the limits of national 
territorial waters, thereby making it necessary for these companies to 
establish afliates in the region if they wished to continue to sh there.
Map I.2 illustrates the geographical distribution of the afliates 
of major Asian TNCs in the food and beverage industry. In the top 100, 
the only Asian investors which operate in Latin America are Japanese 
companies; most of the foreign affiliates of these companies are positioned 
in China and the United States, however. 
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Map I.2 
MAJOR ASIAN TNCs IN THE FOOD AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRY: DISTRIBUTION 
OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC AFFILIATES, 2002









Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AGRODATA database.
C. Country analysis
1. Japan
Japanese FDI in electronics and motor vehicles has been analysed 
extensively, but the subject of Japanese FDI in agrifood industries has been 
somewhat neglected (Agustin-Jean, 2006). Nevertheless, these investments 
are far from negligible. The Japanese Ministry of Finance reports that, in 
1989-1994, 1,229 Japanese investments totalling ¥528.1 billion were made 
worldwide in agriculture, sheries, lumber and pulp, and food processing. 
As shown in table I.3, the value of investment projects, especially those in 
the food sector, rose quickly between 1989-1994 and 1995-1999. However, 
in 2000-2004, the number of investments fell to 282, with a total value of 
¥535.9 billion. The reduction in the number of projects and the relative 
stability of the value of foreign investments over such a long period of 
time conrm the occurrence of an atypical retreat on the part of Japanese 
agrifood companies (as compared with their Western counterparts) from 
international markets. For Japanese investors operating in this group of 
industries, the most active ones, in descending order of the value of their 
foreign investments, are food, lumber and pulp. 
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Confirming the information supplied by the affiliate data used to 
construct map I.2, statistics on investment values show that, although 
Latin American nations are not among the main host countries, they 
have been receiving substantially larger volumes of Japanese investment. 
The share of these investments entering the region rose from just 13% 
of the total in 1989-1994 to nearly 28% of total Japanese investment in 
agrifood industries in 2000-2004. As mentioned above, in terms of the 
value of investment projects, the food industry generally receives 
the most investment funds. Most of these Japanese food-industry 
investment projects are undertaken in Asia, however, and, in the case 
of Latin America, the largest recipient industry, both in 1989-1994 and in 
2000-2004, was lumber and pulp. In Latin America, Japanese investments 
in farming and forestry, which were the second-highest in 1989-2004, had 
declined somewhat by the second half of this period. The average value 
of projects, by year, fell from ¥3.92 billion in 1980-1994, to ¥ 940 million 
in 1995-1999 and to only ¥ 340 million in 2000-2004. On the whole, these 
trends may reflect the favourable effect of the new laws adopted in 
the region concerning investment in the forestry sector (Girado, 1999). 
Japanese investors seem to be quite interested in the high-value-added 
segment of the lumber/wood chain and, to a lesser extent, in its low-
value-added segment (forestry). At the level of host countries, these 
Japanese investments may be of considerable significance. For instance, 
in the 1990s, the sectors receiving the most Japanese investment in 
Argentina were, after motor vehicles, pulp and wood, while, in Chile, 
after mining, they were fishing and forestry (Girado, 1999).
Japanese investment in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region’s food industry grew rapidly, rising, from just ¥8.2 billion in 
1989-1994 to ¥56.1billion in 2000-2004. The size of the enlarged 
supranational MERCOSUR market and increased demand for processed 
food in some Latin American nations, such as Brazil, may have helped 
to boost the level of these Japanese investments in the region (Farina and 
Viegas, 2005; Girado, 1999). Finally, investment in fisheries, which had 
declined in relative terms in 1995-1999, had recovered somewhat by the end 
of the period. Girado (1999) reports, for instance, that Japanese investments 
in salmon production in Chile and in other fisheries in Argentina are 
resource-seeking investments because they are aimed at supplying the 
home market. In this respect, the relative position of Latin America needs 
to be examined in the light of the changes taking place in the geography 
of specific Japanese industries. (For instance, Oceania has now become the 
most important site for Japanese fishery projects (see table I.4)). 
According to data from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Brazil’s 
food manufacturing industry, followed by Chile’s farming and forestry 
sector, were the two Latin American markets that received the largest 
amounts of Japanese outward investment in agrifood industries in 2004.
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Table I.4 
JAPANESE OUTWARD FDI IN AGRIFOOD INDUSTRIES, BY REGION, 
1989-1994 TO 2000-2004
(Number of investment projects and 100 million Japanese yen)
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 676 6 839 300 20 592 182 3 241
Lumber and pulp 363 2 721 146 2 482 47 1 536
Farming and forestry 324 1 233 69 513 31 303
Fisheries 196 644 89 352 22 279
                             North America
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 198 2 697 89 4 275 50 873
Lumber and pulp 85 1 671 25 1 396 5 50
Farming and forestry 50 229 8 162 3 24
Fisheries 16 62 2 6 4 73
                              Latin America
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 13 82 15 371 9 561
Lumber and pulp 11 250 2 5 2 854
Farming and forestry 59 235 11 47 3 17
Fisheries 15 71 7 38 5 60
                                Asia
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 344 1 649 150 1 287 104 1 591
Lumber and pulp 200 464 85 743 26 438
Farming and forestry 116 174 18 77 6 131
Fisheries 115 371 64 259 9 34
                                Europe
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 61 763 25 13 348 12 126
Lumber and pulp 29 175 15 147 10 93
Farming and forestry 20 88 5 17 2 41
Fisheries 18 44 4 3 2 3
                               Africa
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 2 2 2 139 2 2
Lumber and pulp 4 2 2 2 2 2
Farming and forestry 2 2 5 115 2 2
Fisheries 12 51 7 17 3 12
                               Oceania
1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value
Food 60 1 650 20 1 174 7 90
Lumber and pulp 36 160 20 191 5 103
Farming and forestry 79 506 24 97 20 93
Fisheries 21 47 7 32 4 101
Source: Author’s calculations based on information from the Ministry of Finance, Japan.
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 The latest available data on outward FDI are for 2004. The figures 
indicate that Latin America is not a priority area for Japanese agribusiness, 
with lumber and pulp, followed by food, appearing to be the most attractive 
regional agribusinesses for Japanese investors. 
Data at the affiliate level on major Japanese food and beverage 
processors also seem to confirm that Latin America is not a priority 
destination for Japanese investors in the agrifood sector. A study focusing 
on the top 100 firms reports that, of the total number of affiliates of very 
large Japanese companies in 1996-2000, 68% were in Asia (home country 
included), 12% in North America (United States and Canada), 10.4% in the 
European Union and only 4% in Latin America (with the rest being scattered 
over the other world regions). Moreover, the share of Latin American 
affiliates fell between 1996 and 2000 (Filippaios and Rama, 2008).11 
The largest Japanese companies which operated in the Latin 
American food and beverage industry in 2007 have all invested in affiliates 
which produce locally and are therefore more than just sales offices. With 
the exception of Suntory, which has diversified into non-food products, the 
remaining companies focus on agrifoods. These companies work in a variety 
of agrifood product lines, such as alcoholic beverages, fish, seafood and 
others. They are relatively small, compared to their Western counterparts, 
but they have been growing (Anastassopoulos and Rama, 2005).
Japanese agrifood companies have used different strategies to enter 
Latin American markets. In some cases, Japanese companies have forged 
alliances with domestic firms in order to penetrate specific types of markets. 
For instance, Suntory, a major Japanese producer of alcoholic beverages has 
partnered with ANCAP, a State-owned Uruguayan company, to produce 
whisky (Girado, 1999). In other cases, Japanese companies operating in 
Latin America have worked with groups of enterprises which sometimes 
include rival Japanese conglomerates that are coordinated by an association 
of large Japanese manufacturers; this strategy has enabled the firms to 
share the cost of penetrating distant and unknown business environments 
(Gutierrez, 1998). In contrast to the strategies used in other regions, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have not been an important entry 
mode for TNCs operating in the food and beverage industry. Tozanli (2005), 
analysing the M&A patterns of the top 100 firms, finds that Japanese TNCs 
engaged in virtually no operations of this nature in Latin America in 1987-
2002 (with such operations amounting to a total of just 1.5% of the mergers, 
minority takeovers, partnerships, and licensing and franchising agreements 
11 To put these figures into perspective, it should be noted that Latin American affiliates 
accounted, according to the study, for 9.2% of the total number of affiliates of European 
Union food and beverage TNCs and for 14.4% of North American (United States and 
Canadian) food and beverage TNCs.
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entered into by such companies).12 On the other hand, no closures of 
Japanese facilities were reported in this industry during that period in 
Latin America (or elsewhere), which contrasts with the high volatility of 
other food and beverage investments in the region (Tozanli, 2005). During 
the period in question, the author notes that major food and beverage TNCs 
sold off subsidiaries or divisions that were operating in non-core businesses 
or that were producing insufficient value. The large Japanese firms included 
in the top 100 did not, however, participate in major sell-offs, divestitures or 
spin-offs in Latin America (though Japanese companies did undertake such 
operations in North America and Oceania after 1992).
These trends are confirmed by a study on foreign TNCs in the 
Brazilian food and beverage industry which suggests that Japanese (or other 
Asian investors) did not play a central role in major M&A operations. From 
1988 to August 2001, out of 48 purchasers, only one company was based in 
the Middle East, while the rest were based in the region (Brazil included), 
the United States and Western Europe (Farina and Viegas, 2005). In sum, 
Asian investors did not play a part in the turmoil that overtook the Latin 
American food and beverage industry during that period, or, at the very 
least, do not seem to have played a leading role.
According to another study, at least part of the changes in Latin 
America’s export package of resource-based products may be attributable 
to China’s and India’s imports from the region. The gains obtained from 
the increase in resource-based Latin American exports have not been very 
widely distributed, however (Lederman and others, 2009).
In Latin America, there has also been some concern about competition 
between Asia (especially China) and Latin America for export shares in the 
United States market (Lederman and others, 2009); this may be of particular 
concern in the case of Mexican exports of manufactures (Santiso, 2006). On 
the other hand, however, Mexican exporters enjoy competitive advantages 
owing to their proximity to the United States. According to another study, 
the deterioration of the position of Latin America and the Caribbean in 
third markets relative to China and India is attributable to domestic supply 
conditions rather than to any reduction in demand for the region’s products 
as a result of China’s and India’s increasing market shares (Lederman 
and others, 2009). The study’s authors admit, however, that some specific 
subsectors and some countries (e.g., Mexico, Central America) have probably 
been negatively affected by the expanding share of Asian exports. None of 
12 It should be noted that, for these Japanese companies, the share of North American 
operations accounted for 13.4% of total operations and Western European operations 
amounted to 28.4%. In other words, very large Japanese TNCs active in food and beverage 
processing seem to have used this mode of entry to penetrate or expand in developed-
country markets, but not in Latin American markets.
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the more vulnerable Latin American manufacturing sectors is analysed in 
that study, however, apart from the furniture (timber-based) industry. 
Finally, unlike the case of other Asian agrifood investors, the 
presence of Japanese agrifood firms in the region seems, on the whole, to 
be unrelated to the presence of a Japanese immigrant population. Cultural 
embeddedness has not been the foundation for any of the main strategies 
used by Japanese companies to enter Latin American markets. An 
important exception here would be the cooperation programme launched 
for the development of soybean production in Brazil’s savannah region, 
which will be analysed below.
2. China
According to data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, that 
country’s outward (non-financial) FDI stock amounted to US$ 262 billion 
as of the end of 2010. Non-financial outward flows stood at US$ 60.1 billion, 
or 26% more than the previous year. The share of agriculture in outward 
flows and stock fell, respectively, from 5.2% and 1.9% in 2004 to just 0.7% 
and 0.8% in 2010. Though these investments increased during the period, 
investment in other sectors climbed more rapidly. According to the same 
source, there is only one agrifood company among China’s top 50 non-
financial TNCs. China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs ranks sixth 
in terms of outward FDI stock, thirteenth in terms of foreign assets and 
tenth in terms of foreign revenue.
According to official Chinese statistics, China’s FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean averaged around US$ 4 billion per year between 2003 
and 2009. Around 97% of that sum was channelled into tax havens in 
the Caribbean. If these countries are excluded, then, in 2009, the largest 
recipients in terms of outward FDI stock were the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Peru and Mexico.13 In Latin America, China has mainly 
invested in minerals, petroleum fields and coal-tar fuels (Saavedra-Rivano, 
1999), although a recent study suggests that Chinese FDI in the region is 
currently turning towards manufacturing (Nicolas and Thomsen, 2008). 
Confirming other observers’ views (see the previous section), Malamud 
(2007) suggests that, in the case of China, economic decisions are largely 
based on political and diplomatic action rather than on economics forces 
alone. According to this author, China’s main interest in Latin America 
focuses on energy, some minerals (such as copper) and soybeans.
According to Santiso (2006), Chinese investors are now following 
a similar pattern to the one followed in the 19th century by Western 
companies, since their major objectives are to obtain strategic inputs and 
to access the transport networks and port facilities they need in order 
to export products from Latin America to China. However, Santiso is 
13 Includes financial FDI stock.
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sceptical about the potential of Chinese FDI in the region and believes that 
Chinese investors, unlike their Western counterparts, will prefer formulas 
involving contracts between their State-owned enterprises and Latin 
American governments (for infrastructure projects, for example) over FDI. 
In Gutierrez’s (1998) view, China’s interest in Latin American 
agrifood production is closely related to the following home-country 
factors: a very large population; a growing demand for food; new 
patterns of consumption that include goods produced by Latin America 
(e.g. beef, coffee); rapid urbanization; and the low productivity of Chinese 
agriculture. For China, he argues, it is cheaper to purchase Latin American 
foodstuffs than to modernize the domestic agricultural sector. By the end 
of the 1990s, Daila Hua Feng Enterprises, probably the largest Chinese 
agrifood company, had invested through its affiliate Lanco Pacific 
Argentina in slaughterhouses and meat processing plants in Argentina in 
order to supply the home market. This was a joint venture with San Justo 
Corporation S.A., ThyssenKrupp (a German firm which was supposed 
to build up the meat processing facility) and a French investor. However, 
owing to very serious difficulties with the Argentine partner, which was 
sued by the Chinese TNC, the deal fell through. After this frustrated FDI 
experience, China authorized imports of Argentine beef and poultry to 
meet the growing demand generated both by its domestic market and by 
tourism. Since 2005, some 11 domestic and foreign meat processing plants 
have been authorized to operate in Argentina following inspections by 
Chinese authorities. Although the above joint venture never started up 
operations, these subsequent commercial transactions confirm that the 
Chinese investor’s motivation was clearly to export to China. As shown by 
UNCTAD (2009), many large Chinese agrifood TNCs also undertake FDI 
because they need to secure brands, distribution networks and technology.
As stated earlier, cross-border M&A operations have been an 
important entry strategy for food and beverage TNCs wishing to penetrate 
foreign markets; hence the need to analyse the distribution of Chinese 
outbound M&As and the relative scale of their Latin American operations. 
In 1995-2007, Chinese investors participated in 196 of such operations 
valued at US$ 64.8 billion (Nicolas and Thomsen, 2008). During this period, 
the sectors which attracted the most Chinese outward investments were oil 
and gas (US$ 21.3 billion) and financial services (US$ 19.6 billion). As noted 
earlier, the level of Chinese investment in tax havens in the Caribbean is 
substantial. The food and beverage industry attracted only US$ 1.1 billion 
distributed over 11 operations, with Latin America accounting for only 
US$ 100 million and the rest being distributed between Asia and Western 
Europe. Another study, which covers a more recent period (2000-2007) and 
analyses information from the Thomson One Banker database, concludes 
that Chinese investors participated in seven international deals relating 
to agriculture and food production but that none of these operations 
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concerned the acquisition of companies located in Latin America (Sethi, 
2009). In 2008-2010, Chongqin Food Group acquired an agricultural 
company in Brazil but the rest of Chinese international agrifood M&As 
targeted Africa and a few developed countries.14 The studies confirm that, 
as stated above, the presence of Asian investors in this type of operation in 
Latin America has been limited.
On the other hand, the so-called “China effect” (i.e., China’s potential 
negative effect on inward FDI in Latin America) has also caused concern 
in the region. The available empirical evidence is still inconclusive, though 
authors seem to agree that the effects, if any, are mild. According to some 
authors, there is evidence to suggest that inflows of manufacturing FDI into 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and particularly South America, have 
been substituted by inflows into China and India (Lederman and others, 
2009). However, these authors admit that their results are not statistically 
robust —even in the case of Mexico and Central America, which seem to 
be the most heavily affected economies. Another study concludes that the 
China effect is negligible in the case of Latin American inward FDI and 
sometimes even mildly positive (Chantasasawat and others, 2008). Finally, 
other authors find that inward FDI in China has had little effect in terms of 
reducing inward FDI in Latin America, with the exception of investments 
received by Mexico and Colombia in some specific years.
Some TNCs based in other Asian countries have also expanded into 
Latin American agrifood industries. Examples include a number of Indian 
TNCs operating in edible oil businesses and Shree Renuka Sugars, which 
has invested in leading Brazilian sugar and ethanol companies (Nazareth 
Satyanand 2011). Korean investments in Latin America have been led mainly 
by large conglomerates (chaebol). Korean chaebol have large investments in 
fisheries in Uruguay and especially in Argentina, although the level of local 
processing is very low (Girado 1999). Some Korean food SMEs that cater to 
Korean immigrants in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and 
Paraguay may also be maintaining a presence of some importance. 
D. Case studies
1. Japan and the Cerrados Region Development 
Programme (PRODECER) in Brazil
Japan’s model of cooperation and associated investments in the 
Latin American agribusiness sector is illustrated by the Cerrados Region 
Development Programme (PRODECER). The main objective was to develop 
medium-sized farms that would be competitive in the production of key 
14 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/china-global-investment-
tracker-2012.
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export crops. The programme, which was in operation between the 1970s 
and 2001, helped to open up Brazil’s vast central savannah region to grain 
production. It is an interesting example of a public-private partnership for 
which the executing agency was a bi-national firm —CAMPO— that had 
been created specifically for that purpose. JICA provided financing and 
supervised the programme. 
Both Brazil and Japan pursued strategic interests through 
PRODECER. For Brazil, this programme served as a direct continuation 
of two other programmes for the development of the central region.15 
For Japan, it contributed to the diversification of the supply of major 
agricultural commodities on the world market at a time when its demand 
for commodities was rising rapidly. In the 1970s, the implications of Japan’s 
dependence on external supplies were highlighted when a temporary 
embargo on soy exports was imposed by the United States.
The large second-generation (Nisei) population of Japanese descent 
in Brazil, which by the 1970s was dominating major sectors of agricultural 
production in the southern central region, played a key role in the 
programme’s introduction. Japanese immigrants have figured prominently 
in the development of Brazilian agriculture since the beginning of the 
twentieth century: after substituting for slave labour on São Paulo’s coffee 
plantations, they built a horticulture sector from which two cooperatives 
emerged. Both were leaders in the modernization of Brazilian agriculture 
in the southern central region and helped to provide farmers settling in 
the Cerrados region with assistance through PRODECER. The crucial role 
of second-generation Japanese immigrants was certainly an important 
factor in cementing Japan’s commitment to the programme.16 
There were three different phases of PRODECER, and its coverage of 
the Cerrados region increased as the programme moved from one phase 
to the next. The first (1979-1982) was a pilot project in the State of Minas 
Gerais that covered 70,000 hectares, while the second (1985-1994) extended 
the model to other areas of that state and to the states of Goiás, Bahia, 
Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, incorporating another 200,000 
hectares. The third phase (1994-2001) added 80,000 hectares in northern 
Brazil (Maranhão and Tocantins). In the course of these three phases, over 
700 farmers were settled in 21 projects in 8 states. A range of products 
were promoted, including corn, rice, cotton, coffee and soy. By the third 
15 The first was the Programme for the Development of the Alto Parnaiba region in the 
State of Minas Gerais (PADAP) and the second was POLO-CENTRO. Both programmes 
involved investment in infrastructure and the extension of credit to medium-sized 
commercial farmers (with tracts of between 200 and 300 hectares). The government also 
created the Cerrados Centre for Agricultural Research (CPAC) to promote the large-scale 
development of the Cerrados region, which later received technical support from JICA.
16 Nevertheless, the programme had strict rules for the selection of farmers, with the criteria 
used including age, educational level, management capacity and financial track record. 
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phase, the average farm size had increased to 1,000 hectares, and soy was 
accounting for some 80% of overall output. 
PRODECER was discontinued in 2001, although the CAMPO firm 
continued its operations. It was terminated because farmers participating 
in the programme found themselves saddled with heavy debts at a time 
of high inflation and abrupt macroeconomic shifts, while the leading 
cooperatives went bankrupt. Moreover, the commercial transformation of 
the Cerrados region was well under way by then, and targeted support 
was no longer needed. Nevertheless, CAMPO continued its activities even 
while its shareholding structure was being modified.17 CAMPO has four 
subsidiaries and a farm where genetic material is developed and farming 
practices are tested.18
A bi-national evaluation of PRODECER found that its outcome had 
generally been positive in terms of its contribution to the transformation 
of the Cerrados region into an export platform for grains and particularly 
soy products on the basis of medium- to large-scale commercial farming 
operations integrated into cooperatives. During the two decades that it 
was in operation, some US$ 550 million were invested in the incorporation 
of 350,000 hectares in seven states. Annual income was calculated at 
US$ 165 million, with US$ 30 million being collected in the form of taxes. 
Twenty-one individual projects involving 758 farmers organized into 16 
cooperatives created 20,000 direct and 40,000 indirect jobs. Some 620,000 
tons of grain were produced annually, with an additional 1 million tons 
being produced as the result of multiplier effects.
The Cerrados frontier thus became an alternative source of soy for 
Japan, even though most of that country’s needs continued to be met by United 
States production. However, United States soy producers no longer enjoy a 
monopoly, and Japan has undoubtedly benefitted from the contribution made 
by the Cerrados region to the reduction of world soy prices. In this sense, the 
PRODECER cooperation programme can offer important lessons to countries 
that now have concerns similar to those of Japan with regard to ensuring 
commodity supplies in the context of rapid economic growth.
17 JALECO, the Japanese holding company, sold its 49% equity share to employees of 
CAMPO and to a number of Japanese firms in Brazil. BASAGRO, a Brazilian holding 
company, held on to its 51% share, some 65% of which was controlled by the Federal 
Union and the Brazilian Cooperative Organization (OCB), respectively. The development 
banks of Minas Gerais, Bahia and the federal government accounted for a further 16% of 
that stock, and some 15 private banks and Brazilian firms held the rest.
18 The first of those subsidiaries provides consultancy services to Brazil, Japan and other 
countries. The second is a plant micropropagation firm that works with bananas, 
pineapples and soybeans. A third specializes in soil analysis, with key support from the 
Japanese, while the fourth supplies plants to the Amazon.
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Nevertheless, there have been several downsides. First, the farming 
systems in use gave rise to serious environmental problems, which 
later became a focus of joint research programmes. The destruction 
of biodiversity was partly due to the adoption of a predominantly 
monoculture farming system.19 Second, the state governments 
underinvested in the construction of roads and related infrastructure. 
The third and greatest problem, however, was the high level of 
indebtedness of the farmers involved in the programme, which became 
evident in its second phase. This was due not only to high inflation and 
macroeconomic instability, but also to specific features of the programme 
itself, including the high level of investment required in order for 
farmers to establish themselves on the Cerrados frontier and the high 
interest rates which were applied, particularly in the third phase. Finally, 
NGOs and academics have criticized the programme model, which was 
based on the use of medium-sized and large farms, because this led to 
the expulsion of small farmers, with the end result being a net exodus 
from the rural regions where the programme was implemented and a 
deterioration in income distribution in those areas. 
2. Asian logging investments in the Brazilian and 
Peruvian Amazon
Over the last two decades, planted forests have expanded rapidly in 
the Southern cone and are competing with crops and livestock production 
as agriculture and forestry rapidly converge. In Brazil, tree plantations now 
cover over 6 million hectares. Coffee and fruit producers (apples, orange 
juice) have received funding in the form of reforestation credits. The opening 
up of the central-western and northern regions has typically involved a 
three-phase cycle that combines logging, livestock and grain production. 
The production of palm oil for use in biofuels is being used as a reforestation 
strategy for the degraded lands of the Amazon. This convergence is perhaps 
most marked in the biofuels sector, where second-generation raw materials 
are likely to be based on advances in cellulosic enzyme technology, which 
will tend to make forestry and agricultural crops interchangeable as raw 
material inputs. Thus, forestry and paper and pulp firms have become 
increasingly involved in the biofuels sector. Investment decisions have 
shifted from specific crops and products to the issue of gaining access to the 
increasingly scarce resources needed to produce them, in particular water. 
Except for one Japanese firm (Eidai), which started up its logging 
investments in 1973, other Asian logging investments in the Brazilian 
Amazon did not begin to take off until the 1990s (Harago, 1993). Several 
19 In response, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) developed a mixed 
livestock- cropping system which is currently being proposed as a solution for degraded lands.
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firms from Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and China invested in Brazil. 
Their interest in Brazil stemmed from the decline of tropical forests in Asia 
and increasingly strict regulations, together with the difficulty of entering 
the African market due to the dominance of European firms (Greenpeace, 
1997; 1999).20 Asian investments generally took the form of joint ventures or 
acquisitions of local firms that had been hard-hit by the decline in exports 
sparked by the revaluation of the Brazilian currency after 1994.21 It should 
be noted, however, that while Greenpeace drew attention to the presence 
of Asian firms, in particular, its data attest to the predominance of United 
States and European investments during the period in question.
In the 1990s, Asian firms were held responsible for the Amazon’s 
deforestation. Greenpeace and other NGOs directed public attention to 
the growing deforestation of the Amazon and what they characterized 
as the key role of Asian investments in that connection. Greenpeace 
acknowledged that Asian investments accounted for only 3% of production 
in 1997, but it also highlighted the sharp differences in installed capacity, 
which it contended could lead to their increasing domination of the 
sector.22 As this was seen as a possible threat to the future of the Amazon, 
a parliamentary commission of inquiry was created to investigate Asian 
logging firms’ operations in the Amazon (Vianna, 1998). In parallel with 
this, Greenpeace launched a campaign against the export of mahogany 
that focused on Amaplac (the firm bought by WTK), Eidai and the French 
firm Lapeyre, which led the government to impose a moratorium on new 
mahogany exports (Greenpeace, 2003/2005). The government also beefed 
up its policing capacity and set up a satellite monitoring system.
As time went by, however, the focus on Asian investments in the 
Amazon diminished, as the conclusion began to be reached that the “the 
Asian invasion had not materialized” (Macqueen, 2003). Asian investments 
were increasing less than had been foreseen, and Asian investors adhered 
more closely to existing regulations on logging and forestry management 
than domestic firms did. Moreover, it turned out that domestic firms 
were causing much more deforestation than exporters were (Borregaard, 
20 In a context of large-scale illegal logging and weak monitoring that hindered data 
collection, Greenpeace (1999) was one of the few organizations that succeeded in collecting 
information on a group of 17 multinational logging companies in the Amazon, which was 
a subset of Asian investment in the 1990s.
21 In the 1990s, the first Asian companies that were active in the Amazon were Rimbunan 
Hijau and WTK, both from Malaysia. In 1995, WTK took control of Amaplac, a Brazilian 
firm in Manaus, and a forest property in Carauari (Amazônas State). In 1996, Tianjin 
Fortune Timber from China bought into Compensa. In 1997, Rimbuna Hijau took over 
two firms in Belém (Pará State) and Carolina (Amazonas State).
22 Local firms had a capacity of 4,000 to 6,000 cubic metres per year, compared to 120,000-
170,000 cubic metres in the case of Eidai and over 600,000 cubic metres in the case of 
Rimbunan Hijau.
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Dufy and Winchester, 2008). Exports accounted for only 15% of timber 
production, while the rest was sold on the domestic market.23 Furthermore, 
exports were dominated by United States and European firms, while the 
Asian firms had a minority share. 
Asian investors’ expansion in Brazil was also limited because of their 
geographic diversification (in other South American countries, as well as 
other locations) and their industrial diversification into other agribusiness-
related technologies or even wood substitutes.24 Another factor that may 
have held back Asian companies’ expansion is tighter regulation and the 
increased attention that was focused on the Amazon. 
The mobilization that occurred around the issue of “Asian 
investments” in the Brazilian Amazon underscores the risks involved in 
FDI when it is identified with sensitive resources. In the case of PRODECER, 
it became clear how a strategic concern with food security and, more 
generally, commodity supplies led Japan to develop a very high-profile 
government cooperation programme. In the case of these more recent 
Asian investments, however, what is at issue is the alternative sourcing 
strategies being used by individual firms to reposition themselves within 
global markets. Without the support of a broader cooperation programme 
and in a situation where the major players are from a country which has 
had very little prior investment in Brazil, unmediated FDI became very 
vulnerable and quickly became the focus of opposition.
Another example of Asian investments in the Latin American 
forest industry is the increasing presence of Chinese firms in the Peruvian 
Amazon. In 2000, the Fujimori Administration enacted a new forestry 
law which expedited the granting of logging concessions. The aim was to 
promote sustainable logging systems, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
office in Peru was influential both in the formulation and subsequent 
implementation of the new forestry regulations. China has become an 
increasingly important destination for Peru’s timber exports, and in 
2009 became the leading importer. Peru has a very large ethnic Chinese 
population which is very active in the timber industry.
23 It should be mentioned, however, that the steep devaluation of the real in 1998 boosted 
exports, which represented 36% of output in 2004 (Lentini, Verissimo & Pereira, 2005). 
24 Japanese firms invested in China and Viet Nam, which were closer to their home 
market. Samling (Malaysia) entered other South American markets and expanded into 
Australia, New Zealand and China in businesses related to forest resources and wood 
products. Rimbunan Hijau has become one of the largest Malaysian conglomerates, with a 
worldwide presence in the production of fertilizers, plantation technology, agro-chemistry, 
aquaculture and biotechnology. WTK (Malaysia) has expanded into other Asian countries, 
Oceania and the United States and has diversified into land development, edible oil 
milling, packaging and hospitality. Finally, the Chinese government is promoting the 
development of a domestic wood pulp industry, which may erode Chinese investors’ 
interest in South American forests.
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The organization of the timber supply chain between Peru and 
China illustrates how new forms of public and private governance have led 
to new forms of coordination. This is demonstrated by a study on 10 firms 
that export the Dipteryx wood species to China. Using the global value 
chain (GVC) framework of Gereffi and others (2003), Putzel and others 
(2008) show that the Peru-China Dipteryx timber supply chain is shifting 
from a producer-driven to a buyer-driven dynamic. In the early 1990s, 
timber firms owned by members of the ethnic Chinese population in Peru 
began to explore the Chinese market. By the end of the decade, however, 
that trade flow was increasingly being organized by multinationals from 
China, with a focus on the importation of raw materials for subsequent 
processing and re-exportation by firms in China. In other words, there 
has been a shift in the governance of the timber trade away from firms 
that specialize in exports and buy timber on the market and towards 
multinationals headquartered in China, which have logging teams and 
sawmills in Peru but do the final processing in China. 
This shift of control into the hands of Chinese multinationals is partly 
the result of the advent of new forms of global governance in which forest 
management and chain-of-custody certification have become essential. 
Chinese firms successfully adapted to Peru’s new forestry law (which was 
heavily influenced by the Peruvian branch of the World Wildlife Fund) 
and to global demands for certification, as illustrated by the 776 certificates 
for forest management and timber processing issued by the Forestry 
Stewardship Council (FSC) by 2009. Another factor was China’s obligation to 
adapt its legislation to the United States Lacey Act on illegal logging under 
United States-China bilateral free trade agreements and the European Forest 
Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) requirements. These 
new regulations favour large-scale operations and benefit those enterprises 
that are able to provide the necessary evidence of compliance.25
3. Japanese investments in Brazilian biofuels
Japan has defined a strategic policy with regard to the biofuels sector in 
Brazil. Its first biofuels plan, in 2002, was amended after the entry into force of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 to include incentives for the adoption of biofuels for 
the transport sector, which depends entirely on imported fuel. Its 74 million 
motor vehicles consume some 60 billion litres of gasoline and 36 billion litres 
of diesel fuel per year. While Japan’s long-term goal is to promote domestic 
biofuels production using cellulosic technology, over the medium term its 
25 The documents necessary for the provision of such evidence have themselves become a 
market. In the meanwhile, illegal logging still predominates, in part as a response to what 
is perceived as being an inequitable situation in which the current regulations benefit 
large-scale players. 
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commitment to the reduction of CO2 emissions has involved the promotion of 
trade and investment with supplier countries such as Brazil.
In 2006, Japan launched a cooperative effort with Brazil to ensure a 
stable, long-term supply of biofuels. The Japanese Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) offered the Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (EMBRAPA) support for the implementation of the National 
Agroenergy Programme (Seedlings, 2007). In a departure from earlier 
cooperation programmes, however, the objective was to ensure direct, 
long-term contractual supply arrangements for the Japanese market 
(Mongabay, 2010). In this first agreement, Japan proposed to finance 
research, agricultural development and the construction of industrial 
plants for ethanol and biodiesel for R$ 1.286 billion. These soft loans were 
executed by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and were provided 
on an individual project basis (Zanatta, 2006).
At the same time, several Japanese firms entered into agreements with 
Brazilian firms. In 2007-2008, Japanese firms committed some US$ 600 million 
to the biofuels sector in Brazil (Equipe Ecoviagem, 2005). Examples include:
• From 2007 onward, Japanese imports of bio-ETBE have been 
conducted by Japan Biofuels Supply LLP (JBSL). In 2008, JBSL 
signed a long-term supply contract with Copersucar. The Mitsui 
Oil Co. initiated the sale of E3 gasoline, supplied by a Japanese 
affiliate of Petrobras. In 2008, Mitsui and Petrobras announced 
the launch of a joint investment programme for the construction 
of ethanol plants in the Brazilian Cerrados region (Soares, 2007). 
• In 2007, the Japanese trading company Sojitz, together with 
the Brazilian company Odebrecht, created ETH Bioenergia for 
the production and marketing of sugar and alcohol (D´Ercole, 
2007). Sojitz acquired a 33% interest in ETH. ETH took over the 
Alcidia plant in São Paulo State in 2007 and planned to invest R$ 
5 billion for the construction of 10 new units in São Paulo, Mato 
Grosso and Goiás. In 2010, ETH, along with Sojitz, acquired a 
majority share (65%) in the ailing Brenco enterprise, out of which 
emerged ETH Bioenergia (Scaramuzzo, 2009). These two firms 
have already invested R$ 3.8 billion in the sector and by 2012 
will be producing 3 billion litres of ethanol, will be generating 
2,700 GWh of electrical energy and will be milling 40 million 
tons of sugar cane in 9 plants. ETH Bioenergia is striving to be 
the leading firm in the sector and has attracted the interest of 
Petrobras, which has plans to become a minority shareholder 
(Bronzatto, 2010). ETH Bioenergia already has a sugar-cane 
venture in Angola and is looking to expand its investments into 
other Latin American countries and into Africa. 
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• Petrobras, for its part, formed a joint venture (Brazil-Japan 
Ethanol (BJE)) with Japan Alcohol Trading Company. It set up 
a plant in Japan for the production of E3 with a capacity of 3 
million litres per month. The gasoline is supplied by the Nansei 
Sekiyu refinery in Okinawa, in which Petrobras has an 87% 
share. With this investment, Petrobras is aiming to convince the 
Japanese business community of the economic and technical 
viability of this new fuel (Rosas, 2009).
Despite these individual initiatives by Japanese and Brazilian 
firms, the Japanese government was not confident that long-term 
biofuels supplies would be secure. To address this concern, in 2007 
Petrobras and Mitsui announced their intention to invest US$ 8 
billion in the construction of some 40 plants for the export of ethanol 
to Japan. The Japan Development Bank (JBIC) would help finance 
these distilleries provided that their output was destined exclusively 
for the Japanese market (Soares, 2007). In addition, Petrobras, once 
again along with Mitsui and in collaboration with the Brazilian firm 
Camargo Correia, announced that studies were being conducted on the 
possibility of constructing a pipeline for the export of ethanol to Japan. 
The Petrobras – Mitsui initiative is one of three plans for proposed 
pipelines. A second involves a leading Brazilian firm, Cosan, with 
which China is negotiating long-term supply contracts, and Brenco 
(now ETH Bioenergia – Odebrecht & Sojitz), which has been developing 
plans with a Dutch holding company aimed primarily at the United 
States market (Latin American Herald Tribune, 2010).
Japanese policy also promotes the development of biodiesel. 
Government policy provides for a blending ratio of under 5%, but tax 
exemptions have sparked many initiatives aimed at attaining a 100% 
biodiesel (B100) fuel. Local governments and NGOs have promoted the 
production of rapeseed oil for cooking and its subsequent collection for 
recycling as a biofuel. Another policy option in the case of diesel fuel has 
been the introduction of tax incentives for the adoption of clean (sulphur-
free) diesel, which is now available nationally. The principal strategy, 
however, would seem to be the extraction of oil from algae, which is thought 
to be capable of meeting from 10% to 20% of domestic demand for diesel 
(GAIN, 2010). The JICA cooperation programme also supports a biodiesel 
programme being run by the government of the State of Rio Grande do 
Norte (2009-2013), which involves the planting of a range of oil crops by 
2,000 small farmers with the assistance of the Brazilian government and 
with crop-purchase guarantees from Petrobras (ABC, 2009).
JICA, Mozambique and Brazil signed a tripartite agreement in 2009 
that was aimed at reproducing the success of the cooperation initiative 
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that opened up the Brazilian Cerrados region to food crop production. 
The Cerrados development model is an alternative to the large-scale 
land purchases now being undertaken by resource-poor countries, 
which could weaken regional food security. The proposed new model 
is geared to enhancing the productivity of small farmers and promoting 
wider regional development through the establishment of agricultural 
processing systems (JICA, 2010).
The Japanese government has played a proactive role in the 
definition of responsible agricultural investment (RAI). It co-organized 
two round tables on the subject in 2009 and 2010 that were attended by 
representatives of many countries and multilateral and civil society 
organizations. The round tables dealt with growing international concerns 
about the recent surge in large-scale vertical investments in developing-
country agriculture, in particular those involving land acquisitions by 
foreign investors. Poorly conceived or executed investments can have 
unintended negative impacts in terms of political stability, social cohesion, 
household food security and environmental protection for the receiving 
country, especially at the local level (government of Japan, 2010). In view 
of this state of affairs, the Japanese government and four international 
organizations formulated a number of RAI principles.26 Attendees 
discussed the utility of an agreed set of voluntary RAI principles, 
while acknowledging the complex challenges associated with their 
implementation (government of the Unites States, 2010).
E. Final considerations
The potential for Asian investment in Latin American agribusiness needs to 
be evaluated in the context of the major changes which have taken place in 
this sector in the past two decades. In developing countries, the agricultural 
sector has become relatively more attractive to foreign investors, while 
the manufacturing segment (food and beverage processing) has become 
less attractive than it is in developed economies. The availability of land 
seems to have become a priority for foreign investors (especially those from 
resource-poor countries) and, as a consequence, in recent years developing 
nations have received more inward FDI stock in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing than developed nations have. In Latin America, more specifically, 
foreign investors have been attracted by activities related to food production, 
26 In particular, RAIs should respect rights to land and associated natural resources; improve 
food security; be transparent; be monitored and ensure accountability on the part of all 
stakeholders; respect the rule of law; reflect the industry’s best practices; be economically 
viable; result in durable, shared value; generate desirable social and distributional 
impacts; encourage sustainable resource use; minimize the risk/magnitude of negative 
impacts; and mitigate those impacts.
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(cereals, soybeans, poultry and meat), but also by the relatively new business 
of biofuels production. At the same time, developing countries have become 
relatively less attractive to FDI in the food and beverage processing industry, 
and more investment in that industry has been channelled to developed 
economies. This situation may now be changing due to the high growth 
rates of emerging markets.
Developing Asia has emerged as an important source of FDI in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing in Latin America. Asian investors are 
already active in various Latin American industries. Examples include 
Korean investments in fisheries (Argentina and Uruguay); Taiwanese 
business alliances with local entrepreneurs of Chinese descent in other 
agrifood businesses; and Malaysian investments in logging (Brazil), beef 
production (Argentina) and fisheries (Chile). Chinese companies have 
also showed an interest in soybean production in Latin America. Many 
Asian investors are from countries which are poor in natural resources. 
Because of this, Asian governments often support Asian companies’ efforts 
to invest in foreign agricultural sectors by providing them with cheap 
credit or by supporting the investors’ negotiations with host countries. As 
a consequence, Latin American governments will probably need to adapt 
their FDI policies and strategies, since, in this respect, Asian investors differ 
from the “traditional” Western investors in this Latin American sector.
Asian FDI in the food and beverage manufacturing industry has 
exhibited a different dynamic. Unlike Western TNCs in this industry, 
Japanese TNCs have preferred to concentrate on their home region, including 
their own domestic market. There has been some Japanese investment in a 
few nations in the region, such as Brazil, however. This trend in Japanese 
investment is likely to grow stronger in the future, especially in those Latin 
American countries where the demand for processed foods and beverages is 
increasing owing to high rates of economic growth.
The case studies show that Asian FDI differs from Western FDI. 
The Japan-Brazil Cerrados cooperation programme, seen by Japan as its 
most significant initiative in this connection in the 1980s and 1990s, was 
not matched by comparable investments from its leading TNCs. These 
firms were more focused on Asia and/or developed-country markets 
and benefitted little from the opportunities opened up through the 
consolidation of the Brazilian soybean complex. Asian and particularly 
Malaysian investments in logging in the 1990s, on the other hand, were 
unrelated to broader bilateral cooperation programmes or agreements. 
They were instead part of the global strategies of leading Asian TNCs 
whose concern was to access new sources of raw materials.
China, for its part, operates quite differently in some sectors. In the 
case of logging investments in Peru, China’s involvement differed from 
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that of the United States in that this sector was not subject to specific 
regulations with regard to the negotiation of bilateral agreements. On 
the one hand, the adoption of a forestry certification strategy by China in 
its domestic market certainly provides a different framework for private 
investment decisions. In the food and biofuels sector, on the other hand, 
the Chinese government and State firms are more directly involved.
Japan’s recent focus on FDI in Brazil, in addition to its triangular 
cooperation arrangement with Brazil and Mozambique for the 
development of the latter country’s savannah region, has been combined 
with long-term contractual agreements for the provision of supplies to 
Japan’s domestic market and with strong incentives for Japanese firms to 
invest in these sectors. Both objectives differ considerably from those that 
underlay the strategy adopted under the earlier cooperation programme 
aimed at opening up Brazil’s central-western agricultural frontier. 
Nevertheless, one feature that is common to both phases of Japan’s 
cooperation activities has been their alignment with the priorities of the 
host country. In the case of the central-western frontier, cooperative efforts 
built upon the Brazilian government’s PRODECER programme while, more 
recently, Japan’s cooperation and investment proposals have been aligned 
with the host country’s ethanol and the biodiesel programmes. Although, 
as discussed, the cooperation programme was the object of criticism from 
both an environmental and a social perspective, it was not the subject of 
an ongoing controversy within civil society. The same cannot be said of 
Asian logging investments in Brazil in the mid- and late 1990s. In this case, 
private firms from a number of Asian countries made a range of individual 
investments which failed to take into account the direction of government 
policy in the region or the sensitivity of civil society organizations and 
movements regarding the question of deforestation. The result was a 
parliamentary committee of inquiry which denounced the “Asian invasion”.
Successful investment strategies adapt to the host country’s and 
global concerns. Earlier fears at the local level about an “Asian invasion” 
of Latin American natural resources (including land, forests and mining) 
have been succeeded by a global concern with investment strategies 
that are seen as involving “land-grabbing”, together with the spread of 
minimum social and environmental standards from niche markets to 
large-scale traditional agricultural commodities. Indeed, the justification 
given for the new biofuels markets is that they respond to social and 
environmental concerns. If they are to be successful, investment strategies 
must be in keeping with emerging global governance concerns. Japan has 
taken a lead here with the promotion of the Principles for Responsible 
Investment Initiative, which may become a minimum requirement of 
international credit institutions for future investments or part of the 
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access conditions for major markets. The increasing attractiveness of Latin 
American countries to foreign investors suggests that RAI-style standards 
may become a key component of the future investment climate.
During the last decade, Latin American countries have increasingly 
directed their agriculture-based exports to emerging Asian markets. While 
this has been an important driver for Latin America’s rapid growth during 
this period, there is concern that this trade pattern is associated with a trading-
down strategy whereby the region is limiting its global competitiveness 
to primary production. This pattern has therefore posed the challenge of 
devising sustainable value-added investment strategies. Asian agribusiness, 
which has traditionally sited its investments in its own region, or in the 
markets of the developed world, has begun to increase its investments in Latin 
America. As demonstrated here, this is by no means a homogeneous process, 
and it is difficult to discern the accompanying patterns, given how very recent 
the trends under scrutiny are. This analysis does suggest, however, that 
virtuous-circle investment strategies are, above all, aligned with host-country 
priorities and with the emerging patterns of global governance.
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Chapter II
The changing nature of Asian investment in 
Latin American manufacturing: 
a value chain analysis
Jae Sung Kwak
Introduction
This chapter assesses the changing nature of Asian foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Latin American manufacturing, with a focus on 
the position of Latin America within Asian global value chains. Value 
chain analysis helps to evaluate the local benefits of participating in the 
global economy. The study also identifies the policies that have enabled 
individual producers and countries to increase their shares in these 
gains. At the same time, the report seeks to depart from the dichotomy 
of whether globalization benefits or harms the poor within the context of 
bilateral relations between Asian and Latin American countries.
Current trans-Pacific investments are largely dominated by 
Asian investment in Latin America, which is concentrated in four 
areas of the manufacturing sector (steel, automobiles, electronics and 
textiles); investment in the other direction is still minimal. To begin 
with, Japanese firms have a long history —since the mid-1950s— of 
involvement in the production of steel products in Latin America, and 
in more recent times Korean companies have begun to invest in Latin 
America as well. Second, increasing demand for automobiles and the 
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strengthened global competiveness of Chinese, Korean and Japanese rms 
have resulted in large-scale investment projects in Latin America. Japanese 
companies such as Toyota, Honda and Nissan have paved the way for 
their Korean and Chinese peers to follow. Third, Asian brands are leading 
the global market as the principal innovators in the eld of electronics. 
Here, the trend is twofold: efciency-seeking investment in Mexico for the 
United States market, and market-seeking investment in Brazil. Fourth, 
the Central American and Caribbean subregions have become export 
platforms of the textile and garment industry for the United States market. 
The main investors are Korean rms.
The focus on value chains is particularly useful for analysing 
the position of Latin America in the FDI and trade strategies of Asian 
multinationals. Value chains are “the full range of activities which are 
required to bring a product or service from conception, through the 
different phases of various producer services, delivery to nal consumers, 
and nal disposal after use.” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000). A simple model 
of a value chain shows that production is only one of the elements in value 
added links. The present research focuses on the ow of multiple inputs and 
services in the production life cycle (see diagram II.1). 
Diagram II.1 













Source: Kaplinsky and Morris (2000).
An important dimension of value chains and global production 
networks is their power relations, in which one or a few rms dominate 
the overall chain or network (Geref, 1994). Two types of governance 
can be distinguished: those chains dominated by buyers (BDC: buyer-
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driven chains), and those dominated by producers (PDC: producer-driven 
chains) (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000). Nevertheless, these two systems 
usually work together when it comes to FDI. This is exemplified in Korean 
FDI in the textile sector in Central America: initially, Korean clothing 
companies produced directly for the United States market. When Korea 
lost price competitiveness owing to rapidly rising labour costs in the 1990s, 
entrepreneurs changed their function in the value chain, subcontracting 
production to third countries like China, Viet Nam and Guatemala, and 
delivering these clothes to the buyers in the final market. In this example, it 
was the buyers that forced contractors to supply goods at minimum prices, 
whereas the decision to relocate production was made by the producers.
A case provided by Kaplinsky and Morris exemplifies the importance 
of value chains. The core competence of a firm in an export-processing 
zone in the Dominican Republic during the early 1990s was the sewing of 
materials designed and cut in the United States, which were then sold under 
the brand name of a major international company. That local firm received 
US$ 2.18 per pair of jeans sewn. As neighbouring countries devalued their 
currencies, the Dominican Republic firm was forced to systematically 
reduce its fee charged  per pair. However, in the end, that was not enough 
and the work was eventually outsourced elsewhere. The vulnerability 
of this firm was its specialization in a narrow function (sewing) within a 
particular segment (production) of the value chain. Its value added was too 
low to improve efficiency, since most value was appropriated in the design 
and branding segments of the chain.
A. The steel industry
The steel industry’s value chain has eight distinctive activities. It starts 
with the transformation of natural resources into an array of steel 
by-products used for the production of automobiles, housing appliances, 
industrial machinery, and many other commonplace devices. The first 
phase (I) includes mining exploitation of key inputs such as pig iron, 
coke and limestone. These three elements together are used to cast cold 
iron ingots and constitute the basis of every steel by-product involved in 
the fourth section. Both production phases (II and IV) are closely related 
to research and development (R&D) and have the two highest value 
added contents and returns on investment within the entire chain. Steel 
by-products can be commercialized directly for industrial use or further 
transformed by subjecting the final products to the fifth (V) section of the 
chain, in which final products are cut and undergo a finishing process; 
this step is chosen mainly when there is a demand for highly-specialized 
goods, as in the case of automobile components. Finally, distribution and 
sales are performed mostly by producers and retailers. In this industry, 
Latin America is sought chiefly for its natural resources and large markets 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































POSCO and NIPPON Steel Corporation are both successfully 
operating similar activities in Brazil and Mexico. They differ, however, in 
terms of how they entered the region: POSCO entered in a mix of greeneld 
investment in Mexico and joint venture in Brazil, whereas NIPPON Steel 
formed an exclusive joint venture with a local company in Brazil. POSCO 
oversees its entire operation within Mexico, with a strong presence of 
Korean nationals in almost every key decision-making position. NIPPON 
Steel depends on its Brazilian partner for all its operations in Brazil. Finally, 
both groups retain most of their R&D activities in their home bases.
The Korean company POSCO has invested in Brazil and Mexico 
for different motives. In Brazil, the POSCO afliate Companhia Coreano-
Brasileira de Pelotização (KOBRASCO) has tried for more than a decade 
to secure access to low-cost, high-quality raw materials to feed its 
steelmaking operations in Korea. Its partnership with the Brazilian 
mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale) has afforded it access 
to one of the world’s largest mines. The KOBRASCO plant produces iron 
ore pellets which are shipped to Korea to be made into steel slabs and steel 
by-products. In Mexico, the company seeks to serve the northern 
hemisphere automobile market. For this purpose, POSCO has two mineral 
processing centres (MPCs, stage V), in Puebla and San Luis Potosi,  where 
galvanized sheets are cut and stamped. It also has a continuous galvanized 
line (CGL, stage IV), which converts hot rolled coils into galvanized sheets. 
It also has two distribution centres for logistics and customer service.  
Diagram II.2 
STEEL INDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN
High value added activities Closely related with R&D












Stage IV: CGL Altamira.
Stage V:  MPC in Puebla and San Luis Potosi
Stage VII: MESDC.
Stage VI - VIII: POSCO main branch Mexico, D.F.
KOBRASCO BRAZIL
Stage I: KOBRASCO. Iron ore pellet plant.
NIPPON STEEL
Stage II: Raw steel production.
Stage IV-V: USIMINAS and Unigal.
Stage VII: Distribution centre.































Source: Prepared by the author.
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The NIPPON Steel investment in Brazil, a joint venture with 
the Brazilian company USIMINAS, is completely vertically integrated 
along the entire value chain. Initially, the company focused on raw steel 
production (stage II), but later diversified product lines into the fourth 
and fifth sections of the value chain. It recently introduced an advanced 
production centre for hot-dip galvanized steel sheets for sale to the South 
American automobile sector. NIPPON Steel can access high-quality, low-
cost raw materials through the domestic mining activities of its partner, 
USIMINAS. The company has a distribution centre (stage VII) to facilitate 
delivery from production centres to clients. NIPPON Steel depends largely 
on its Brazilian counterpart for its operations in Brazil, as it has few 
Japanese on the board or in other strategic positions.
There are two other Asian steel companies with significant 
investments in Latin America: Jindal of India and the Shougang Group 
of China. Jindal works the world’s largest iron ore mine (El Mutun) in 
the Santa Cruz region of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which has 
reserves of over 40 billion tons that are apportioned between Jindal and 
the Bolivian State (Lesova, 2007). The Shougang Group is the largest 
iron ore producer on the west coast of the Americas, in Peru (at Marcona, 
about 500 km south-east of Lima), and its operations include an open 
pit mine, beneficiation plants and a port, producing over 7 million tons. 
The company’s product range comprises blast furnace pellets, direct 
reduction pellets, pellet chips, high-grade pellet feed, calibrated sinter 
feed, high-grade sinter feed and dolomite (Campbell, 2009).
1. POSCO CGL Altamira, Mexico
The Korean company POSCO is one of Asia’s most profitable 
steelmakers, the world’s third largest steel producer by total output and 
the second largest in terms of capital. It possesses a combined capacity 
of 35.5 million metric tons of crude steel, and reported sales over 
US$ 24 billion in 2009 (POSCO, 2010).
The Mexican affiliate of POSCO, POSCO CGL Altamira, produces 
steel products for the automobile industry, including processed 
products of cold rolled, hot-dip galvanized steel goods, and galvanized 
steel sheets.1 The investment in Mexico was the first step in its 
1 Cold rolled products are used in the production of car body panels, while hot-dip 
galvanized steel products are used in civil engineering and construction, and in the 
fabrication of electrical and automobile parts. Galvanized steel sheets are also used in 
diverse areas, especially in the production of auto parts. 
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overseas expansion, following from the company’s goal of becoming 
the world leader in automobile steel products. The POSCO approach 
has been gradual; two processing centres for cutting and stamping 
galvanized sheets were opened in 2007 and 2008, respectively, the first 
in Puebla and the second in San Luis Potosí. With an initial investment 
of US$ 25 million at each location, both plants have been processing 
170,000 tons of auto steel sheets annually. In 2009, POSCO opened a 
continuous galvanized line (CGL) facility in Altamira. Map II.1 shows 
the strategic location of the plant vis-à-vis its major markets. This plant 
produces 400,000 metric tons of galvanized sheets per year (POSCO 
Mexico, 2009).2 
The company’s investments in Mexico are strategic for three 
reasons. First, Mexico is a major supplier to large automobile companies 
worldwide. For several decades, Mexico has been producing car parts 
for a range of automobile models and brands, in parallel with car 
assembling. Nowadays, the country has both low-cost, experienced 
labour and more than 1,000 parts suppliers to offer, which enhance 
the potential of automobile clusters and value chains. Second, Mexico 
has a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada. Third, 
national and local governments grant tax exemptions to foreign 
investors.3 Its investments in Mexico have helped POSCO to gain a 
strategic position within the global market by placing its automotive 
steel production right on the doorstep of its major clients in Mexico 
and the United States, such as GM, Toyota, Mercedes, Volkswagen and 
Hyundai. Moreover, the company offers a full service package —sales, 
production and processing— to automakers throughout the region 
(POSCO Mexico, 2009).
POSCO Mexico currently employs 215 workers directly, and 450 
indirectly. Of these, 47 have been trained in the Republic of Korea, in 
areas such as quality control, production, administration and marketing. 
Within the POSCO corporate organization in Mexico, most heads of 
department are Korean expatriates, which runs the risk of underutilizing 
local expertise.
2 The Altamira facilities complement the POSCO steel sheet processing plant in Birmingham, 
Alabama, which produces 120,000 metric tons per year. This combination strengthens the 
company’s presence in the United States auto parts market, in addition to the strategic 
alliance of POSCO with US Steel.
3 For example, the Tamaulipas state government granted the CGL plant a three-year tax 
exemption and a 50% reduction in registration taxes (POSCO Mexico, 2010).
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Map II.1 
POSCO: LOGISTICS FOR AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY IN MEXICO
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data from POSCO Mexico.
2. Companhia Coreano-Brasileira de Pelotização 
(KOBRASCO)
The Korean multinational POSCO and Vale, Brazil’s largest mining 
company and world leader in iron ore pellet production, sealed a joint 
venture named KOBRASCO under equal ownership in October 1998. 
KOBRASCO operates an iron ore pellet plant with an annual production 
capacity of 4 million tons. Iron ore pellets are the raw material used 
inside blast furnaces to produce steel. Through this joint venture, POSCO 
has secured a stable provision of raw materials (pellets) for domestic 
steel and iron production. In the case of Vale, the move has represented 
an opportunity to increase its presence in Asian markets, while assuring 
a large, stable customer for its products.4 As part of this joint venture, 
the KOBRASCO International Trading Company (KOBIN) was created 
to act as an intermediary for trade and nancial transactions on the 
global market. Overall, KOBRASCO has been very protable, except for 
4 Vale has other joint ventures for pellet production with Italian, Japanese and Spanish steel 
companies which are in close geographical proximity to one another and operate under 
similar lease agreements.
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a setback as a result of the global crisis, when production fell by 30% 
during the first nine months of 2009.
About a decade ago, POSCO set about securing its supply of 
iron ore pellets in order to maintain a leading position in regional and 
global steel production. This was accomplished through joint ventures 
with the world’s three largest mining companies: Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton in Australia, and Vale in Brazil, which together represented 
70% of global supply. POSCO also joined forces with DONGKUK Steel 
(of the Republic of Korea) and Vale to build a steel mill in Ceará, Brazil, 
with a production capacity of 6 million tons a year. The fact that POSCO 
has strengthened its position in the region shows its strategic interest in 
Latin America.
3. NIPPON Steel USIMINAS, Brazil
NIPPON Steel Corporation is one of the largest steel producers 
in the world. In order to expand its production base, NIPPON foresaw 
the need to ensure access to raw materials and diversify its production 
geographically. It established joint ventures to ensure access to raw 
materials with major raw-material providers around the world, such as 
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton in Australia, and Vale in Brazil. 
In 1957, NIPPON sought to spread its production around the 
globe through strategic collaboration with the Brazilian State-owned 
company, USIMINAS. Together, they built a plant in the city of Ipatinga 
in the mineral-rich state of Minas Gerais. From 1962 to 2010, the joint 
venture expanded its annual production capacity from 0.5 million tons to 
5 million tons in crude steel and to 11 million tons in steelworks (see 
table II.2). In 1991, USIMINAS was privatized, and the joint venture 
decided to diversify production: crude steel production fell from 96% to 
80%, while other products grew from 4% to 20% in the 1990s.
Table II.2 










USIMINAS 1957 27.5 5 637 of crude steel11 050 of steelworks 5 051
UNIGAL 1998 30 480 b 119.7
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data from USIMINAS and NIPPON Steel Corporation.
a Total production for USIMINAS includes the consolidated production of the Ipatinga and Cubatão plants. 
b With the initiation of the second UNIGAL plant in 2012, total production is expected to double by the 
end of that year.
The changing nature of Asian-Latin American economic relations 87
The global crisis of 2009, the subsequent swift recovery of Brazil 
and other emerging markets, and the merger of ArcelorMittal increased 
the pressure on NIPPON Steel to strengthen its production bases and 
upgrade its technologies.5 In this context, NIPPON and USIMINAS 
have built two plants: UNIGAL and UNIGAL 2. UNIGAL produces 
hot-dip galvanized steel sheets for automobiles, with an annual 
production capacity of 400,000 tons. UNIGAL 2 is expected to start 
operations in 2012 with a capacity of 550,000 tons per year. It has also 
invested in the production of new value added products for pre-salt 
oil exploration on the coast, such as Sincron (USIMINAS, 2010a). For 
this purpose, the company has invested in new accelerated cooling 
technology for plate production at its Ipatinga mill. Most of the USIMINAS 
production is for the domestic market while 20%-30% of its production is 
sold abroad.6
Most employees of USIMINAS and UNIGAL are locals, with 
the exception of some Japanese nationals holding senior positions. 
Both companies are headed by Brazilian nationals, and both vice-
presidencies are held by Japanese citizens. During the early stages of 
the joint ventures, extensive training and internship opportunities in 
Japan were made available to key Brazilian engineers. 
Increasingly diversified operations have made these joint ventures 
between NIPPON Steel and USIMINAS successful cases not only in 
Brazil, but also in Latin America.7
4. BAOSTEEL Victoria Iron & Steel Co., Brazil
In 2010, BAOSTEEL Group Corporation was the world’s second 
largest crude steel maker after ArcelorMittal. The company produces 
mainly premium steel and operates in six sectors: steel industry, resource 
5 USIMINAS was relatively well prepared for the crisis, having restructured the company 
and reduced its debt. NIPPON, for its part, strove to “enhance its manufacturing skills, 
capabilities and platform; sharpen its technological edge; bolster its global sales and 
marketing capabilities; and enhance its global production and supply structure to facilitate 
integrated, more strategic Group management” (NIPPON Steel Corporation, 2010a).
6 USIMINAS exports to Asia (China and Republic of Korea) and the Americas (Chile, 
the United States and Argentina). Surprisingly, the company sells little to Japan, 
notwithstanding the share of NIPPON in USIMINAS.
7 In 2010, USIMINAS established another joint venture (Mineração USIMINAS) until 2015 
with a Japanese company (Sumitomo Corporation), to improve access to raw materials 
through an investment of up to US$ 4.1 billion in industrial plant, dams and loading 
terminals. It owns four mines in the Serra Azul region in the state of Minas Gerais, and 
land in the state of Rio de Janeiro for the construction of a port terminal. This partnership 
is strategic for USIMINAS, due to Sumitomo’s expertise in selling iron ore as well as its 
global presence, especially in the Chinese market (USIMINAS, 2010c).
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development, steel processing, technology service, and finance and 
production services. BAOSTEEL has been aggressively merging with other 
steel companies to expand its production capacity (BAOSTEEL, 2010). 
Unstable prices and increasing dependency on iron ore to supply its mills 
have been big concerns for the company. 
Nonetheless, a joint venture initiative between BAOSTEEL and 
Vale failed in 2009. Seeking a more stable and less costly supply of 
raw materials, BAOSTEEL had established BAOSTEEL Victoria Iron 
& Steel in Anchieta, in the state of Espírito Santo, in partnership with 
Vale, Brazil in 2007, with an ownership split of 60% for BAOSTEEL and 
40% for Vale, Brazil. The joint venture was intended to build a plant 
between 2009 and 2011, with a US$ 3 billion initial investment. Production 
was projected to grow from 5 million to 10 million tons annually and 
to create at least 3,000 direct jobs (Mofcom, 2007). However, the project 
encountered two obstacles: demand for steel dropped in the context of 
the global economic crisis in 2008, and the company failed to obtain 
an environmental licence. In 2009, both companies agreed to dissolve 
the joint venture. Vale acquired the shares of BAOSTEEL and changed 
the company’s name to Ubu Steel Company (known by its Portuguese 
acronym, CSU). This new plant is scheduled to start operations 
in 2014.8
B. The automobile sector
The automobile industry value chain is complex, but may be summarized 
through the main activities that constitute the industry’s backbone. The 
first section of the value chain relates to raw materials, including steel and 
rubber by-products. All the products and processes in this first category 
themselves form part of other value chains corresponding to different 
industries. The second section of the value chain is the production of 
parts and components. In this stage too, the array of component producers 
includes a multilayered system of providers. The present study only 
considers the first tier of component providers, as this receives the most 
investment from brand automakers.
The remainder of the value chain creates the most value, in 
particular the third and fourth sections. R&D and design are critical to the 
assembly process and final product. Once the product is developed and 
8 Vale finally obtained the environmental licence in March 2011, after scaling down 
production plans to 5 million tons annually. Although the US$ 6.2 billion Ubu Steel 
Company is fully owned by Vale, the Brazilian group is looking for a partner to develop 
the project.
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ready for sale, each brand spends heavily on marketing, as this, together 
with the quality of the product, determines customer preferences and 
loyalty. Producers and authorized dealers both participate in the final 
stages, including distribution and sales. These activities bridge the gap 
between producers and final buyers and are indispensable, regardless 
of whether the vehicle has been produced locally or procured through 
imports. After-sales activities, such as repair and inspection, reinforce 
the companies’ traditional marketing channels.
Latin America’s large and growing market makes it an attractive 
destination not only for companies seeking to export outside the 
region, but also for firms wanting to sell within the region itself. Most 
automobile companies that are already well established in Latin America 
are highly integrated along the value chain, while newcomers such as 
the Chinese Chery Automobile Co. Ltd. seem eager to follow the example 
of their peers, such as Nissan in Mexico and Moto Honda da Amazonia 
Ltda. in Brazil.
Chery, one of the China’s fastest growing automakers, saw a 
market niche in an equally fast-growing Latin American region. Chery 
cars were so well received by the public that the company decided to 
expand its activities in the region by forming a joint venture with the 
Argentine group SOCMA. The two companies hired OFEROL S.A. to 
assemble sports utility vehicles (SUVs) and A1 compact cars in Uruguay 
(stage IV), to taps the benefits of producing within the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR). About 60% of all parts come from China, Brazil 
and Argentina, while the rest is procured locally. The joint venture 
represents the largest FDI project in Uruguay, consolidating a local value 
chain. As sales have exceeded expectations, the plant has not been able to 
meet demand and the Chinese carmaker plans to expand production by 
building a new plant in São Paulo state, Brazil by 2013.
Given its active participation in the motorcycle market in Latin 
America in general, and Brazil in particular, Honda began operations 
in Brazil in 1971 by importing motorcycles through the establishment 
of Moto Honda do Brasil. Five years later, Moto Honda da Amazonia 
was created to produce stationary engines (stage II), motorcycles and 
all-terrain vehicles (stage IV).  In addition, two more firms were created: 
one to produce and import motorcycle parts (stage II) and the other 
to work on innovation (stage III). Moreover, one warehouse and two 
distribution centres were established (stage VI). Finally, as a part of the 
company’s brand creation and marketing efforts, Honda Access was 
established as a source of original parts, apparel and other services for 
Honda motorcycle riders. 
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Diagram II.3 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN







Stage IV: CKD assembly plant.
Stage V-VI-VII: Marketing and sales dealerships.
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Stage III: R&D innovation.
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Stage V: Honda Access and advertising
Stage VI -VII: Distribution centres and dealers.
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Stage IV: Civic, City and Fit production.
Stage V: Marketing and brand creation
Stage VI -VII: Distribution networks and dealers. Nissan Mexicana, S.A
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Source: Prepared by the author.
In 1997, Honda entered the automobile-producing business in Latin 
America with a production plant (stage IV) for specic models (Civic, 
City and Fit models). Other car models were imported from Japan or the 
United States. Although Honda’s automobile distribution network was 
smaller than its motorcycle network, the sixth and seventh sections of the 
value chain have clearly been in place since the company started its initial 
importing phase. Marketing and brand creation have likewise formed 
crucial components of Honda operations in Brazil. 
Nissan also rst explored Latin America through imports, starting 
with a network in Mexico, together with a warehouse and a distribution 
centre for Datsun cars and auto parts in 1959 (stage VI). Two years later 
Nissan started producing automobiles, and continues to do so today at 
two factories located in Aguascalientes and Cuernavaca (stage IV). Its 
entire operation revolves around the importance of R&D, for which a 
technological development centre, a prototype-modelling centre, and 
an emissions laboratory were set up. That section of the value chain 
was essential to the development of key components such as engines 
(stage II). Stages V through VII of the value chain are controlled by the 
main Nissan Mexico regional ofces located in Mexico City.
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1. Chery Socma S.A. Uruguay
In contrast with Brazil and Mexico, Uruguay only recently started 
manufacturing auto parts and assembling vehicles. Currently, there are 
around 40 manufacturers of automobiles and auto parts in Uruguay. 
Uruguay has struggled to make a name for itself within MERCOSUR and 
to attract foreign automobile investors successfully.
Chery Socma S.A. is a joint venture set up in May 2007 between 
Chery Automobile Co. Ltd. of China, Socma of Argentina and Oferol 
of Uruguay, with an initial investment of US$ 12 million.9 Chery holds 
51% of the total shares and the Macri Group (Socma) of Argentina 
holds the remaining 49%. Oferol of Uruguay acts as the assembler. The 
creation of Chery Socma was intended to combine Socma knowledge of 
the automobile market in MERCOSUR and assembly plants for Fiat and 
Peugeot in Uruguay and Argentina, with the innovative technologies 
and products of Chery.10 Nowadays, Chery Socma produces 25,000 
units per year.
The joint venture assembles SUVs and A1 compact cars in Carrasco, 
Uruguay, through a complete knocked-down or CKD process,11 utilizing 
imported parts from China, Brazil and Argentina and local parts 
manufactured in Uruguay. Chery Socma targets mostly the Argentine 
and Brazilian markets. Initially, 40% of auto parts were procured within 
the region to meet the MERCOSUR rules of origin for tariff-free exports 
to other member countries. A special agreement between Brazil and 
Uruguay obliged the company to increase local content to 60% within a 
three-year period in order to continue to receive preferential treatment. 
If Chery were unable to meet the local content threshold, it would still 
be able to export a limited number of automobiles to Brazil tariff-free 
provided at least half of all parts had been procured locally.12
9 Chery reported remarkable growth: its first unit was produced in 1999, while its mass 
production grew from 50,000 to 1 million units between 2002 and 2007. Today, Chery is 
the fourth largest producer on the domestic automobile market in China and the leader 
among Chinese-owned groups abroad. Chery has formed alliances with large international 
automobile manufacturers such as Chrysler and Fiat.
10 In 2007, Chery also entered into a joint venture with Uruguayan firms Bognor and Socma 
to produce bulletproof automobiles at the Oferol facilities in Uruguay.
11 Complete Knocked-Down refers to a dismantled kit coming from the home country, to be 
reassembled at a subsidiary in the host country.
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Source: Prepared by the author.
Moreover, Chery Socma constitutes the largest Chinese FDI project 
in Uruguay and is the rst Chinese operation in the auto industry in 
Latin America. Apart from assembly companies, several foreign investors 
have entered the auto parts manufacturing industry in Uruguay, which 
reinforces the local industry’s value creation and assures Chery of 
the procurement of raw materials. Examples of foreign investors with 
signicant equity shares include Bader, ArcelorMittal, GKN Driveline, 
Dana Corporation, and Yazaki Corporation (Uruguay XXI, 2011).
Uruguayan automobile assembly lines had gained expertise after 
the creation of MERCOSUR, but subsequently suffered from the crises 
that hit Argentina, in particular, and the world economy in general 
(Bittencourt and others, 2010). The slacker demand following the crisis has 
proven disastrous for sustaining previous production levels. The World 
Investment Report stated that, by December 2009 alone, “production [in 
the automobile sector] fell year-on-year by over 51% in Brazil and 47% 
in Argentina” (UNCTAD, 2009). Several assembly plants had to shut 
down and, in the case of Oferol in Uruguay, had their focus redirected to 
armoured cars, with the plant using 30% of its installed capacity.
Despite the success of its SUV model Tiggo13 on the Brazilian 
market after the 2009 crisis, the plant had trouble expanding production 
13 The model was nominated (but finally not chosen) as “SUV of the Year” by Brazilian 
magazine Auto Sporte, which demonstrates the way the Chinese brand is valued in the 
Brazilian market.  
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to the degree expected by Chery (El País, 2010). In 2010, the Chinese group 
announced an agreement with the São Paulo state government in Brazil to 
build the first Chinese automaker plant in the city of Jacarei, with a total 
investment of US$ 400 million. The plant should produce 50,000 units 
annually by 2013.
2. Moto Honda da Amazonia
Honda Motor Co. Ltd. has several affiliated companies producing 
motorcycles, automobiles and power products, mostly located in Japan 
and other Asian countries. It has many subsidiaries on other continents, 
including Latin America: one in Argentina and three in Brazil. 
In Brazil, Honda launched its activities in 1971 with Honda Motor 
do Brasil. It first imported motorcycles and two years later expanded its 
business to power products. In 1976, Honda built a plant called Moto 
Honda da Amazonia Ltda (HDA) to produce motorcycles, quads (all 
terrain vehicles – ATVs) and stationary engines, in Manaus, Amazonas 
state. HDA also controlled two other companies located in the same 
area: Honda Componentes da Amazonia Ltda (HCA), producing 
parts, and Honda Tecnologia da Amazonia Indústria e Comércio Ltda. 
(HTA), responsible for R&D. In 1992, Brazil began to liberalize imports, 
including automobiles and parts, and Honda started importing its cars. 
High demand for its imported cars led to the establishment of Honda 
Automóveis do Brasil (HAB) in 1997, in Sumaré, São Paulo state. By 
2009, HAB had produced 700,000 automobiles and HDA 13 million 
motorcycles in Brazil.14 
Despite the growing competition led by Yamaha, HDA has retained 
the leading position in the Brazilian market, with a 70%-80% market 
share. The most successful model has been the Honda CG FAN 125cc, 
which enjoys great popularity on account of its fuel economy, resale value 
and low maintenance cost. Although the domestic market constitutes its 
priority, HDA also exports motorcycles to other Latin American countries, 
its only exporter competitor within this sector being Yamaha.
HDA has subsidiaries in most parts of the value chain to satisfy its 
growing demand. Moto Honda da Amazonia runs a non-stop production 
plant in Manaus to meet the demand for motorcycles in Brazil. HDA has 
742 dealers nationwide both for the sale of motorbikes and spare parts, and 
for providing after-sales service and repairs. HDA has also established an 
14 As expected, domestic sales and exports were affected by the international crisis in 2009. 
Nevertheless, projections by the Brazilian Association of Producers of Motorcycles and 
other two-wheelers (ABRACICLO) pointed to a recovery in 2010 and 2011 to levels similar 
to those of 2008.
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R&D centre called Honda Tecnologia da Amazonia Indústria e Comércio 
Ltda (HTA).15 In addition, Honda Componentes da Amazonia Ltda. 
(HCA) manufactures genuine parts and imports components needed 
for use elsewhere in the manufacturing process from Japan. HDA has a 
warehouse in Sumaré, and two distribution centres elsewhere, which 
maintain inventories and ensure the distribution of motorcycle spare parts 
nationwide. Honda Access Ltda. is a subsidiary that provides genuine 
parts and apparel for Honda motorcycle customers. Diagram II.5 depicts 
the relationships among the group’s companies, offering an overview of 
Honda supply chain management.
Diagram II.5 
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT










 Source: Prepared by the author.
3. Honda Automóveis do Brasil Ltda.
After importing Honda automobiles for ve years, HAB set up its 
rst factory in 1997, in Sumaré, São Paulo. After 12 years of production, 
Honda ranked fifth (with a 5% market share) in the highly competitive 
Brazilian automobile market, behind Volkswagen, Fiat, GM and Ford, 
but ahead of Renault, Peugeot, Mercedes-Benz and Toyota. The company 
has adopted and introduced new production processes to maintain high 
quality standards. 
15 In 2009, Honda started manufacturing and selling the world’s first flexible motor fuel 
engines, equipped with  a Mix Fuel Injection System in the new model CG150 TITAN 
MIX, which runs on a combination of ethanol and gasoline. This technology reduces 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and fuel costs.
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So far, the company has focused on the production of three types of 
vehicle (City, Civic and Fit), which has enabled economies of scale. Honda’s 
focalized production strategy within a single category has made its 
achievements in Brazil even more interesting. The latest model produced 
at the HAB plant is the City FFV (fuel exible vehicle). Imports from 
production bases in Japan, Mexico and the United States cater for domestic 
demand for other models of Honda (SUVs and sedans). The four largest 
automobile producers have also dominated exports and yet, apart from 
Volkswagen —which has a much longer history in Brazil— Honda exports 
a smaller share of automobiles to other countries in the Americas than 
companies as Ford and GM (see gure II.1). The MERCOSUR countries are 
an important destination for Honda exports, accounting for up to 94% of 
exports of the Civic model.
Figure II.1 

















Source: National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (ANFAVEA) of Brazil, 2012.
4. Nissan Mexicana S.A.
Nissan Motors is a Japanese company (established in 1933) operating 
in auto manufacturing, sales and related activities, along with industrial and 
marine equipment businesses. Working in a strategic alliance with Renault 
for the past decade, the company’s global production and sales were about 
3.4 million units in 2009 (Nissan, 2010). Nissan has three production sites in 
Latin America, in Mexico and Brazil, and two sales networks in Chile. 
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Nissan Mexicana has become Asia’s largest automobile producer in 
Mexico, and constitutes an important asset to the Japanese automaker. It 
has fully integrated production facilities for design, R&D, manufacturing, 
sales and management, at nine locations throughout Mexico, to meet the 
high demand from the United States and European markets (see table II.3). 
The latest addition to its value chain was a prototype-modelling centre 
located in Mexicali. 
Table II.3 
FACILITIES OF NISSAN MEXICANA
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data from Nissan Mexicana.
a This facility is considered an investment by Nissan Design America in Mexican territory.
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The group owns two production plants at Aguascalientes and 
Cuernavaca, with a production capacity of 350,000 units and 250,000 
units, respectively.16 Cuernavaca was the first Nissan plant ever 
established outside Japan. In 2010, the company announced a plan to 
increase its production capacity from 22,450 units to 134,000 units by 
March 2011. The Aguascalientes plant was established in 1982 as part 
of Nissan’s strategic plan to strengthen its internationalization strategy. 
This plant was so successful that Nissan has used it as a benchmark 
for other production sites within the region and beyond. Competitive 
labour costs and State support have also contributed to its success. In 
2006, the plant introduced a system of rotating three groups of workers 
in two shifts per day to keep operation at optimal capacity. As a result, 
annual production jumped from 203,000 to 350,000 units without any 
new investment in infrastructure.
The Aguascalientes plant has three sections: engine production, 
vehicle assembling and warehousing. The first section has two types 
of systems operating.17 In the second section, the vehicle assembling 
process is divided into four stages. Steel plates are manufactured 
through press forming processes and then welded and processed in 
a vehicle bodyline. For this stage, the company adapted the Nissan 
Integrated Manufacturing System (NIMS) line, seeking to improve 
its operation while reducing the likelihood of error. Along with low 
labour costs, NIMS has helped to improve product competitiveness 
by achieving a 72% automation rate. After each unit has undergone 
the painting stage, the processed vehicle plates are moved to the 
assembly line.
After the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came 
into force, the Government of Mexico eliminated several protectionist 
policies, including the Automotive Decree and minimum local content 
requirements (Moreno, 1996). Moreover, domestic manufacturers were 
allowed to import up to 10% of their total production into Mexico 
tariff-free. Most of the parts and components supply is still heavily 
concentrated with Japanese producers.18 
16 The company may see production rise in the coming years due to the introduction of three 
subcompact models (The Economic Times, 2010).
17 One is a mixed production system that produces a large number of engines. The other, a 
caravan production system, manufactures fewer engines in a shorter time.
18 There are significant risks when production is highly concentrated in one country, in this 
case, Japan. Following the devastating earthquake and tsunami of March 2011 in Japan, 
several production processes across the globe have been affected by shortages of parts.
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C. The electronics industry
The electronics value chain resembles that of the automobile industry in 
terms of its extensive nature and the key role of the procurement of raw 
materials. It includes several layers of parts and components producers. 
They sell not only amongst themselves, but also directly to the brand 
or company operating the final assembly.  In the third section of the 
value chain, firms undertake R&D and design in an effort to enhance 
the scope and quality of the product line. Therefore, these activities are 
closely related to the manufacturing processes of main components and 
final assembly lines. Brand marketing is vital in promoting the public’s 
acceptance of a given product. Its activities are intense, given the highly 
competitive electronics market and the rapid pace of technological change 
towards the offering of new products.  Finally, distribution and sales are 
conducted by parent companies and authorized dealers.
With the exception of two companies, Asian investors in Latin 
America have integrated their operations throughout the entire value 
chain, except for the stages dealing with the production of raw materials 
and the creation of R&D centres. The first exception is LG Brazil, which 
has completely internationalized its operations and relies heavily on 
local human resources to develop regional business19 So far, LG is the 
only electronics company to run a local R&D centre in São Paulo to 
strengthen its presence in the mobile market (stage III). The second 
exception is the Chinese group Huawei, which has a production plant for 
telecommunications products in Brazil, together with a manufacturing 
management support centre, a training centre for its employees, a spare 
parts centre and a logistics centre (stages V to VII). These additional 
investments have helped to create an extensive customer-oriented service 
network that enhances the Huawei market position in the mobile phone, 
USB modem, and mobile broadband markets.
Other FDI investors include Panasonic and Samsung. Panasonic has 
factories in two locations: in São José do Campos (São Paulo state) where 
it produces and exports batteries, flashlights, mechanical components for 
audio and video, and microwave components (stage II); and in Manaus 
(Amazonia), where it has a production plant (stage IV) and a component 
manufacturing plant (stage II). The other company is Samsung, for 
whom Latin America is the second most important continent in terms of 
investments. Samsung has operations in Manaus and Campinas in Brazil, 
where it assembles mobile phones, monitors, AV products and hard disk 
drives (stages II and IV). In 2011, Samsung added a new air-conditioner 
19 LG Brazil operates factories in the Manaus, Paulinia and Taubate regions. The first location 
produces televisions, videocassette recorders (VCRs) and A/C stations (stage IV), the 
second, home appliances and the third, mobile telephones and monitors (stages II and IV).
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production line, while a laptop computer factory is expected to start 
operations shortly. Samsung has become a main provider of electronic 
goods within Brazil, with strong exports to the rest of Latin America 
(stages VI and VII). In Mexico, Samsung has production sites in Tijuana 
(on the Baja California Peninsula) and in Queretaro. Both plants produce 
liquid crystal display (LCD) and plasma display panel (PDP) televisions, 
mobile handsets and LCD monitors (stage IV). The Samsung distribution 
network covers the entire Mexican territory, guaranteeing local sales and 
exports to its most important market in the United States, and to other 
Latin American countries (stages VI and VII).
Diagram II.6 
THE ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN
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Source: Prepared by the author.
1. Panasonic do Brasil Ltda. (PANABRAS)
In 1967, the Japanese company Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Corporation launched its rst operation in Brazil, with a sales ofce 
in São Paulo. At that time, the company imported batteries from Japan 
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and commercialized them locally. In 1974, it established a factory in São 
José dos Campos (São Paulo state), under the name of National do Brasil 
Comercial Ltda. and produced batteries under the brand name National. 
By 1980, the company was exporting batteries to Bolivia and televisions 
to Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Panama. National do Brasil 
inaugurated an air-conditioner factory in 1984, and a home appliances 
division in 1987 (see table II.4).
Table II.4 
CHRONOLOGY OF PANASONIC DO BRASIL (COMPANY STRUCTURE), 1967-2006
Year Event
1967 Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation opened an office in São Paulo
1974 The Matsushita Group established National do Brasil Comercial Ltda., a battery factory 
in São José dos Campos
1981 Springer National da Amazônia Ltda. was created in Manaus
1982 Springer National Componentes S.A. was established in Manaus
1984 National do Brasil inaugurated the air-conditioner factory in São José dos Campos
1987 National do Brasil created the Home Appliances Division
1988 National do Brasil became Panasonic do Brasil; Springer National da Amazônia and 
Springer National Componentes became Panasonic da Amazônia
2001 Springer sold its shares of Panasonic da Amazônia to Panasonic do Brasil
2006 Panasonic da Amazônia S.A. unified the name to Panasonic do Brasil Ltda. 
(PANABRAS)
Source: Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation, 2008.
Matsushita expanded its operations to Manaus in 1981 as an export 
base to other countries in the Latin American region and to the United 
States. It opened a factory through a joint venture between National do 
Brasil and Springer Amazônia Indústria e Comércio. Springer had just 
finished a two-decade contract with a United States company (Admiral), 
which had provided the company with expertise in refrigerators and air 
conditioners. The production also made it necessary to establish Springer 
National, a parts factory, nearby. In 1988, the Matsushita Group changed 
the brand name from National to Panasonic, following an international 
strategy of brand unification. The company in Manaus proceeded to 
incorporate the parts factory and changed its name to Panasonic da 
Amazônia. In 2001, Springer sold its shares to Panasonic do Brasil, which 
now controls the entire production and sales process.  Panasonic do Brasil 
in Manaus has made the most of its geographical location and the benefits 
of its special fiscal regime to boost exports to Colombia, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Panama, Mexico and the United States.
Adapting to the growing number of middle-income consumers in 
Brazil, Panasonic has become more aggressive in its sales strategy, advertising 
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accessories for luxury cars and high-end home appliances. Today, Panasonic 
do Brasil employs around 2,000 people and plans to build another factory in 
Brazil before 2016. It produces batteries (manganese and alkaline), flashlights, 
mechanical components for audio and video, and microwave components at 
its São José dos Campos production site, and televisions, audio appliances, 
recorders, watches, microwave ovens, DVD players, cell phone batteries, 
digital cameras and LCD screens at its Manaus location. 
2. Toshiba T&D do Brasil Ltda.
Toshiba T&D do Brasil Ltda. (TTB) is a subsidiary of Toshiba 
Corporation, and is located in the city of Contagem, Minas Gerais state. 
In 1968, TTB started off producing distribution transformers in Contagem. 
Today, the company produces a wider range of transformers, such as 
power, furnace, rectifier and cycle-converter transformers, as well as 
step voltage regulators, derivation shunt reactors, pressure relief valves 
and fans. This Brazilian Toshiba affiliate is strategically important to the 
Japanese headquarters, as it contributes to the development of the electrical 
power sector in countries within South, Central and North America. The 
company conducts business with clients in Colombia, Argentina, Paraguay, 
Guatemala, Mexico and the United States, in addition to Brazil.
The Toshiba Corporation also established another subsidiary in 
Curitiba (Paraná state), Toshiba Sistemas T&D do Brasil Ltda. (TSTB), 
which focuses on manufacturing equipment to supply energy generation, 
transmission and distribution, as well as on industrial and infrastructural 
goods. Its main products are SF6 gas circuit breakers, disconnect switches, 
protection and control systems, surge arresters, gas insulated or GIS 
substations, medium voltage or MV cubicles and vacuum circuit breakers. 
In sum, TTB (Contagem) produces transformers, targeting industries as 
clients, while TSTB (Curitiba) produces larger energy systems that target 
governments and infrastructural projects.
Toshiba Corporation also has a joint venture with Sociedade Eletro 
Mercantil Paulista (SEMP) in the industrial zone of Manaus, named 
SEMP Toshiba Amazonas S.A. This joint venture has become one of the 
main television manufacturers in Brazil. Over the past three decades, the 
company has diversified and modernized its production, including LCD 
televisions, digital television converters, DVD players, stereos and (fixed 
and mobile) phones. In 1998, the company entered the computer business 
by establishing Semp Toshiba Informática (STI) in Salvador, Bahia state. The 
growing demand for computers, especially notebooks, in Brazil, has led STI 
to expand its production constantly, employing over 400 people in Bahia 
alone. Another joint venture, Semp Toshiba Componentes, also located in 
Manaus, produces parts for both Semp Toshiba Amazonas and Informática.
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3. Huawei do Brasil
Huawei Brazil was founded in 1999, with offices in Rio de Janeiro, 
São Paulo, and Brasilia. By 2005, its investment had grown to US$ 100 
million (Huawei do Brazil, 2008). The Campinas facility includes a 
technical support centre, training centre, and a spare parts and logistics 
centre. Huawei employs about 400 staff, 75% of whom are local employees. 
It is the market leader in fixed and mobile broadband goods, holding 
about 70% of the USB modem market with more than 1 million terminals 
sold. The company also leads the supply of infrastructure for fixed and 
mobile telephone services in Brazil, serving other markets such as the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA), Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) and Datacom. Most 
Huawei clients in Brazil and Latin America are local telecom providers, 
including Telemar.
By 2007, Latin America had become Huawei’s most significant 
market. The company has no production sites in Brazil. It is mainly a 
service provider, focusing on the development and implementation 
of communications technologies, for which marketing and customer 
services are key areas. The company has partnerships with major 
national operators such as Telemar, Brasil Telecom and some government 
departments and major financial companies. Huawei has established 
four training centres in Latin America (in Campinas, Mexico City, Bogota 
and Caracas) with the capacity to train 380 trainees simultaneously. A 
wide range of high-quality technical training sessions have been made 
available. By May 2008, 12,000 trainees had been trained at these facilities. 
Huawei Brazil has a threefold strategy: innovation, partnership 
and localization. The first, innovation, includes the introduction of next-
generation technology such as voice-, data-, and multimedia services in 
emerging markets. The second, partnership in Brazil, is a long-term goal 
that seeks cooperation in logistics, engineering and support services. It 
may also go further to include strategic alliances with industrial leaders. 
The company’s third strategy, localization, seeks to incorporate local 
entities and investment, hiring local staff, cooperating with local partners, 
logistics and support infrastructure, and establishing cross-cultural 
communication (Huawei do Brazil, 2008).
4. Samsung Electrónica da Amazonia Ltda. (SEDA)
Samsung Electrónica da Amazonia Ltda. (SEDA) was established 
in Manaus, Brazil in 1996 as a subsidiary of Samsung Electronics 
Corporation (SEC). Nowadays, it operates one plant in Manaus and 
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another in Campinas, employing around 5,000 workers, producing 
electronics products such as television sets, mobile phones, monitors, 
as well as audiovisual (AV) products and hard disk drives (HDDs) for 
the domestic and overseas markets. SEDA sales grew rapidly to reach 
US$ 2.7 billion by 2008.
Brazil is attractive to Samsung not only because of its vast market, 
but also for its great potential as a production platform for the rest of 
the Americas. Traditionally, Samsung produced cheap home appliances, 
mainly in Brazil, Mexico and China, and concentrated the production of 
premium goods for the United States market at its Korean facilities (Park, 
2010). However, in view of the need to satisfy the rapidly increasing 
domestic demand of middle- and high-income consumers in Brazil, 
Samsung decided to produce better-quality goods within Brazil, thereby 
reducing distribution costs and enabling a faster response to changing 
market conditions. With this goal in mind, SEDA invested heavily in the 
local production of leading Samsung products, such as mobile phones 
and television sets. 
SEDA is a key player in the domestic market for television sets 
and mobile phones; it has now entered the market for air conditioners 
and computers as well. It ranked second in terms of market share 
of LCD television sets in Brazil in 2008. The SEDA Manaus plant 
produces 300,000 television sets per year. As Brazil produces only a 
few of the components of LCD and plasma television sets, most parts 
are imported from Samsung subsidiaries and other companies abroad. 
SEDA was the first company to introduce LED television sets in Brazil, 
and monopolized sales for about a year before competitors appeared. 
SEDA is also an important player in the mobile phone market. The 
company had planned to operate a new manufacturing line within the 
Manaus plant to meet increasing demand, with an annual production 
of about 500,000 mobile phones by 2011 (Jung, 2011). It is also 
entering new product markets: its Manaus plant began producing air 
conditioners in September 2010, and the Campinas plant will soon start 
producing computers. 
The success of SEDA can be attributed, in part, to the creation 
of an innovative supply network. This system detects detailed global 
market changes by region and product, in real time, and distributes the 
information to supply and sales networks. In turn, production quantities 
are constantly adjusted to sales records. This system thus allows 
Samsung to adjust quickly to customers’ needs (Park, 2010). Another 
reason for its success is that Samsung involves local human resources in 
running the business, including in management positions.
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Table II.5 
SAMSUNG ELECTRó NICA DA AMAzONIA: PRODUCTION HISTORY, 1995-2011
Year Production
1995 (December) Started production of CRT TVs and VCRs
1996 (January) Started sales
1998 (July) Started production of computer monitors
1999 (March) Started production of mobile handsets
1999 Stopped production of TVs
2002 (March) Started production of HDDs
2004 (January) Relocated mobile handset plant to Campinas
2004 (March) Started production in Campinas
2004 (October) Resumed production and sales of TVs
2007 (February) Started production of mobile handsets (CDMA à GSM)
2011 (March) Started laptop production
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data from Samsung Electrónica da Amazonia Ltda. (SEDA).
5. Samsung Mexicana S.A. de C.V. (SAMEX)
Samsung established two subsidiaries in Mexico: Samsung 
Mexicana (SAMEX) in Tijuana, Baja California in 1988 and Samsung 
Electronics Mexico (SEM) in Queretaro. Prior to this, SAMEX had mainly 
produced cathode-ray tubes (CRT) for televisions, computers and cellular 
phones. Nowadays, SAMEX focuses on producing LCD and PDP television 
sets, LCD monitors and mobile handsets. Its plant in Tijuana produces 
over 1.3 million LCDs per month. Samsung is a leading electronics 
multinational, especially in the United States and European markets. 
Samsung’s annual sales have increased by a 26% average since 2003, based 
on a market strategy of high quality and advanced technology. In addition, 
most products manufactured by SAMEX are exported to the United States 
and Canada (80%) benefiting from NAFTA, while the remainder is sold to 
the rest of Latin America (12%) and the Mexican domestic market (8%).
SAMEX uses large amounts of imported parts and components, 
such as casings, screens, panels, mother boards, semiconductors and 
other critical parts, from Chinese, Korean and Japanese suppliers. 
Many local suppliers are subsidiaries of other foreign rms. In Tijuana, 
30 out of 53 supply companies are of Korean origin, and among those 
30 companies, 70% are in partnership with SAMEX (see table 6). Few 
products and services are purchased from Mexican suppliers, as they 
often do not meet the strict quality standards established by SAMEX. 
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Table II.6 
SAMSUNG MEXICANA: KOREAN SUPPLY PARTNERS, 1991-2007
Name of corporation Year of entry Handling area
Cobuy 2007 Electronic components
KOMEX 2006 TV & MNT cabinet
NOSCOM 1999 Electronic injection and assembly
Taewoo Mexico 1999 TV monitor stand base
Daedong Corp. 2000 Plastic moulding (TV)
Chemtronics 2007 PBA for LCD/PDP
Daewon 1991 Van-trailer parts
Daeha Cable 1997 TV and industrial wire harness, cable assembly
Samsung SDI 1995 Display device
Dongchul Mexico 1994 Bracket, heat sink
Seshin electronics 2001 EPS resin
Han-il electronics Mexico 1998 PCB assembly
Source: Samsung Mexicana (SAMEX), 2009.
6. LG Electronics do Brasil
In 1995, LG Electronics (LG) established production plants in 
Brazil, both to avoid high import tariffs on finished goods and to reduce 
the distance between production centres and the Brazilian market.20 The 
firm has three production plants. The first is LG Electronics da Amazonia 
(LGEAZ) located in Manaus, which started operations in 1995 and 
produces home appliances such as TVs, VCRs, and air conditioners. The 
second is LG Electronics de São Paulo Ltda. (LGESP) operating in Taubate, 
which started in 1996 and manufactures mobile telephones and monitors. 
The third plant opened in Paulinia21 in October 2011. Between 1996 and 
2010, LG invested US$ 28 billion in its Brazilian plants, and plans to invest 
another US$ 5.8 billion for the production of LCDs and plasma television 
sets, aiming to produce 2.55 million television sets by 2012. However, LG 
products are manufactured with minimum local content. The Manaus 
plant reported that local supplies (plastic front and back covers and boxes) 
represent 6%-10% of all inputs in the case of CRTs, and 3%-4% in the case of 
digital television (D-TVs). In 2008, sales of LG Electronics do Brasil reached 
US$ 28 billion, with exports accounting for less than 7% of all sales.
20 LG Electronics was founded in the Republic of Korea as Goldstar Co. Ltd. in 1958. In 1995, 
the company changed its name to LG. It has 114 subsidiaries around the world, employing 
82,000 people. In Latin America, LG has sales offices in 12 countries, and production sites 
in Brazil and Mexico.
21 The city of Paulinia donated the construction site and provided tax concessions for the 
operation of this new plant. In return, LG should employ at least 20% of the local work force.
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The success of LG in Brazil can be explained, in part, by its emphasis 
on hiring local employees in every business area, including marketing 
and production.  Korean workers take on only the role of connecting 
the subsidiary with the parent company in the Republic of Korea (Kim, 
2010). LG aims to locate all stages of its production chain within the Latin 
American region, from R&D to production, sales and customer services. 
D. The textiles and apparel sector
The global textile sector and apparel industries are both part of the same 
global value chain, but are situated in different groups of countries. Most 
apparel firms are in developing countries, benefiting from cheap, unskilled 
labour. In contrast, textile production has remained in developed or 
transition economies, as it is intensive in capital and R&D. High value 
added activities are concentrated in R&D, design and brand creation.
This section looks at Korean-owned apparel production affiliates 
in Central America serving the United States market. Being original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) contractors for major brands, these 
companies also subcontract to smaller Korean small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) located in and outside the region, for such activities 
as procurement of raw materials (fabrics and trims) and shipment to final 
clients in the United States. Therefore, the value chain processes performed 
in Latin America are limited to design (mostly part of a full package deal), 
assembly and distribution activities.22
Over the past two decades, Korean companies have focused on OEM 
services, i.e. mass production of pre-ordered designs for their customers. 
However, lately, these large producers have entered the original design 
manufacturing (ODM) business, where companies participate in the 
entire production process and serve the final market by creating their own 
brands. Entering the design phase, while seemingly an upgrade of the 
Korean firms’ participation in the value chain, is mostly intended to create 
their own collections for their home market. That is, the bulk of design 
projects are concentrated in the Republic of Korea.
In terms of production, exports and investment in Central America, 
the three largest Korean companies are Sae-A, Hansae and Hansoll. 
Sae-A is by far the largest Korean operation in the subregion, with six 
production lines located in Guatemala and four in Nicaragua. As part of 
its production facilities, Sae-A also owns printing technology for more 
22 There are other Chinese and Korean apparel producers in South America. However, their 
production capacity is smaller than that of producers in Central America, and produce for 
domestic markets.
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sophisticated goods. The company’s production consists mainly of crews, 
polo shirts, pants and graphic tees (stages V and VI). Hansoll, the smallest 
of the three Korean apparel rms in Central America, produces apparel 
at one location in Guatemala and another in Honduras, and works with 
several subcontractors to increase its production capacity. Hansae manages 
sewing factories in Nicaragua and Guatemala which, about a decade ago, 
had rapidly become Hansae’s major sources of revenue. Recently, however, 
the company’s expansion has been mostly in South East Asia, particularly 
in Viet Nam. Nonetheless, Central America remains an important 
contributor to Hansae’s total revenues.
Diagram II.7 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN





























































Stage VI: 10 sewing factories (Guatemala and Nicaragua).
Stage IX: Distribution networks in Latin America and New York City.
Hansoll
Stage V: Design
Stage VI: 3 sewing factories in Guatemala and Honduras.
Stage IX: Distribution networks within the United States.
Hansae
Stage V: Design
Stage VI: Factories in Nicaragua and Honduras.
Stage IX: Distribution networks within the United States.
Source: Prepared by the author.
1. Sae-A
Sae-A was founded in the Republic of Korea in 1986 and rapidly 
expanded its operations abroad with a focus on the United States market. 
After consolidating its position at home, in the mid-1990s Sae-A invested 
in new production plants in developing countries and sales ofces in 
the United States. The company invested mainly in production sites in 
Central America, geographically closer to its United States customers, 
starting with several factories in Guatemala and later adding new 
facilities in Nicaragua. Recently Sae-A investment efforts have shifted 
towards South East Asia (Indonesia and Viet Nam), both to maintain price 
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competitiveness as labour costs in Central America have risen, and to 
serve the rapidly growing consumer demand in Asia. Nevertheless, half 
of its global production has remained in the Central American subregion.
From 2000 to 2010, Sae-A export revenues expanded at an 
average annual rate of 20%. They grew from US$ 21 million in 1995 to 
US$ 126 million in 2000 and US$ 980 million in 2010. As an 
acknowledgement of its performance, the company has received two 
awards from the Government of Korea as part of a programme monitoring 
the performance of the nation’s exporting firms. Most Sae-A clients are 
located in the United States and, therefore, its trading offices in New York 
and Los Angeles play a strategic role in its global operations. Recently, 
the company has expanded its list of clients to include prominent brands 
such as Adidas, Oshkosh B’Gosh, Levi’s, Pacific Sunwear of California (Pac 
Sun), Express, Forever 21, and K-mart (see table II.7).
Table II.7 
SAE-A, HANSOLL AND HANSAE: MAIN BUYERS
SAE-A HANSOLL HANSAE
Buyer Country Buyer Country Buyer Country
Target United States La Senza United States Gap United States
Wal-Mart United States Liz Claiborne United States Kohl’s United States
Gap United States Adidas Germany Old navy United States
Kohl’s United States American Eagle United States Nike United States
Liz Claiborne United States Old navy United States Target United States
Aeropostale United States Delias United States The limited United States
Lane Bryant United States Express United States
Adidas Germany Gilly Hicks United States
Gymboree United States Hollister United States
Abercrombie 
& Fitch
United States The Limited United States
Bcbg 
Maxazria
United States Gap United States
Carter’s United States Pink United States
Oshkosh 
B’gosh
United States Reebok United States
Levi’s United States Kohl’s United States
Pacific 
Sunwear
United States Justice United States
Express United States JC Penny United States
Forever21 United States Victoria’s Secret United States
K-mart United States Eddie Bauer United States







  Muji Japan   
Source: Prepared by the author.
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In Central America, the company first invested in Guatemala in 1998, 
and a few years later opened facilities in Nicaragua. Guatemala has become 
the site of six production facilities equipped with sewing machinery and 
printing technology in one factory. All together, there are 67 production 
lines for knitwear (mainly crews, polo shirts, pants and graphic tees) with 
a monthly capacity of 10.5 million units.  By 2010, the Guatemalan plants 
accounted for 31% of overall Sae-A production. In Nicaragua, the company 
has grown from two to four factories. These have 106 production lines 
for knitwear (mainly basic crews and pants) with a monthly capacity of 
4.3 million units. By 2010, the Nicaraguan plants accounted for 16% of 
global Sae-A production. 
2. Hansoll Textile
Hansoll Textile, established in 1992, is a Korean consortium of 
companies devoted to textiles, processing and final apparel-making. 
After opening its first overseas location on the island of Saipan in 1997, 
the company invested in Central America: first in Guatemala in 1998, 
and later in Honduras in 2000. During the past decade, Hansoll also 
expanded its production base to Asia, especially India and Cambodia. 
Rising costs led the company to shut down factories in Saipan (after 10 
years of operation) and Honduras (after three years). 
Hansoll exports have grown impressively from about US$6 
million in 1993 to about US$ 580 million in 2009. Its exports grew 
every year except 2005, when new competitors arrived following the 
liberalization of the global textile and apparel trade, upon the expiration 
of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (Multifibre 
Arrangement). After rapidly restructuring its operations, Hansoll 
regained export growth with a 30% rise in 2006. As in the case of other 
large textile groups, its major buyers are mainly located in the United 
States, even though certain brands served by the company are originally 
from Germany and Japan (see table II.7).
Hansoll’s Central American operations started in Guatemala in 
2000. With a monthly capacity of 1.1 million pieces and 12 sewing lines, it 
has been serving a diverse range of clients, including Kohl’s, Liz Claiborne 
and Walmart. The second Hansoll factory in Guatemala opened in 2003, 
with eight production lines, increasing production to 730,000 pieces per 
month. Similarly to other Korean apparel producers in Central America, 
this firm increases its production capacity for large orders by outsourcing 
to smaller Korean factories also located in the subregion, in order to 
guarantee timely delivery to United States clients. 
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3. Hansae
The rm was established in the Republic of Korea in 1982, where 
it has produced textiles for more than 15 years. In 1998, Hansae started 
overseas production in Central America, rst in Nicaragua and later in 
Guatemala in 2005. From 2003 to 2007, the company tripled its exports from 
US$ 193 million to US$ 530 million. All buyers are located in the United 
States, including Gap, Old Navy and Nike, among others.
Hansae investments in Asia expanded much faster than in Central 
America. It invested in countries such as China, Indonesia, Cambodia 
and, in particular, in Viet Nam, whose share in total Hansae exports grew 
from 18% in 2003 to 45% in 2007. As a consequence, Central America’s 
share in Hansae global production began to decrease from 2006 onwards 
(see gure II.2).
In summary, for most of the 1990s and in the previous decade, Korean 
companies provided mainly OEM services, which basically meant mass 
production of pre-ordered designs. However, lately, large producers such 
as Sae-A, Hansoll and Hansae have started to enter the ODM business, in 
which a company participates in the entire process, from the development of 
fabrics and fashion designs to the creation of its own collections. 
Figure II.2 
HANSAE: CONTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES’ FACTORIES 
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  Source: Hansae.
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E. Concluding remarks
Emerging markets, once an arena of marginal importance, have now 
become essential to the competitiveness and growth of many foreign 
companies. Despite the mixed results of studies on the effectiveness of FDI 
incentives, there seems to be a consensus that foreign investment benefits 
the local economy (Farrell, 2004). For this reason, governments, both 
central and local, are eager to have their share of foreign capital, along 
with the transfers of technology and management skills that accompany 
it. Furthermore, the forward and backward linkages that FDI generates in 
local value chains are regarded as important benefits.
Many countries hosting manufacturing investments, especially 
the larger economies in Latin America, do require foreign investors to 
obtain supplies from local sources. Mexico imposes higher tariffs on 
products imported from countries without a free trade agreement, thereby 
strengthening local content requirements. In Brazil, imported products are 
subject to a higher tariff unless a company can prove that particular parts 
and materials are not available locally. 
However, foreign investors are often not satisfied with local supplies 
in Latin America. Common complaints include delayed deliveries, 
low quality and high cost. The presence of China, the most competitive 
manufacturer in the world, has given foreign investors little incentive to 
source from local supply chains. Even ever-rising trans-Pacific shipping 
costs are no impediment to goods made in East Asia in terms of delivery 
speed, quality and price. 
How do Asian investors respond to the dilemma of host-
government demands and local supply problems? The current report has 
identified company responses in two directions: importing “raw” parts 
and enhancing them by in-house assembly to categorize production as 
local (Brazil) or persuading Asian SMEs in the home-production network 
to invest locally (Mexico). For example, the Samsung Tijuana plant 
successfully lined up 22 local vendors in the area for digital television 
manufacturing, comprising mostly parts suppliers already existing in their 
Korean production network. Therefore, although as much as 43% of parts 
and materials may be locally supplied, many of them actually come from 
Korean SMEs in the maquila industry that supply large manufacturers 
like Samsung and LG. Either way, the spillover effects to local R&D and 
innovation are minimal when the core parts are imported from Asia. 
Therefore, the failure to build technology-intensive local supply 
chains has diminished the positive impact of Asian investments, leaving 
the creation of low-skilled employment by such multinational corporations 
(MNCs) as the only local benefit. 
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Is it possible for local Latin American suppliers to join the more 
sophisticated parts of the value chain? Should governments put more effort 
into strengthening innovation and capacity-building in local industries? 
Can they compete with their Asian counterparts? Unfortunately, the 
tentative answers may not be that positive.
The most typical regulations on MNCs are the strengthening of 
joint venture requirements and the local-contents requirement to purchase 
a certain percentage of inputs locally. However, it has been repeatedly 
argued that these regulations are of dubious effectiveness. MNCs in 
India and China source many contents locally even though they are not 
subject to local contents requirements. These two countries provide a 
large supply of relatively low-wage, skilled labour and a strong industrial 
base. Similarly, “Mexico began phasing out local-content requirements for 
automakers in 1994 but still has seven times more jobs in companies that 
make components” (Farrell, 2004).
It is worth recalling that most FDI entered Brazil only after the 
government stabilized its economy through the 1994 Real Plan. In this 
regard, host economies should concentrate on strengthening their 
economic foundations to maximize the benefits of FDI, by stabilizing 
the economy and promoting competitive markets, rather than relying on 
microeconomic incentives and regulations.
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Chapter III
Global services models for promoting 
economic integration between 
Asia and Latin America 1
Joaquín Piña
Introduction
This study looks at specific services sectors which could be instrumental 
in promoting and strengthening economic integration between Asia and 
Latin America. The focus is on the global services industry,  which offers a 
higher integration potential than traditional services sectors.
The global services industry grew out of three main trends: 
outsourcing, information technology (IT) development and offshoring. 
Outsourcing refers to a type of business restructuring in which a non-
core process formerly performed in-house is contracted to a third party 
or company. Offshoring refers to the overseas migration of certain 
operations, with or without outsourcing (National Academy of Public 
Administration 2006). 
Market deregulation and integration in the 1990s forced 
multinational companies to shift specific operations to less developed 
nations based on cost-saving opportunities. In the early stages of this 
1 The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without formal editing, 
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Organization.
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process, India secured a privileged position due to its rich pool of highly 
skilled, low-cost human resources in IT. Early offshoring/outsourcing 
involved low complexity tasks such as accounting and basic customer 
services. Growing IT capabilities supported a new range of higher-value-
added contracts, allowing multinational companies to save operational 
costs while concentrating on their core business. 
In the past decade, many emerging countries saw the opportunity 
and adopted active policies to promote their offshoring capacities, offering 
subsidies and other benefits to attract foreign investment and develop 
infrastructure. By 2012 this competitive scenario included South-East Asia, 
China, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America. There is an 
ongoing debate in developed countries about offshoring’s overall costs and 
benefits, as well as its motives and projections. This is particularly the case 
for higher-value-added segments; research has yet to determine whether 
R&D offshoring is a strategy to secure access to global talent or merely 
another form of labour- cost arbitrage (Lewin and Couto, 2006). 
No official global services data are available. Such data are 
considered a subset of the commercial services account which individual 
countries register in their balance of payments. The services account 
includes three main items: transportation services, travel-related services, 
and other commercial services (also known as non-traditional services). 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has estimated the total current 
volume for other commercial services, leaving global services to private 
estimates which lack official status.
A. Analysis of offshoring industries 
in Latin America and Asia
1. Definition and international trends
Offshoring (offshore sourcing) has been defined as an international 
business strategy that enables companies to shift manufacturing or 
service activities overseas, sourcing high-skilled human resources with 
cost advantages (Bhide, 2005). The offshoring of services is a recent 
development: a few decades ago services were considered non-tradable 
and offshoring possibilities were limited to the sourcing of manufacturing 
components. IT development has been signalled as one of the key factors 
in international trade in services. Significant process improvement 
through new communication platforms, automation tools, supply chain 
and inventory management, and simulation technologies were the main 
drivers of business process outsourcing and offshoring, enabling value-
chain fragmentation in vertically integrated industries. The global services 
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industry is related to the vertical integration of industries, and has shown 
unprecedented growth in terms of business segments, market size, country 
positioning, corporate strategies and revenue, and trade volumes.
(a) Main services segments
Services offshoring is a by-product of software offshoring in the 
early 1990s and has evolved since then to include a wider range of services 
for a variety of industries with specific levels of technology. Currently 
there are three main areas:
• Information Technology: IT infrastructure services, software 
applications and IT consulting.
• Business: accounting and finance, human resources, 
sales and customer services (in horizontal processes) and 
vertically specialized applications in finance, healthcare and 
telecommunications.
• Knowledge development: specialized financial services, 
engineering services, architecture, clinical trials and R&D activities.
(b) Market highlights
According to estimates by the Boston Consulting Group (2009), 
offshoring-related flows reached an overall value of US$ 132 billion in 2008, 
of which the United States represented 70%, followed by the European Union 
(18%) and Asia (9%). Current market volume is the result of average annual 
growth rates of 35% reflecting geographical expansion of the industry.
Recent data and estimates lend support to the notion that a new stage 
of slower growth rates and consolidation has begun within the industry. 
According to AT Kearney (2009), in the first half of 2009 new offshoring 
contracts fell by 25% in value terms. Annual growth rates of 15% are not 
expected until the global economy fully recovers from the current crisis. 
In Latin America, services data show a slightly countercyclical 
response to the crisis. Chile’s exports of goods fell 19% in 2009, while 
total services exports fell 21% (mainly owing to a sharp fall in export-
associated transport). Other services (which include offshoring and global 
outsourcing) decreased only 13%.
In the first quarter of 2010 traditional services, such as travel and 
tourism, suffered the immediate impacts of the earthquake which struck 
Chile on 27 February, with a loss of 16%, while other services grew by 15%.2
2 IT and financial services grew by 12% and 11%, respectively, while sales and purchase 
services increased by 18% possibly due to post-earthquake reconstruction efforts (for 
more details see Central Bank figures www.bcentral.cl).
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(c) Main offshoring services provider countries
India, Ireland and the Eastern European countries are the main 
providers of offshoring services today.
India shows a higher level of maturity owing to early creation of 
back-office centres by companies such as British Airways, American 
Express and GE in the 1980s. These companies were attracted by the 
availability of low-cost, highly skilled human resources. Since then, many 
of these centres have been spun off, while local companies have developed 
aggressive international strategies. According to current market estimates, 
India’s offshoring companies employ 700,000 people and produce revenues 
of US$ 11 billion (1% of GDP). The industry’s main driver is India’s vast 
high-skill labour pool, with 2.5 million graduates per year. However, 
industry dynamics are such that the increase in wages is eroding former 
comparative advantages vis-à-vis other providers. 
Ireland’s offshoring industry is similar to India’s in terms of 
multinational presence, although more recent in development. Rather than 
human resource availability, Ireland’s success in offshoring is related to 
public policies, including attractive tax legislation. Language and cultural 
affinity to the United States, European Union membership and proximity 
to Europe’s continental markets were also instrumental in attracting 
foreign investment.  
Eastern Europe became an outsourcing and offshoring alternative 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Central planning was abandoned 
for free-market policies and foreign investment. Industry drivers were 
similar to those in India (labour pool, cost arbitrage) and in Ireland 
(European Union membership), with German companies playing a 
significant role owing to geographical proximity and cultural affinity. 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are currently the main players 
in terms of project development.
(d) Corporate strategies
Process outsourcing was a private sector response to market 
deregulation, which started in the United States and the United Kingdom 
with a series of public policies designed and adopted to address 
growth and productivity stagnation after the crisis of 1973-1975.  In the 
1990s outsourcing and offshoring gained momentum driven by trade 
liberalization, international finance deregulation and capital account 
liberalization in many emerging economies. Multinational companies in 
the manufacturing, telecommunications, transport and retail industries 
seized the opportunity and adopted aggressive services-offshoring 
strategies to cut costs and increase efficiency and competitiveness in a new 
global scenario.
The changing nature of Asian-Latin American economic relations 119
According to a survey conducted by AT Kearney (2006), the 
percentage of multinational companies considering services operations 
overseas increased from 50% to 70% between 2003 and 2005, with the 
proportion rising fastest among United States companies (from 62% to 
87%). Sectors with a substantial outsourcing and offshoring potential are 
IT (68%); customer service centres (50%); R&D (40%); shared services (40%) 
and knowledge centres (23%).
Significant foreign investment growth in services is a consequence 
of both national promotion policies and a wider range of location 
alternatives for multinational companies, including through direct 
investment, joint ventures with local partners and outsourcing. 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2008), foreign investment in corporate services reached 
US$ 2.05 trillion in 2006, with financial services accounting for 
US$ 2.5 trillion of US$ 7.7 trillion in overall services. As of 2006, foreign 
investment in services represents 62% of total foreign investment, against 
30% in manufacturing (UNCTAD, 2008).
A significant feature in this trend is R&D internationalization 
(Couto and Sehgal, 2007) in a context in which multinational companies 
account for 50% of world expenditure on R&D. A survey of top executives 
by Booz & Allen and Duke University’s School of Management identified 
decision-making patterns of European and United States multinational 
companies. European companies tend to outsource transactional, 
low-cost operations, while United States companies outsource higher 
complexity processes.  European companies select locations by language 
and cultural affinity, hence their preference for Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, while United States companies prefer India, China and 
locations in South-East Asia such as the Philippines, based on large-
scale, high-skilled labour supply. In terms of offshoring models, German 
and Spanish companies tend to establish captive centres, while United 
States companies are more disposed to outsource. European firms are 
sensitive to risk related to cultural differences; United States companies 
are concerned with IT security.
In a context of international financial turmoil, offshoring will 
maintain its role in a globalized world economy, but corporate strategies 
and growth dynamics will evolve. Some analysts forecast slower growth, 
as well as higher concern for risk, a tendency towards consolidation of 
operations and smaller geographical expansion. Global operational models 
will balance complementary offers from India and Eastern Europe and 
providers will aim towards higher specialization. Current global providers 
tend to combine operations 30% in higher- to medium-cost countries 
such as the United States, Canada and Western European countries, and 
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70% in lower-cost regions such as Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. This follow-the-sun model allows for balancing near-shore 
and offshore alternatives, securing access to talent, language skills and 
cultural affinities, reducing operational costs and profiting from time-zone 
differences to accelerate project cycle development.
In addition, competition among top technology companies has 
become so fierce that that they cannot afford to rely solely on domestic 
markets for their R&D teams. This is why companies such as Yahoo! and 
chip-design software developer Synopsis are tapping talent in countries 
like Chile. The key concept is Ready-to-Market3 (Couto and Sehgal, 2007), 
speed in developing new products in a more competitive context and 
restriction of work visas in the United States even for IT specialists. This is 
forceing IT companies to source R&D from overseas centres.
(e) Public policies and support
Almost all the Latin American countries have developed policies to 
attract foreign investments in contact centres, business process outsourcing 
(BPO), information technology outsourcing (ITO) or knowledge process 
outsourcing (KPO) (Gereffi., Castillo and Fernandez-Stark, 2009). They 
have designed schemes that combine promotion with incentives to 
support foreign investors, directly or indirectly, in these services (ECLAC, 
2009). Indirect estimates of the impact of offshoring on overall economic 
activity are given in ECLAC (2011). This publication quotes Latin American 
software services exports from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico as 
having reached US$ 4.4 billion in 2010.
Brazil and Mexico combine international promotion programmes 
with national and State incentives. Brazil’s Apex and Mexico’s Bancomext 
are the agencies responsible for international marketing and promotion. 
Brazil offers lower taxation incentives at the national level for investments, 
IT-related R&D activities and technological park development. Mexico’s 
national maquiladora endorsement and operation law allows foreign 
companies to operate as industrial free trade zones. In both countries, 
subnational  entities have some autonomy in promoting investment 
through tax breaks, infrastructure provision and training subsidies. 
Brazil’s top destinations are Campinas and metropolitan São Paulo; in 
Mexico foreign companies are located in Monterrey, Guadalajara and 
Mexico City. 
In Spanish-speaking South America there are several investment 
promotion agencies such as Argentina’s ProsperAr, Chile’s CORFO and 
CINVER, Colombia’s PROEXPORT and Uruguay XXI.  Argentina has 
3 Competitive edge measured as critical speed in transforming R&D investments into 
goods marketable worldwide.
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a range of national incentives similar to Brazil’s, with tax incentives for 
the software industry. Argentina’s provinces have their own programmes 
consisting of special taxation and infrastructure and public service 
subsidies. Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Rosario have attracted a range 
of offshoring providers from Spain, India and the United States. Chile 
offers training incentives instead of special taxation to foreigners. It also 
offers co-financing for IT infrastructure and free, long-term office rent, as 
well as English courses for engineers and technicians. Colombia has an 
industrial parks scheme operating as a free-trade-zone regime, as well as 
a set of tax breaks for BPO companies and English-language training for 
BPO and contact centre professionals. In Uruguay, services exports must 
obtain official recognition as such to be exempted from VAT. Software 
companies are also eligible for income tax exemption. Uruguay’s free-
trade-zone regime also covers services exports, including zero import-tax 
for equipment, raw materials and semi-processed goods, as well as VAT 
and corporate net wealth taxes.  
Central America’s main investment promotion agencies are Costa 
Rica’s CINDE, El Salvador’s PROESA and the Dominican Republic’s CEI-
RD. Costa Rica’s free trade zone is flexible and not limited to specific 
regions or cities. Any company can apply to a location of its choosing and 
obtain a government decree granting free-trade-zone status. The system 
exempts firms from all kinds of taxes for a certain period, including VAT 
and tax on remittances. English and other language training schemes 
are also offered. El Salvador has a law exempting global services centres 
from VAT, as well as relevant goods and equipment custom taxes. The 
Dominican Republic has a free-trade-zone regime as well as English 
training programmes and is currently overhauling its educational system.
2. Services offshoring in Latin America
Latin America is currently an emerging offshoring destination for 
a host of European and United States multinationals. It also has a high 
development potential and offers the conditions to become a world leader 
through the industry’s transition to a new, post-boom stage. But countries 
must address policy issues and closely coordinate at the regional and 
multilateral levels, if they wish to develop the necessary conditions to 
seize this unique, temporary opportunity.
(a) Latin America’s offshoring industry profile
There are no official figures for this industry, and private estimates 
vary. Taking the Boston Consulting Group’s worldwide estimate of US$ 
132 billion (2008) in services exports, Latin America’s market share would 
be approximately 7%, that is US$ 9.2 billion in offshoring contracts, 
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mainly in IT and BPO.4 This is the result of a six-year run of double-digit 
growth in the number of new projects being located in Latin America by 
offshoring companies. According to fDi Markets, more than 6,000 BPO or 
KPO projects came to Latin America between 2003 and the first quarter 
of 2009, representing a twofold increase over that period. Latin America’s 
market share in total foreign direct investment (FDI) for offshoring 
projects is still modest (5%) compared to Asia-Pacific (49%) and Eastern 
Europe (10%) (OCO Global & fDi Markets, 2009). But it was the fastest-
growing region in the world in this respect, even against a backdrop new 
projects falling worldwide by 15% in 2009.
Latin America was first seen as a potential global services hub 
after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011 in the United States. The 
subsequent national security measures have made it increasingly difficult 
and cumbersome for Indian IT professionals to obtain work visas in the 
United States. (Chu and Herrero, 2005) Furthermore, increasing demand has 
pushed up the costs of Indian engineers. Latin America’s growing relevance 
in the offshoring industry can be measured in export volume as well as in 
terms of international positioning. Business environment, cost structure, 
skilled labour availability and government support are the main factors.
Table III.1 






50 best cities for 
outsourcing
Argentina 39 Top 30 Leader Buenos Aires
Barbados New player
Brazil 92 Top 15 Leader São Paulo, Curitiba, 
Brasilia
Chile 29 Top 10 Leader Santiago
Colombia 22 New player To follow
Costa Rica 25 Top 25 Leader San José
Dominican Republic New player With potential
Ecuador With potential
El Salvador 5 New player With potential
Guatemala New player To follow
Jamaica Top 25 With potential
Mexico 59 Leader Monterrey, Juárez
Nicaragua With potential
Peru 5 To follow
Panama 6 Top 45 Leader




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of fDi Market, 
AT Kearney, Gartner & Global Services.
Note: Top player: countries in AT Kearney’s offshoring ranking.
New player: countries in the process of reaching AT Kearney’s offshoring ranking.
Leader, to follow and with potential: Classification by Gartner according to the conditions offered in each 
country for attracting offshoring activities.
4 IDC, BCG, and AT Kearney.
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According to AT Kearney’s Global Location Index (2009), eight Latin 
American and Caribbean countries are among the world’s top competitive 
locations: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama 
and Uruguay. The Global Location Index identifies new players with 
active promotion strategies such as Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
the Dominican Republic, and Barbados (AT Kearney, 2009). According to 
a model developed by Gartner (2009),5 which evaluates critical industry 
factors, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama are 
leaders. Countries to follow are Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay, and the territory of Puerto 
Rico. Countries with potential are Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Jamaica and Nicaragua.
Offshoring development in Latin America shows different levels of 
maturity, but common factors are identifiable in terms of four categories: 
(i) countries with large domestic markets such as Brazil and Mexico; 
(ii) Spanish-speaking South American countries; (iii) Central America and 
Spanish-speaking Caribbean countries; (iv) English-speaking Caribbean 
countries (ECLAC, 2009; Gereffi, Castillo and Fernandez-Stark, 2009).
(i) Brazil and Mexico
Offshoring was first observed in the information and 
communications technologies (ICT) sector in Brazil and Mexico in the late 
1990s. The clients of these sectors were manufacturing and electronics 
producers. Both countries had large domestic markets and were close 
to the United States. As industrial activities migrated to China, several 
hardware companies in Mexico and Brazil transformed their facilities 
into services centres, capitalizing on their infrastructure and skilled 
labour supply. United States ICT and BPO companies also explored new 
locations south of their borders. They located low-added-value centres 
for transaction processing and data entry facilities mainly in Mexico.
The large Indian providers came later, with contact centres, shared 
centres and IT applications development. Early United States providers 
were EDS and ACS. Also, Tata, Inofsys and Wipro from are India. But both 
Mexico and Brazil have significant local services providers which are also 
active in offshoring: Mexico’s Softek, Neoris, and Hildebrando (Mexico); 
Brazil’s CPM, Politec, Ci&T, Tivit, and Stefanini.
(ii) Spanish-speaking South America 
Offshoring in IT/BPO has developed fairly recently in South 
America and varies greatly between countries. Three hundred new 
5 Evaluation criteria: English advanced skills, government support, labour availability, 
infrastructure, educational system, costs, political and economic context, cultural affinity, 
law enforcement, personal data protection and IP protection.
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offshoring centers have been registered as FDI projects in South America 
in the past six years: 39 in Argentina, 29 in Chile, 22 in Colombia, 9 in 
Uruguay and 5 in Peru (fDi Market, 2010). The region is seemingly 
succeeding in capitalizing upon its geography as a near-shore destination. 
It also offers competitive qualified-labour costs and several government 
programmes to support FDI projects.
Argentina is the offshoring leader in South America. It has an 
extensive network of graduate universities in Buenos Aires, Córdoba and 
Rosario. National currency devaluation in 2001 increased Argentina’s cost 
advantages, which boosted investment in new projects and expansion 
of existing capacity throughout the industry’s whole value chain. 
Teleperformance, Convergys, Atento and TeleTech are active players in 
the contact centre industry. IT and BPO firms include Accenture, IBM, 
Motorola, Intel, Tata, Microsoft and EDS (ECLAC, 2009).
Chile and Colombia are recent, high-growth players which entered 
the market after 2005. Chile has a national policy for attracting FDI 
through CORFO, and this facilitates basic infrastructure for call centres. 
Higher-value-added centres are a more recent phenomenon. Chile’s main 
assets are political stability, human resources and costs. The country also 
offers specific capacities for different value chain segments, provided 
by firms such as Teleperformance, Transcom, Capgemini, Citigroup, 
Oracle, Pioneer, Synopsis and Yahoo! Colombia is offering voice and data 
applications for contact centres and BPO, and is gaining presence in IT-
associated higher-value-added areas, attracting firms such as Convergys, 
SITEL, Atento, Digitex and EDS.
Uruguay spearheaded software exports from Latin America in the 
1990s. After developing an internationally-oriented domestic industry, the 
conditions were in place to attract international firms such as Tata, Trintech, 
IBM and Microsoft. In 2007 Uruguay exported US$ 120 million in IT services 
to Latin America, North America and Europe (Cuti, 2007). According to Tata 
executives, the firm picked Uruguay to host its Latin America headquarters 
because of its image of neutrality among the region’s animosities (see 
chapter II) (Chu and Herrero, 2005). Peru is a new player. Economic growth, 
pro-market policies and qualified-labour cost advantages make Peru a 
country “to watch”, according to the Gartner Index.
(iii) Central America and the Caribbean
In Central America and the Caribbean subregion, offshoring has 
developed in certain countries, including the Dominican Republic and 
Costa Rica. Of the 36 new foreign centres located in Central America 
between 2003 and 2009, 25 were located in Costa Rica, 6 in Panama and 
5 in El Salvador.
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Costa Rica had a headstart in the 1990s in attracting IT, BPO and 
contact centres, and is now the regional leader. Some of the landmarks 
were Intel’s assembly facility (1998), Procter & Gamble’s shared services 
centre (1999) and offshoring centres operated by companies such as 
Western Union, HP and IBM. Since 2001 other countries have adopted 
offshoring strategies based on three main factors: increasing demand for 
near-shore, customer and BPO services focusing on the United States; the 
migration of manufacturing operations to China; and greater availability 
of bilingual human resources as a result of national training programmes, 
as well as the return of emigrants from the United States (ECLAC, 2009). 
This sort of strategy was adopted first by Panama, El Salvador, and the 
Dominican Republic, followed by Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras.
(iv) English-speaking Caribbean
The English-speaking Caribbean has a smaller-scale offshoring 
industry, owing mainly to population factors. However, offshoring has helped 
to provide these countries with a diversification strategy to compensate for 
the cyclical fluctuations in tourism, the region’s main export service (ECLAC, 
2008). Language, culture and geography played a role in the establishment of 
early offshoring  ventures in the 1980s, with data entry and customer service 
centres for the United States  market. The sector enjoyed a resurgence after 
2005, with significant developments in Jamaica (where offshoring employs 
10,000 people), Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago.
(b) Asia’s offshoring industry profile
Some very successful offshoring initiatives have been developed in 
Asian countries, especially India, the Philippines, Viet Nam and China. 
These countries have attracted large European, United States, Japanese 
and Korean multinationals, which outsource or locate in-house centres 
based on cost considerations or other benefits offered by host countries.
(i) Philippines
The Philippines is one of the most competitive offshoring 
destinations thanks to its attractive labour and operational costs and 
bilingual human resources.
The Philippines has a population of 90 million6 and per capita 
income of US$ 3,515 (PPP).  Different Western and Oriental cultures 
merge in its many islands, and languages spoken include Malay (95% 
of the population), English (the official and business language) and 
Spanish (in the Catholic religion). As well as the local population, an 
estimated 11 million Filipinos live overseas. They are often referred to as 
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and send home US$ 15 billion in bank 
remittances, almost 13.5% of GDP, per year. 
6 United Nations Population Division, 2009 estimates.
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Some 788 call centres are currently operating in the Philippines: 35% 
are located in Makati city,7 a metropolitan Manila municipality considered 
to be the business and financial capital. Another important location is 
Origas Center, also in Metropolitan Manila, which hosts United States, 
Canadian and French operators such as Sitel, Telus and Teleperformance. 
According to the main private sector organizations, Business Process 
Association of the Philippines (BPAP) and BPO Services Association, 
in 2008 offshoring employed some 435,000 and generated revenues of 
US$ 6.1 billion. Accordingly, the Philippines is the third largest offshoring 
destination in the world after India and Canada.
To sustain industry growth the government offers significant fiscal 
and non-fiscal incentives through its Board of Investments (BOI), a public 
agency responsible for promoting foreign investment in the context of a 
medium-term development plan.
Apart from traditional call centres, several BPO companies offer 
legal and medical file transcription, financial and accounting services 
(the Philippines is one of South-East Asia’s largest back-office and shared 
services centre locations), and software and digital animation. Companies 
such as Disney, Marvel Comics, Warner, Hannah Barbera, Universal and 
Cartoon Network, as well as Japanese manga and animé8 producers, are 
outsourcing with Filipino animators.
(ii) China
China could hardly be other than an important industry player, given 
its vast resources pool and unparalleled economic growth. The Government 
of China is promoting services sector development in keeping with the 
country’s industrial and technological stature. Several multinationals, 
including Dell, Motorola and HP, have located customer service centres in 
China, alongside local such as Bank of China, China Mobile and Huawei.
This growing supply targets mainly the domestic market, however, 
with some provision for neighbouring countries. While labour costs are 
exceedingly competitive, China lacks India’s (and to a lesser extent the 
Philippines’) bilingual and English skills.
Several cities, including Dalian, Hangzhou and Chengdu, compete 
for foreign investment, offering a large graduate pool and tax and 
infrastructure benefits. Dalian is a seaport located in North-East China. It 
was nicknamed “China’s Bangalore” because of its extraordinary growth 
in IT-related offshoring activities. GE, Microsoft, Dell, HP and Accenture 
7 See [online] www.callcenterdirectory.net.
8 Manga are comics and cartoons produced in Japan. Animé refers to Japanese animation 
films, usually based on manga characters and products. For animation offshoring and 
outsourcing in the Philippines, see Animation Council of the Philippines (2008).
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are currently operating in Dalian, but the main players are Japanese, due 
to geographical proximity and the availability of Sino Japanese bilingual 
technicians. There are 22 universities and a student population of about 
220,000 (Friedman, 2004). Dalian also has a tax and infrastructure 
incentive programme in the form of its technology parks (Dalian 
Software Park and Dalian High-Tech Zone), where the main activities 
are software development, BPO, programming, circuit design, R&D and 
digital animation. Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province in South-East 
China, is one of the most dynamic cities in the country as regards private 
investment. IT outsourcing and offshoring are concentrated in Chengdu 
Hi-Tech Zone and Tianfu Software Park. This is a long-term project 
which will reach 1.2 million m2 by 2010 and an overall capacity of 50,000 
employees.9 About 100 companies operate in Chengdu Hi-Tech Zone, of 
which 40% are foreign: they include IBM, Accenture, Symantec, Huawei, 
SAP, Nokia-Siemens, EMC, Alcatel-Lucent, Siemens, Synnex, Maersk, 
Tencent and China Mobile.
(iii) Viet Nam
In recent years Viet Nam has become a new player in Asia’s 
offshoring industry, specifically in IT services. Companies such as Intel, 
Honda, BP and Prudential have outsourced IT services to Quang Trung 
Software Park and Saigon High Tech Park, located close to Ho Chi Minh 
City, Viet Nam’s largest city. Viet Nam has a population of 85 million and 
a per capita income of US$ 2,793. The country adopted a market socialism 
model in 1986, with notable results. Viet Nam’s economy is now the second 
fastest-growing in the world after China and it is more open in terms of 
foreign trade and investment. In 2006 Viet Nam acceded to WTO and 
adapted its intellectual property laws to conform to the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Viet Nam’s main asset is a generous pool of skilled labour, with 
80,000 IT-related graduates each year. This is fewer than China and India, 
but still significant from a national point of view (CNN, 2007). Viet Nam also 
offers a stimulus package similar to that provided in several Latin American 
countries: four-year VAT exemption, special import tariffs for equipment 
and income tax liberation (Wilson, 2007). Another asset is the Vietnamese-
American community, located mainly in California, which operates as 
a powerful broker in filling the business-culture gap between the United 
States and Viet Nam.10 Weak points, however, are the country’s telecoms 
infrastructure and poorer bilingual-English skills than the Philippines.
9 See [online] www.chengduinvest.gov.com.
10 Phil Tran created Egg Digital in 1995, a design and 2D animation company in Ho Chi 
Minh City. In 2002 he started designing race cars for Forz Motorsport, a Microsoft Xbox 
videogame. TMA Solutions, founded by Canadian-Vietnamese Nguyen Huu Le, outsources 
software development for Nortel, Comsys and Alcatel-Lucent (see also Balfour, 2006).
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(c) Labour and competitiveness
Costs are among the key factors for offshoring decisions (AT Kearney, 
2009), while ITO and KPO demand higher and specic skills.
There are no common indicators or labour costs estimates for all 
the countries analysed in this study, and still less information concerning 
specialized services. AT Kearney has constructed a labour competitiveness 
index (see gure III.1) on the basis of specic costs for offshoring.
Figure III.1 




















The AT Kearney index weighs country data on average wages and 
compensations for call centre operators, BPO analysts, IT programmers 
and local managers. In this index Viet Nam is the most competitive 
country, followed by India, Indonesia and the Philippines, all of which 
have a labour supply consisting of thousands of college graduates per 
year. At the other extreme is Ireland, where salaries are paid in Euros and 
the labour supply grows only marginally. 
The Latin American countries are situated in between. Costa Rica 
leads the region, followed by Panama. Both are more competitive than 
Ireland and even some Eastern European countries, including Poland and 
the Czech Republic.
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3. Services integration between Latin America and Asia
(a) World market share
WTO estimates the share of different regions in world services 
exports on the basis of individual countries’ balance of payments. 
According to this information, Asian countries account for 26% of total 
services exports, while Latin America represents just 3% (see figure III.2).
Figure III.2 






Source: World Trade Organization (WTO).
Services exports represent a relatively new eld for Latin 
America’s commodity-based, export-oriented economies. In trade 
negotiations Latin American governments still treat merchandise 
exports as the priority, including in their negotiations with Asian 
countries. Only a handful of public institutions responsible for trade 
promotion and negotiation have taken on board the importance of 
global services industries and even those responsible for services trade 
have been slow to react. Latin American countries thus still tend to be 
seen as providers of raw materials. Geographical and cultural distances 
also explain the region’s lack of allure in terms of attracting investments 
in global services.
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Relative to world services exports, Latin America’s exports of other 
commercial services represent a lower share (2%) than traditional services 
such as transport (3%) and travel (5%). Services trade in Asia and Latin 
America involves different sectors: Latin America’s main exports are in 
transport and travel (61%) while other services represent only 39%. In Asia, 
the latter represent 50%.
The European Union is the world leader in global services or 
offshoring (a subset of other commercial services) with 46% of the 
world’s exports, followed by the United States with 16%. Three large 
Asian economies —India, China and Japan— rank third, fourth and 
fth, respectively. Singapore, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China range from sixth to 
eleventh. Brazil is the only Latin American country among the main 
services exporters, with about 1% of the world’s “other services” exports.
Table III.2 
MAIN SERVICES EXPORTERS, 2010-2011
Country
Exports 
(billions of dollars) World market share
2010 2011 2010 2011
European Union (27) 925.5 1 030.9 45.8 46.0
United States 326.7 352.3 16.2 15.7
India 95.9 101.5 4.7 4.5
China 90.2 98.3 4.5 4.4
Japan 86.6 93.1 4.3 4.2
Singapore 65.1 72.7 3.2 3.2
Switzerland 61.0 70.0 3.0 3.1
Hong Kong, China 54.0 61.1 2.7 2.7
Canada 40.1 44.3 2.0 2.0
Republic of Korea 36.9 44.4 1.8 2.0
Taipei, China 21.6 25.3 1.1 1.1
Russian Federation 20.7 24.9 1.0 1.1
Norway 19.3 21.6 1.0 1.0
Brazil 19.4 24.1 1.0 1.1
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO).
(b) Double taxation agreements
Double taxation occurs when a single economic activity is taxed 
by more than one jurisdiction, i.e. when more than one State taxes the 
same income.
In the world income approach,11 the principle behind most tax 
legislations, any person situated or residing in a specic country will 
11 There are other double taxation systems such as the “territorial” one, in which taxation 
is levied only on territorially-generated income. Most countries have adopted the world 
income approach.
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pay taxes on any kind of income, disregarding its domestic or foreign 
origin. The result is an over-taxation which affects capital, investment, 
services and technology flows between countries. There are cases 
of even triple or fourfold-taxation depending on the number of tax 
administrations involved, and this is a strong deterrent of trade between 
foreign partners/taxpayers.
Many countries negotiate and sign bilateral double taxation 
agreements (DTAs) to avoid double taxation. There are three main 
kinds of DTAs: the model developed by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the model developed by the 
United Nations, and the Andean Community model. Of these, the 
OECD model is the most widely used. The main difference between the 
models is the way by which the “fiscal sacrifice” is shared between tax 
administrations, i.e. between the country where the economic activity 
takes place and the one where the head office is located. Preferences 
between models depend on whether the country is a capital exporter 
or importer. Only five Latin American countries have signed double-
taxation agreements with Asian countries.
(c) Services agreements between Asia and Latin America
In the past two decades several countries have signed agreements 
to liberalize trade in services. With different coverage and depth, these 
agreements take either a positive or a negative list approach.
Agreements set forth relevant information for companies willing to 
explore foreign markets, specifically concerning local legislation affecting 
the national treatment principle, with which every country must comply. 
However, this is not sufficient to actually export a service.
Global services perform high-tech, value-added international 
transactions through ICT networks, which necessarily involve technical 
assistance and support. Physical presence of foreign technicians is 
sometimes required in the country where the service was contracted. 
Agreements in trade in services include important chapters on business 
travel, temporary entry and work visas. Usually these issues are part 
of the negotiating agenda, but to date agreements between Asian and 
Latin American countries show no significant improvement on previous 
conditions. Labour legislation is a sensitive issue virtually everywhere.
Services trade integration between Asia and Latin America is also 
limited, with only 11 service agreements signed as of 2009. Chile has 
the largest share of agreements with specific service chapters, followed 
by Mexico, Panama and Peru. Guatemala and Honduras have bilateral 
agreements with Taiwan Province of China. 
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a platform that has 
potential to promote services integration. APEC has created a services 
group (GOS) to promote and facilitate cooperation and investment in the 
services trade; however, only three Latin American countries, Mexico, 
Chile and Peru, are participating.
In 2001, GOS created an operational framework for the voluntary 
liberalization of trade in services. This includes an indicative list of 
possible measures for that members may adopt in their individual action 
plans. However, no significant developments have taken place, owing 
to restrictive policies on services in individual countries, as well as the 
non-mandatory nature of APEC agreements. Nevertheless, a services 
negotiation “model chapter” was designed in 2007-2008, which could be 
used as a model for a regional agreement.
Even though market liberalization in the context of APEC is not 
substantial compared to the Doha Round of trade talks, it is a positive sign. 
Asia-Pacific is the world’s most dynamic region in terms of innovation and 
economic and trade growth, so services trade integration is a relevant issue. 
It could materialize in a new-generation trade agreement called the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) between Australia, the United States, Peru, Viet 
Nam, Malaysia and the group known as the Pacific 4 (Brunei Darussalam, 
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. Japan, Canada and Mexico may also 
join the group.
Consolidation of niche services might be a reasonable target. 
Technological and scientific cooperation between Latin American 
universities and R&D-intensive Asian companies has the potential to become 
a spearhead for services integration between the two regions (see chapter III).
B. Asian offshoring services firms in Latin America: 
case studies
Global services centres in Latin America are subsidiaries of United States 
and European firms. The Asian presence, especially from India, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea, is concentrated in a limited number of projects and 
countries. However, there are several successful experiences which may 
serve as an example for Latin American countries willing to reproduce 
and enhance them.
Between 2003 and 2009, approximately 62 centres were set up by 
Indian, Japanese and Korean companies in Latin America. Brazil and 
Mexico were the main target markets followed by Argentina, Chile and 
Costa Rica (see table III.3). Indian companies form an emerging group 
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of large offshoring service providers, while the pattern among Japanese 
and Korean firms is establishment of in-house centres for large hardware 
and electronics companies.
Table III.3 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): ASIAN OFFSHORING SERVICES 
CENTRES, 2003-2009
Country India Japan Republic of Korea Total
Argentina 4 2 1 7
Brazil 6 7 5 18
Chile 4 3 3 10
Colombia 1 - 2 3
Costa Rica 2 2 - 4
Guatemala 1 - - 1
Mexico 9 5 2 16
Panama - - 2 2
Uruguay 1 - - 1
Total 28 19 15 62
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of  data collected by fDi Markets and Off-shoring Times.
Indian service companies are international providers offering 
near-shoring under the concept of a “global delivery model”. They 
combine and complement capacities located in Asia, Europe and Latin 
America. Their business models focus on BPO and ICT services for 
vertically integrated sectors such as retail, finance and banking, and 
telecommunications. Indian services leaders such as Tata, Infosys, Wipro 
and HCL are the trendsetters in this industry. 
By contrast, Japanese and Korean companies follow an 
offshore/in-house model. These are centres run directly by hardware 
components, network equipment, semiconductors and electronics 
companies in general.
Centres operating in Latin America under this rationale focus on 
post-manufacture (distribution, logistics, sales and marketing, customer 
support and technical support); internal process support such as shared 
services, software development; and pre-manufacture services such as 
R&D, testing and design (KPO). Samsung, LG, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu and 
NEC are important players.
1. Indian firms
India is one of the largest players in the offshoring industry. 
Different sources estimate India’s market share in the range of 6% to 7% 
(Nasscom) and agree upon the country’s absolute leadership in offshoring 
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(63%). Companies operating in high-tech parks such as Bangalore, 
Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, Pune, Chennai and New Dehli export an 
average of US$ 10 billion per year. They employ 10,000 people in their 
Latin American centres.
Indian services companies were created by large industrial 
conglomerates or by independent entrepreneurs. Domestic markets were 
closed to foreign competition during the 1970s and 1980s, facilitating 
the development of these companies. They gained experience and 
volume that would later be instrumental to their success in the global 
scene. Other players in India are multinational companies such as GE, 
IBM and American Express. Main services providers are TCS, Infosys, 
Wipro Technologies WNS Global Services and Genpact. Several were 
created as back-office centres for local companies or multinationals, 
and later opened their resources to third party customers. Indian 
competitiveness is based on human capital (especially IT talent at 
competitive costs), and English skills, a great advantage vis-à-vis other 
Asian countries.
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) is part of the Tata Group, one of 
India’s largest conglomerates, founded in 1868 as a textile company. Today 
Tata Group is a diversified holding with interests in the automotive, 
telecoms, food and steel industries. TCS was the group’s IT services unit. 
During the 1970s and the 1980s it gained visibility in IT outsourcing and 
offshoring, especially for the financial sector. In the second half of the 
1990s TCS took advantage of the approach of the millennium bug and 
the adoption of the euro. Since then it has become the largest Indian 
global services provider, with annual sales of US$ 5.7 billion (2008). 
Tata’s arrival may be considered a milestone and a spearhead in Latin 
America’s offshoring industry. Currently Tata has operations throughout 
Latin America and employs 9,000 people, including IT professionals. 
Its business model combines a local market focus in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, and global sourcing from 
Mexico and Uruguay. 
WNS was created in 1996 as a small-scale back-office centre for 
British Airways, with 30 employees located in Mumbai. Six years later it 
was acquired by an American investment fund. In June 2006 it was the 
first Indian company to be listed in the New York stock exchange. Initially 
specialized in tourism and air travel, it has expanded into retail, banking 
and insurance, among other areas. WNS has 23 thousand employees and 
has recently set up in Latin America with a bilingual shared-services 
centre in San José, focusing on the United States market.
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Wipro (Western India Products) was created as a food company 
in 1947, the year of India’s independence. Like other industrial 
conglomerates, it took advantage of the protectionist years to explore 
and develop IT hardware. Its software services unit was created in 
1992. Since then, Wipro has become one of the largest global services 
providers. It arrived in Latin America in 2008, establishing two shared-
services centres in Curitiba, Brazil, providing services to financial 
institutions as well as entry management, customer services and human 
resources management on behalf of local clients. In 2010 it opened 
an IT services centre in Brazil with 350 professionals, and another in 
Monterrey, Mexico, aimed at the United States, Latin American and 
European markets. 
Infosys is one of the youngest companies in India’s global services 
industry. It was created in 1981 by seven entrepreneurs from Pune. In 
2008, sales reached US$ 4.6 billion, of which 97% were service exports. It 
stands out among its Indian peers for its academic links and recruiting 
and training policies. Infosys runs one of the largest corporate training 
centres in Asia, the Mysore campus, in Karnataka state. In 2007 Infosys 
established its first Latin American subsidiary in Monterrey, Mexico, 
focusing on banking, financial services and retail. The following year 
it opened a development centre in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. There the 
focus is on banking, financial services, insurance, manufacturing, retail, 
telecoms and energy.
HCL was founded in the 1970s as a hardware and electronic 
equipment manufacturer. In the 1980s it ventured into system 
development. With offices in São Paulo, Brazil, it serves customers in 
telecommunications, IT, healthcare, financial services and government. 
It also runs an IT application and development centre in the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul.
Genpact was founded in 1997 as a GE subsidiary. It has sales 
of more than US$ 1 billion and 37,000 employees. In Mexico Genpact 
operates two centres in Ciudad Juárez in the state of Chihuaha, and in 
Caborca in the state of Sonora. These offer bilingual English-Spanish 
customer service, document management and financial-accounting 
registry storage. In 2008 Genpact bought a call centre from GE Money 
in Guatemala. 
Apart from these large BPO and ITO companies, there is a new 
generation of smaller-scale companies such as Evalueserve, Axial 
Analytics and Crisil-Irevna, whose focus is KPO, including market 
research, financial and patenting analysis.
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Hardware has become one of the most globalized industries in 
the world, and Japanese companies have gained leadership in each of its 
segments, including electronics, telecoms and network equipment and 
personal computing.
Japanese companies have expanded worldwide creating 
manufacturing centres in Asia (China and Viet Nam), in Eastern Europe 
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and in Latin America, (Mexico and 
Brazil). Between 2003 and 2009, Japanese companies were responsible for 
80% of all hardware industry projects in both countries, second only to the 
United States in terms of foreign investment. 
Brazil and Mexico offer different location advantages. Projects in 
Mexico target the United States, while those in Brazil focus on the large 
domestic market (ECLAC, 2008).
These investments have strengthened Japanese firms’ world-
class manufacturing capacity, and are gradually widening their range of 
activities to include different value-added services. Japanese companies 
operate several sales, marketing and technical support services, while 
gradually developing testing and software centres. Some specific R&D 
activities are also performed in industries such as telecoms (NTT), 
automotive (Nissan), chemicals (Takasago), pharmaceuticals (CMIC) and 
mining (Nippon Mining & Metals). Interestingly these are joint ventures 
with local companies and research centres.
Japan has not developed a global services industry such as India’s, due 
to high labour costs and a more centralized, risk-adverse corporate culture. 
However, recessions and the ensuing cost-saving needs have forced Japanese 
multinationals, such as Sony, Nissan and Toyota, to outsource BPO services 
to China and, to a lesser extent, to the Republic of Korea, Viet Nam and India. 
Japan’s main BPO providers are Fujitsu, IBM Japan, NEC and Nihon Unisys.
Fujitsu provides global services through Fujitsu Consulting, with 
operations in the United States, Canada and India, and a call centre in 
Costa Rica. NEC operates through NEC Solutions, NEC India and joint 
ventures with Indian companies such as HCL.
Japan has a strong competitive advantage in telecoms services, 
particularly Internet and digital television. NTT America, the United 
States subsidiary of NTT, is an active IP service provider. In the 1990s NTT 
created Access Nova, an R&D scheme with the University of Chile’s School 
of Engineering. Initially focused on application development for wideband 
platforms, Access Nova has become an independent company while 
strengthening its relationship with NTT and a network of Japanese R&D 
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centres. Access Nova has an agreement with NTT DoCoMo to develop 
software applications for third and fourth generation mobile phones.
Another Latin American subsidiary of NTT is Micomo, a joint 
venture with Chile’s State-owned mining giant CODELCO. Micomo 
develops IP telecoms solutions for large mining operations, integrating 
developments from other institutions such as University of Chile’s 
Mathematical Modelling Centre (CMM,12 see chapter III), MIRS Robotics, 
ABB Chile and several R&D centres in Australia and the United States. 
Another domain with Japanese involvement is R&D in specific areas, 
such as mining and resource-based industries. A prominent example 
is Biosigma, a joint venture between Nippon Mining & Metals and 
CODELCO. This is a case study for R&D offshoring services integration 
between Asia and Latin America.
Biosigma comprises a team of 12 Chilean and Japanese doctoral 
graduates specialized in molecular microbiology, bio-metallurgy and 
mineral characterization, working on developing biotech applications. 
According to the CREAX database, they have registered 42 patents, 
including mineral bacteria-based bioleaching technologies. Biosigma may 
be considered an in-house research centre and one of the main players in 
international research in this domain, which includes BHP Billiton, South 
Africa’s Mintek and Colorado-based Geobiotics.
Table III.5 
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Table III.5 (concluded)
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3. Korean firms
The Republic of Korea has a similar services outlook to Japan. Large 
Korean conglomerates (known as chaebol) and their subsidiaries in electronics 
and automobiles operate in-house centres in key markets, including Latin 
America. Foreign multinationals such as IBM also provide outsourcing to the 
Republic of Korea’s domestic and Asian markets from high-tech centres such 
as Incheon and Songdon International City. Korean large service providers 
include conglomerates such as LG, Samsung and Korea Telecom.
LG is a chaebol with 52 subsidiaries in electronics, chemicals 
and telecoms. Its global service companies include CS Leader and AIN 
Teleservices, in-house support service for LG Telecom customers; as well 
as LG CNS, an IT service provider whose subsidiary Ucess Partners is a 
Philippines-based BPO provider. In Latin America, LG operates an in-house 
call-centre and a training centre in Panama, as well as sales, marketing and 
technical support in Brazil, Chile and Colombia (see table III.6).
Table III.6 
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Samsung is one of the world’s largest providers of call centre 
equipment and technology, including IP telephony and ofce servers. 
Samsung has manufacturing operations in Manaus, Brazilian Amazonia 
(hard disks and LCDs) and Campinas, São Paulo (printers and cell phones). 
It operates in-house call centres in Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Santiago 
and Pereira (Colombia). High-value-added services (mobile technology 
development) are located in São Paulo, Campinas and Recife. Highly 
skilled human resources are the key factor in these investment projects, 
particularly Brazil’s public and private universities such as the State 
University at Campinas (UNICAMP),13 one of Latin America’s foremost 
research institutions.
Korea Telecom is a global, diversied telecoms conglomerate 
present in all signicant industry segments, including high-tech 
consultancy and network management. Its natural area of inuence 
is Asia. In contrast with Japan’s NTT, it does not have signicant 
operations in Latin America, though it has some prospective operations 
in Chile.
4. Chinese firms
Trade and nancial exchanges between China and Latin America 
focus on raw materials, which are increasingly important for the region. 
In this context, Chinese large-scale investments are meant to secure and 
consolidate the supply of minerals, energy and other fundamental materials.
One exception is Huawei, one of the world’s most prominent 
high-tech companies. Huawei was created in 1988 and provides mobile 
Internet access solutions for large telecoms operators. It is one of the 
world’s largest 3G technology providers, with US$ 11 billion in local 
sales (2006).
Huawei has a commercial presence in Brazil with ofces in São Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia. It also operates a training centre in Campinas 
with more than 1,000 employees. In 2008 Huawei sold US$ 1 billion in 
services, reecting growth in Latin America’s largest mobile market.
There are no Chinese offshoring projects in Latin America. Being a 
labour-intensive economy, China promotes foreign investment in its own 
domestic services sector. Chinese companies investing in Latin America 
usually need work visas not only for engineers and top executives, but 
also for unskilled workers.
13 The second largest city in the state of São Paulo.
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5. Challenges to integration between Latin America 
and Asia
Research shows that Latin America cannot achieve a large-scale 
competitor status against large Asian services providers from India, the 
Philippines or China. Latin America cannot compete with Asia’s cost 
structure, labour supply, or market and industry scale.
However, there is scope for integration and complementarity which 
can be promoted to achieve a critical mass of successful initiatives. 
Robust Indian expansion in Latin America reveals a strategic vision 
to provide near-shore services to the United States market. Japanese 
and Korean in-house centres are part of a support network for large 
electronics and automobile clusters. Policymakers should target these 
two segments with fine-tuned initiatives, especially in ITO, KPO and 
value-added, higher-complexity centres. Current support mechanisms, 
including tax breaks and subsidies, have succeeded in attracting a first 
wave of investments, but should be updated to adjust to a new stage of 
industry development. Relevant strategy issues can be drawn from the 
experience of Eastern Europe and South-East Asia.
For example, there are still few joint Asian-Latin American R&D 
centres, which have the potential to become a major building block in 
Latin America’s nascent knowledge-based economies.
C. Policy outlines for promoting the integration 
of offshoring services between Asia 
and Latin America
In the medium and long terms, Asia will be the world’s leading economic 
zone. In terms of policy, China and India will base their leadership on 
strategies focused not on export promotion, but on creating the right 
conditions for the internationalization of their companies.
In terms of trade in services, Asia and Latin America are very 
different. Several Asian countries are the world’s largest players, while 
Latin America is only marginal in this field.
Analysis of recent trends and medium-term perspectives show 
some competitive elements that might eventually allow Latin America 
to gain a better position in the global services trade. Whether this 
actually occurs will depend on a combination of public policies and 
corporate vision.
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1. Latin America’s perspectives in the offshoring industry
Latin America has a newly-gained role as a near-shore services 
provider for the United States market and a growing one as support centre 
hub for Japanese and Korean hardware manufacturers. Competitive 
advantages have been built up to offset historical prejudices and 
perceptions of Latin America as a politically and economically high-risk 
region. Some global services firms see Latin America not as a competitor 
to Asia, but rather as a complementary provider.
To take advantage of the current scenario, Latin American countries 
need to consolidate a set of advantages and skills. Current offshoring 
providers are not necessarily forced to choose between Asia, Europe or 
Latin America; instead, they seek a well balanced mix of operations on 
the three continents, allowing them to develop a truly global services 
supply in at least three time zones. In the case of R&D, this combination 
of different teams working simultaneously shortens the access-to-market 
of knowledge-based goods and services, from Internet search engines to 
chip-design software or biotech applications.
India’s leadership in offshoring has been contested by a set of 
challenges such as increasing country risk, higher staff turnover and 
permanent wage inflation. The appreciation of the rupee, terrorist strikes, 
geopolitical risk and corporate malpractice are also increasing the need for 
India’s providers to diversify geographically. 
Eastern Europe, an alternative location to India, has also shown 
signs of stagnation. Rising labour costs, stalled labour supply and 
workforce mobility within Europe are eroding competitive advantages as 
far as estimated growth rates are concerned.
In this context, Latin America has a clear value to offer in the form 
of its skilled labour and cultural and geographical proximity to the United 
States and Western European markets. Though costs are higher than in 
India, they can be offset by higher productivity due to lower staff turnover, 
a smaller time-zone gap and a relatively stable business environment.
India’s and Eastern Europe’s offshoring development are the result 
of national efforts to simultaneously promote a skilled labour supply 
and develop consistent labour markets for engineers, finance specialists 
and accountants, quantitative analysts, biotech researchers, physicians, 
nurses and support teams.14 From that point of view, Latin America has 
14 The McKinsey Global Institute (2005) estimates that global demand for skilled workers 
specialized in services by main global industries (automobile, financial services, 
healthcare, insurance, IT services, software development, pharmaceuticals and retail) 
grew by more than 1.2 million worldwide between 2003 and 2008.
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enormous potential. On the basis of information from McKinsey’s Global 
Institute (2005), Latin America’s labour supply is estimated at 50% of 
India’s (in volume terms), larger than other countries and regions such 
as China or Eastern Europe. The offshoring industry has not viewed this 
skilled labour availability from a regional perspective yet, but has rather 
seen it in terms of individual countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama. A regional positioning strategy could 
create a powerful, human-resources-driven, near-shore service supply. 
Latin America’s cost advantages are consistent with the concept of 
a near-shore service platform for the United States market. Travel costs 
to the United States are significantly lower than from India or Eastern 
Europe, and travel times are shorter. A narrower time-zone gap is also a 
strong point. Costs savings lie between those of India and Eastern Europe.
Table III.7 
LATIN AMERICA, INDIA AND EASTERN EUROPE: CHART 
OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES, 2009
(Averages)
Factor Latin America India
Eastern 
Europe
Cost savings from the United States (percentages) 25-40 30-50 10-20
Time-zone gap with respect to the United States (hours) 2.5 13 7
Travel times from the United States (hours) 8 21 10
Travel costs from the United States (dollars) 2 750 8 500 5 400
Source: AT Kearney.
2. Public policies and productivity
The quality of public policies has been signalled as a key factor 
in economic growth and development in any given scenario. From the 
point of view of this study, attention must be given to policies that could 
stimulate factor productivity and promote the services industry.
Labour productivity is practically stagnant in Latin America (Farrell 
and Remes, 2007), precisely because of low productivity in the services 
sector,15 which is currently the largest employer and focus of investment in 
the region. Services industries in Latin America are lagging behind owing 
to an institutional environment which lacks a pro-innovation and pro-
entrepreneurial drive.
15 Brazil’s food retail productivity is only 16% of that of the United States.  In more capital-
intensive services such as retail banking, Latin American productivity is less than half that 
of the United States (Farell and Remes, 2007).
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Latin American governments have spent many years focusing on 
manufacture and industrial promotion policies, both capital-intensive 
industries that were losing competitiveness vis-à-vis Asian products. Only 
recently have they turned to policies to promote services and capitalize 
on their potential. Future developments should address company creation 
and closure, and promotion of market and factor flexibility.
3. Policies to promote the services industry 
Several Latin American countries have adopted services promotion 
policies. Policy studies show both successes and shortcomings (Gereffi, 
Castillo and Fernandez-Stark). Issues that need to be addressed include:
• Infrastructure improvement: ICTs are central to the development 
of trade in services, based on cost-competitive quality broadband 
availability. 
• Skill availability: A critical mass of skilled, bilingual professionals 
is central to cash in as a near-shore powerhouse. 
• Institutional coordination: Export promotion is usually the 
responsibility of industry, trade or foreign relations ministries. 
Services export promotion is somehow diluted in a number 
of agencies such as customs, tax administrations, industrial 
promotion and investment attraction. 
• Incentives: Several Latin American countries offer a set of 
incentives to attract foreign investment into offshoring and 
outsourcing projects. There is a risk of discrimination against 
local companies, which should be eligible if WTO rules allow it.
• Intellectual property rights and privacy: Call centre operation 
involves personal data management, which requires mandatory 
legislation to protect it. KPO also requires intellectual property 
rights protection.
There is broad scope to improve the regulatory environment in 
Latin America, including by eliminating restrictions and harmonizing 
standards as a means to make the region more attractive to Asian investors. 
Trade agreements are important for creating certainties and reducing risk, 
but they are not enough to promote actual business. A combination of 
policies is needed to improve bilateral trade regulation:
• Promotion of services agreements with Asia and implementation 
of agendas included in free trade agreements. The goal of services 
agreements should be to promote greater integration in value-
added segments such as innovation and technology. If Latin 
America is to be perceived as a stable, attractive and low-risk 
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economic zone, services integration within the region is central. 
This involves new and prompt mechanisms for obtaining work 
visas for technical and managerial staff, flexible rules for new 
start-ups, and international services trade without mandatory 
commercial presence. 
• Agreements to avoid double taxation between Latin America 
and Asia. Governments should evaluate the real trade-offs 
between the initial decrease in tax flows versus new tax income 
from economic growth and job creation. 
• Latin America-Asia mutual recognition agreements. Obstacles 
to skilled labour mobility are a major limitation to services 
integration. Some professional services require diploma 
recognition. In other services, professionals must stay in a 
foreign country for lengthy periods, making it all the more 
important to adopt mechanisms to avoid double taxation and 
double contributions to retirement funds.
4. Policy on research and development
Another key area for promoting integration and complementarity 
between Asia and Latin America is scientific research. Patent, investment 
and R&D data confirm that Latin America is lagging behind in knowledge 
creation, which does not mean that the region lacks world-class researchers.
Table III.8 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: INVESTMENT IN R&D AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2006
Country Public Private Total
Japan 0.60 2.20 2.80
Republic of Korea 0.60 1.90 2.50
Brazil 0.63 0.42 1.05
Mexico 0.23 0.23 0.46
Chile 0.36 0.31 0.67
Argentina 0.35 0.15 0.50
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and information provided by the International Monetary Fund.
R&D levels in Latin America are lower than in Asia, and similar 
to some European countries, but most R&D expenditure is made by the 
public sector. In Japan and the Republic of Korea the largest share in R&D 
expenditure is made by private industrial conglomerates. In Latin America 
the public sector is the largest sponsor of scientific research, through 
government R&D promotion agencies such as CONICET (Argentina), 
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CONICYT (Chile) and COLCIENCIAS (Colombia). Japanese private 
investment in R&D amounts to US$ 95 billion yearly, i.e. equivalent to 
2.2% GDP; by contrast, the Government of Brazil provides US$ 6 billion, or 
0.63% of GDP, in R&D grants and subsidies.
Integration between the two regions could be sought through 
potential complementarity between private resources (Japan, Republic of 
Korea) and State subsidies by Latin American R&D agencies. Today, R&D 
cooperation between Latin America and Asia is scarce.
Mexico and Argentina show the highest levels of cooperation in 
terms of patented knowledge. However, Chile is the only country to 
have developed cooperation projects with an Asian country. As of 2006, 
Chile had a single shared patent with Japan, though the work of Biosigma 
should help to raise this number in the coming years. This Japanese-
Chilean joint venture has achieved significant advances in bioleaching 
bacteria. Biosigma is an interesting case study, inasmuch as it has created 
new capital flows through patented knowledge. 
Another relevant factor in R&D country indicators , is the role of 
foreign companies. In Ireland, Hungary and the Czech Republic this 
percentage varies from 40% to 60% of overall R&D investment. In Mexico 
it is almost nil, which confirms that industrial offshoring (maquila) is not 
a significant source of knowledge development or technology spillover 
(OECD, 2006, p.41). Individual government actions in Latin America 
should be informed by these models, whose lessons could be of value 
in assembling a set of skill-promoting subsidies for attracting R&D 
investments from Asia.
Under law 11.196 of 2005, Brazil allows national and foreign companies 
to accelerate depreciation and treat R&D as operational expenses and thus 
reduce income tax payments (including contracts with universities and 
small companies). Further deductions are possible by contracting scientists 
and patenting inventions. What is more, federal agencies will finance up to 
40% of a researcher’s salary (60% if the contract is in the Amazon region or 
in the Northeast) (Brito Cruz, 2011). The promotion agency of the State of 
São Paulo, Fapesp, covers from 20% to 70% of R&D expenditure to promote 
cooperation between companies and universities. Federal funds are also 
available to sponsor projects in telecommunications, ICTs, petroleum, 
aeronautics, healthcare, mining, water treatment and transport, among 
others. In this context, Brazil is strengthening links with other countries, 
including Japan, to promote research in areas such as health care and bio-
fuels, in which it has world-class capacities and competence. It also has a 
large immigrant community of Japanese origin, with individuals active in 
research, production and politics. 
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A case study for exports of R&D services is the Mathematical 
Modelling Centre (CMM) in Chile, which has built up an impressive 
client portfolio of large mining and services companies, Chilean as well 
as foreign.16 CMM offers world-class R&D outsourcing and an offshoring 
base of state-of-the art mathematical modelling. As seen in gure 20, CMM 
has several R&D projects and joint ventures with local companies, both 
private and State-run, as well as with foreign companies, mainly from 
Europe and North America.
Figure III.3 














































Source: Center for Mathematical Modelling, Universidad de Chile [online] www.cmm.cl.
Note: CMM clients not shown in the gure include the CODELCO subsidiaries Micomo and Biosigma, and 
Chuquicamata and Teniente mines.
Chile has an R&D promotion law which is part of a comprehensive 
national strategy to promote innovation and science, nanced by a 
royalty tax levied on mining activities. Under the law, companies 
which hire a research centre registered with the development agency 
(CORFO) are eligible for credit (35% of total payments) and a 65% tax 
refund. In the past four years, emphasis has been given to collaborative 
university-run research centres focusing on specic areas, as well as 
16 CMM has KPO contracts with Biosigma for biomining technology development and 
with Micomo for IP solutions. Chile’s R&D support system is promoting this kind of 
interaction.
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technological consortiums with private companies, in order to create 
ad hoc solutions for industry-specific problems. Agencies involved in 
this process are CONICYT (Ministry of Education), ICM (Ministry of 
Planning), FIA (Ministry of Agriculture) and Innova (CORFO). Under 
a systemic approach (Ministry of Economic Affairs of Chile, 2010, pp. 
53-58),  these agencies provide capital for collaborative or individual, 
theoretical or applied research. Several of the R&D projects mentioned 
in this study were supported by Conicyt. 
5. Education, training and social capital
Asia and Latin America are separated by geography, time zones and 
cultural factors. Policies could help bridge these gaps by promoting Asian 
language programmes, academic and student exchanges and circulation 
of cultural products. Positive industry perspectives in near-shore and KPO 
(for United States-related projects) lend support to the notion of culture as 
a powerful trade promoter. 
Visa restrictions in the United States since 2003 have affected the 
influx of foreign IT and engineering professionals. Unable to stay in the 
United States, foreign students return to their countries in increasing 
numbers. They ultimately operate as promoters of foreign investment in 
trade in services, including offshoring projects. 
Chile is a significant example. Yahoo!, Synopsis and AirSage’s R&D 
centres are a policy achievement, but they also reflect larger cultural 
issues. Several Chilean engineers who participated in these projects 
trained at universities in the United States, a factor which operates as 
trust-capital. CMM has an agreement with the National Centre for 
Scientific Research (CNRS) of France, and several of its mathematicians 
trained in that country, which helps to explain a number of contracts 
with large French industrial conglomerates. There are few examples 
of such links links between Latin America and Asia, however. Latin 
American engineers, designers and scientists could eventually follow 
graduate programmes in Japan, China or the Republic of Korea and act 
as integration brokers in the future.
Universities could play a key role in Asian-Latin American 
integration in relation to services exports and offshoring. Agreements 
between governments and universities have the potential to stimulate 
professional and scientific training, creating knowledge networks and 
building trust.
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6. Regional initiatives
National policies have been enacted to promote and attract 
investment, and to facilitate bilateral trade between Asia and Latin 
America. There are fiscal incentives as well an attractive supply of human 
resources. But there is still space for regional and subregional action to 
produce a coherent and effective strategy to support Asian companies 
willing to offshore and outsource in Latin America.
A joint regional approach is a major policy challenge for Latin 
America, because a coordinated strategy implies major breakthroughs in 
two key areas:
• Services must gain top priority on national agendas, avoiding 
seizure and co-option by the bureaucratic interests of services 
promotion policies. 
• Services integration within Latin America is central to promote 
a free flow of professionals. Intraregional agreements should be 
implemented to grant work visas and recognition of diplomas 
and qualifications.
Significant efforts could be made within the region to double 
taxation agreements, of which there are only 14 in the region thus far.
Agreements must act as effective support mechanisms for 
companies willing to internationalize. Offshoring project planning 
and design requires specialists to travel, supervise and hold meetings 
with local partners. These professionals also need health insurance and 
pension-fund mechanisms, whether long- or short-term. Agreements 
must bring tangible and practical trade benefits, as well as operational 
flexibility, thus leading to robust integration in R&D, innovation 
and development.
Regional integration institutions have been slow to adopt trade 
in services as a priority on their agendas. Members have not shown the 
necessary commitment to this end. Attention has been given to the 
study and follow-up of national policies, downplaying the possibility of 
coordinating a systematic agenda.
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Chapter IV 
Business models for trans-Latins: Latin 





In recent years Latin America has exhibited strong economic growth, 
supported by a favourable international context including high prices for 
its main export commodities and cautious macroeconomic management, 
particularly on the fiscal front. Also helping to drive growth, an 
economic policy formulated to keep exchange rates high has boosted 
export performance.
However, the outlook for the global economy is highly uncertain. 
Although the worst effects of the 2008-2009 crisis have seemingly been 
avoided, the next few years’ global growth rates are likely to fall short of 
pre-crisis levels, with developing countries growing faster than developed 
economies. The possibility of the developed world relapsing into recession 
cannot be ruled out. This means that international conditions will favour 
Latin America’s growth far less than in 2003-2008 (ECLAC, 2010). 
1 The comments of German King, Joaquin Piña and Jaesung Kwak on a previous version 
of this report are gratefully acknowledged. The authors would also like to thank Sofía 
Fernández Guerrico for her valuable assistance.
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Although developing countries are expected to keep growing 
even in this less favourable scenario, slacker growth of the international 
economy will act as a drag on international trade as developed countries’ 
demand for imports falls and developing countries’ export opportunities 
consequently shrink. Moreover, competition for exports and investments 
will be tougher than before, underlining the need for many developing 
countries to rethink their specialization patterns and network of trade and 
investment relations in order to adapt to the new scenario (ECLAC, 2010).
In this regard, it is important to recall that concerns about the 
sustainability of growth in Latin America existed even during the recent 
high-growth period. At the time, many analysts warned that the fair-
weather period should be used as an opportunity to make the structural 
transformations needed to put the region on a growth path that would be 
sustainable over time.
How to integrate the region into the world economy was one of the 
main points on this agenda of structural change. This issue, in turn, needed 
to be addressed in the context of a global scenario characterized by growing 
integration among national economies —through trade, investment, finance, 
and so forth— and the increasing internationalization of global value 
chains. Although the crisis has hurt trade and investment, trends towards 
production internationalization will not be reversed (although they may 
be slowed for a time). Accordingly, the question of how to integrate Latin 
America into global value chains remains highly relevant.
This issue has many angles. First, it involves questions related to 
foreign trade flows, that is, the geographical and sectoral patterns of exports 
and imports in the region. Second, it touches upon investment  —both 
FDI inflows (in relation to the objectives, strategies and impacts of foreign 
transnational corporations investing in Latin America) and FDI outflows 
(investments by the homegrown multinationals that have come to be known 
as trans-Latins). Third, both trade and investment issues need to be analysed 
in the context of the creation of global value chains, which are deployed not 
only in manufacturing but also in services (López, Ramos and Torre, 2009). 
East Asian countries are, on the one hand, a potential threat for 
Latin American countries because they compete for foreign markets 
and for investment and are a growing source of imports for many Latin 
American countries (which means that some domestic industries in the 
latter could suffer). On the other hand, Asia has been a key driver of world 
economic growth in recent years and its role will be even more important 
in the coming years. This means that Asian countries are also attractive 
markets for Latin American firms wishing to export and invest abroad 
and that they offer opportunities for partnerships in many areas where 
complementarities between both regions exist.
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All forecasts indicate that Asia’s weight in the world economy will 
keep growing. GDP in East Asia and the Pacific expanded at more than 8% 
yearly in 2010 and 2011, vis-à-vis 2.7% and 3.2% for the world as a whole 
(World Bank, 2010). After falling in 2009, FDI from Asia jumped 35% in 
2010 to levels above those recorded in 2008 (IIF, 2010).
The share of South and East Asia (excluding Japan) in total FDI 
inflows grew from 8.4% in the 1970s to 9.5% in the 1980s, 16.6% in the 
1990s and 15.1%  in the 2000s. The region absorbs more than half of all FDI 
flowing into developing countries (UNCTAD). The Asian region presents 
market opportunities and attracts efficiency-seeking investments. 
South and East Asian countries are well integrated into global value 
chains. Each one offers distinctive advantages and capabilities, from 
low labour costs to huge domestic markets and a store of technological 
expertise. Moreover, many countries are upgrading their integration into 
global value chains; China, for instance, is now hosting research-and-
development oriented investments.
But Asia is also a destination for FDI. The share of South and East 
Asia in terms of global FDI outflows grew from 0.2% in the 1970s to 4% in 
the 1980s and 8% in the 1990s and 2000s (based on UNCTAD data).
The emerging role of Asia, and in particular of China and India, 
poses challenges and opportunities for the world; Latin America is not 
an exception. This report will focus on opportunities for Latin American 
firms to invest in Asia. These firms need to rethink their business models 
in order to adapt to the new global scenario. Although FDI sourced in Latin 
American countries is nothing new, the region as a whole is not a major 
player in the world of emerging transnational corporations —with the 
partial exception of Brazilian companies in recent years. Because developed 
countries may be entering a phase of lower growth and fewer investment 
opportunities, investing in Asia may be an attractive option for many Latin 
American firms seeking to internationalize their business strategies. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the experiences of a few 
manufacturing companies that have invested in Asia, not only through 
distribution channels but also by setting up manufacturing facilities. 
The prime focus will be on successful trans-Latin investments in Asia, 
especially their strategies, objectives, perceived opportunities for further 
investments and the challenges of and requirements for investing in the 
region. The results of this study will facilitate the design of strategies 
aimed at fostering such investments, which could help counterbalance the 
current economic relationship between the two regions. That relationship 
is based mostly on exports of natural resources from Latin America and 
imports of manufactured goods from Asia, with low bilateral FDI flows 
between them. 
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A. Latin America in global value chains: foreign 
direct investment
South and East Asia (excluding Japan) account for a growing share of total 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, climbing from 8.4% in the 1970s 
to 9.5% in the 1980s, 16.6% in the 1990s and 15.1% in the 2000s. This region 
now absorbs more than half of total FDI inflows going to developing 
countries (UNCTAD). It receives both market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking investments. South and East Asian countries are well integrated 
into global value chains, with each country offering distinctive advantages 
and capabilities that range from low labour costs to huge domestic markets 
and a store of technological expertise. Moreover, many countries are 
upgrading their integration into global value chains; China, for instance, is 
now hosting research-and-development oriented investments.
But Asia is also a source of FDI. South and East Asia’s share of global 
FDI outflows grew from 0.2% in the 1970s to 4% in the 1980s and 8% in the 
1990s and 2000s (based on UNCTAD data).
The emerging role of Asia, and in particular of countries such 
as China and India, poses a number of challenges and opportunities 
for the world as a whole. Latin America firms are no exception, and 
they are rethinking their business models in order to adapt to the new 
global scenario.
1. Inward FDI
Figure IV.1 shows FDI inflows into Latin America in recent years. 
These inflows have mostly followed the global trend, although with a 
higher degree of volatility. After a sustained fall during the early 2000s, 
FDI started to recover —slightly at first and more strongly in the past 
few years.
The main investors in Latin America are developed countries. 
According to ECLAC data, in 2004-2008 around 30% of inward FDI came 
from the United States, 15% from the Netherlands, 10% from Spain and 5% 
from Canada. Investment from within the region accounted for only 6% of 
total inward FDI. 
Asian investment in Latin America has been very limited, 
accounting for only 1.7% of total FDI to Argentina in 2008. In the case of 
Brazil, Asian countries were the source of 4.6% of total inward FDI in 2008; 
4.4% came from Japan alone. In many Latin American countries, Asian 
investment is so small that it is included in the “other countries” category 
of official statistics, making it impossible to identify the exact amount.
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Figure IV.1 
WORLD AND LATIN AMERICA: INWARD FDI FLOWS
(Billions of dollars)









































Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2011.
The bulk of FDI coming into Latin America has been going to 
the services sector —mainly telecommunications, nance and public 
utilities— although natural resources have been attracting a larger 
share in the past few years. While in 2000 about 60% of total inward FDI 
went to the services sector and 10% to natural resource exploitation, 
by 2008 these percentages had shifted to 50% and 25%, respectively. 
Manufacturing retained a stable 20% share throughout the period 
(ECLAC, 2009). 
There is a strong relationship between trade patterns and the 
type of FDI received by subregions of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
In South American countries, exploitation of natural resources and 
access to national or regional markets (resource- and market-seeking 
strategies) seem to be the determining factors behind FDI location 
decisions, and they centre primarily on natural resource sectors, some 
manufacturing activities (mainly the automobile, chemical and food 
industries) and services (such as public utilities, banks and commerce). 
On the other hand, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, by 
and large, receive efciency-seeking investments in the industrial 
sector (including automobiles, textiles, garments and electronics) 
drawn above all by low labour costs. Geographical proximity to the 
main consumption markets can act as another driver of investment 
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decisions. These investments mainly target labour-intensive stages of 
the transnational corporations’ production networks and, as explained 
earlier, tend to operate as enclaves with low levels of integration into 
the domestic (host) economy.2
The different degrees and forms of Latin America’s insertion into 
global value chains through transnational corporations do not seem to 
generate notable differential FDI impacts in the region. In the case of 
MERCOSUR, research (see Chudnovsky and López, 2006) shows that 
the macroeconomic impacts of FDI have not been significant, with no 
effect on GDP growth or investment. But the microeconomic impacts 
of FDI seem to have been stronger, albeit uneven. While subsidiaries 
of transnational corporations are more integrated from a foreign 
trade viewpoint than domestic companies are, this does not generate 
spillover to local firms (that is, it does not help them become exporters). 
The exception is Brazil, where such spillover seems to have existed and 
has generally benefitted local firms with the highest productivity and 
hurt those with the lowest.
In terms of productivity, the presence of transnational corporations 
seems to have given rise to positive spillover to the local companies that 
supply them. However, horizontal spillover —that is, among companies 
that compete in the same market— is infrequent and seems to depend on 
the particularities of the local companies and the markets in which they 
operate3 (Chudnovsky and López, 2006). Similar findings are reported 
for Colombia, where there is no evidence of horizontal spillover but there 
are cases of vertical spillover (Kugler, 2006).
In Mexico, FDI impacts, although positive in terms of exports, 
employment and wages (at least in certain regions of the country), have 
been weak in terms of production chains,4 human resource training 
and technological development on a local level (Capdevielle, 2005; 
2 Mexico also received substantial market-seeking FDI flows, both in industrial and in 
service sectors.
3 In Argentina, the companies with the most absorption capacity benefitted from the 
presence of transnational corporations; in Brazil, those that gained the most were national 
companies with the widest productivity gap vis-à-vis the transnationals. The hypothesis 
behind the finding in Argentina is based on the fact that the greater the absorption 
capacity, the easier it is to transfer knowledge from transnational company subsidiaries 
to local firms. In Brazil’s case, the finding might be due to the effect of massive inflows 
of market-seeking FDI into a country, displacing local firms that compete directly with 
foreign subsidiaries in the same markets (Chudnovsky and López, 2006).
4 The percentage of local input in the total intermediate consumption of Mexico’s 
manufacturing activity has been in the region of 10%; in temporary import-for-export 
programmes the respective figures double. Nevertheless, only 30% of such inputs are 
industrial, the rest being services that are difficult to replace with imports because of 
physical barriers (Capdevielle, 2005).
The changing nature of Asian-Latin American economic relations 161
ECLAC, 2005; Dussel Peters, 2003). Weak local innovation dynamics 
limit the learning process; weak local linkages obviously curtail 
potential spillover. In more general terms, maquila industries and 
similar ones did see product and process upgrading, and even greater 
organizational complexity and subsidiary autonomy, but this has not 
been accompanied accordingly by functional upgrading nor has it 
prevented labour from being the most important local added value in 
such operations (Capdevielle, 2005). FDI in this region does not seem 
to have generated externalities for local companies by means of human 
capital mobility either. Additionally, in many countries a dual export 
—and industrial— structure has emerged, since national companies 
specialize in primary and traditional goods and, even where they 
produce the same goods, serve different markets (Ciarli and Giuliani, 
2005; Bair and Dussel Peters, 2006). 
In this general scenario, Brazil is the best-positioned country in 
terms of FDI impacts. Fleury and Leme Fleury (2006) report that in the 
face of China’s emergence as a global competitor in the textile industry, 
transnational corporation subsidiaries located in Brazil have focused 
on specialized, high value-added products, which shows their interest 
in remaining in that market (as well as the fact that production is not 
primarily based on low labour costs). Brazil is also the location chosen 
by transnational corporations for research and development operations 
and for investing in high-tech sectors (not with maquila schemes).
2. Outward FDI
The share of world FDI outflows going to developing countries rose 
from 1.2% to 24.9% between the 1970s and 2010-2011 (see table IV.1). Latin 
America influences this trend less than the Asian economies. While the 
weight of the latter went from 19% of total FDI from developing countries 
between 1970 and 1979, to 65% between 2000 and 2010-2011, Latin America’s 
participation dropped from 42% to 28% (and nearly half of it comes from 
major financial centres in the Caribbean).
According to UNCTAD statistics, outward FDI from Latin America5 
in 2010 amounted to US$ 61.4 billion —the second highest figure in the 
region’s history, topped only by the US$ 49 billion reported in 2006 (see 
figure IV.2). The same data show that Mexico was, in 2010, the region’s 
leading foreign investor, accounting for 23% of the total (after suffering the 
impacts of the global financial crisis in 2008), followed by Brazil (19% of 
Latin American outward FDI in 2010) and Chile (14%).
5 Includes South and Central America and Mexico.
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Table IV.1 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND REGIONS: SHARE IN GLOBAL AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY FDI OUTFLOWS, 1970-2011 
(Percentages)































Developing countries 1.2 100 6.4 100 10.7 100 14.8 100 24.9 100
South, East and 
South-East Asia 0.2 19.0 3.9 61.8 7.9 73.3 9.0 60.7 16.3 65.3
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 0.5 41.2 1.2 18.7 2.4 22.0 4.3 29.3 7.0 28.0
   Argentina -0.0 -2.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.3 3.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3
   Brazil 0.3 24.9 0.2 3.8 0.2 2.1 0.5 3.5 0.3 1.3
   Chile 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 2.1 0.3 2.1 0.7 2.7
   Colombia 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.5 1.9
   Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Mexico 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.3 2.3 0.7 2.9
   Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
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Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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Given Latin America’s low share of global FDI outows, it is not 
surprising that among the top 100 transnational corporations from 
developing countries in 2008, only nine are from Latin America (four 
from Mexico, three from Brazil, one from Argentina and one from the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela). In addition to eight South African and 
Russian companies, three from Kuwait and one each from Egypt, United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey, the remaining 68 are from South and 
East Asia (UNCTAD, 2010). Another ranking (which excludes transnational 
corporations from the more advanced Asian economies) shows that among 
the top 100 rms from emerging countries, China leads with 41 rms, 
followed by India with 20. Brazil is third and Mexico fourth (with 13 and 
7 companies, respectively). As for the rest of Latin America, only Argentina 
and Chile are in this ranking, with one company each (see figure IV.3).
FIGURE IV.3 
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES: NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE TOP 100 
GLOBAL FIRMS FROM EMERGING ECONOMIES, 2011

















Source: Boston Consulting Group (2011).
The relative contribution by individual Latin American countries to 
FDI outows from the region has changed over time. Argentina, whose 
companies were already FDI pioneers in the twentieth century and were 
a significant source of FDI in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s, has seen its share 
slip in the past few years —basically due to the sale of a large part of its 
major companies to foreign transnational corporations. Nowadays, as 
said before, Brazil, Mexico and Chile have become leading sources of FDI 
outows from the region. 
164 ECLAC
FDI from the trans-Latins tends to be concentrated in basic industries 
(such as hydrocarbons, extractive mining and the steel and cement 
industries), food and beverages and some services (mostly, engineering 
and telecommunications). On the other hand, FDI from Asian companies 
tends to target high-tech sectors.6 Asian transnational corporations 
increasingly base their activities on efficiency- or strategic-asset-seeking 
strategies; in the case of the trans-Latins the search for natural resources 
and markets prevails and may reduce potential positive externalities that 
might result from emerging economies.
However, there are cases of Latin American companies reaching 
world-class excellence levels in their respective industries (for example, 
Techint in Argentina, CEMEX in Mexico and Petrobras in Brazil). Some 
even compete in sectors that are subject to rapid technological change or in 
which competition on the basis of design and innovation is key. Examples 
include Embraer (Brazil) in the aeronautical sector (see Goldstein, 2002), 
Telmex and América Móvil (Mexico) in telecommunications and IMPSA 
(Argentina) in equipment. 
Although most FDI in Latin America has been intraregional, 
in recent years trans-Latins have increased their investments outside 
the region. Brazilian firms such as Vale, Gerdau and Petrobras are a 
good example of this trend (see Niembro, Ramos and Simkievich, 
2009). There are also examples in Mexico (Alfa Group and CEMEX) 
and Argentina (Techint, IMPSA). As seen below, although Asia is 
still not a major destination for most trans-Latins, there are some 
interesting cases.
The available information on destinations for outward FDI 
from Latin America (ECLAC, 2009) indicates that most of it is directed 
towards the American continent:in 2008 the main geographical 
destination of Brazilian outward investment was the United States 
(with 28% of the total), the financial centres of the Caribbean (25% 
of total Brazilian outward FDI) and the rest of Latin America (12%). 
Asia’s share of Brazil’s outward FDI stock barely surpassed 0.1% in 
2008 and was concentrated in China and Japan (according to figures 
from Brazil’s central bank). Chile’s figures show that 72% of its outward 
FDI went to South America; Colombia’s foreign investments were 
mostly concentrated in the United States (57% of the total). Between 
1994 and 2009 outward Colombian FDI going to Asia was close to zero 
(Colombia’s Banco de la República). There are no statistics available for 
the rest of the countries. 
6 Twenty-four of Asia’s 76 major transnationals operate in IT, electronics and 
telecommunication sectors; only two trans-Latins do (UNCTAD, 2009).
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Notwithstanding the lack of data, Asia is quite marginal as a 
target for Latin American foreign investment. But even if on a relatively 
small scale, Latin American companies do invest in Asia (this may 
be understated in official statistics due to registration issues).7 The 
Vale Columbia Center (2007, 2009) has issued a series of reports with 
valuable information on the activities of trans-Latins, including their 
investments in Asia.
Argentina’s leading multinationals have only a limited presence 
outside the Western Hemisphere, where 88% of their foreign subsidiaries 
are found. Europe accounts for 8% and the rest of the world for 4%. 
Argentina’s top four multinationals have a presence in Asia; in order 
of size they are Techint (metals), Arcor (food), IMPSA (oil and energy) 
and Bagó (pharmaceutical). Among the Asian countries, China has 
received the most investments from Argentina, although on a small 
scale involving less than US$ 30 million per year according to López and 
Ramos (2009). These investments targeted the metal, food and energy 
sectors of the Chinese economy. Worthy of special note is the soybean 
crushing industry: in recent years Argentine soybean exporters have 
set up several processing plants in China, which is Argentina’s largest 
soybean export market (López, Ramos and Simkievich, 2008). 
The case of Mexican multinationals is similar: most of their 
presence outside the Western Hemisphere is concentrated in Europe, and 
their investments in Asia are limited. The main exception is the major 
Mexican cement producer CEMEX, which has investments in China, 
Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand, among other countries. 
Other Mexican companies that have subsidiaries in Asia include ALFA 
and Grupo Carso (both are conglomerates), Gruma and Bimbo (food 
and beverages). Televisa (entertainment) and Grupo Modelo (food and 
beverages) have a joint venture with a Chinese company and sales offices 
in Tokyo, respectively.
The Latin American companies with the highest degree of 
involvement in the Asian economy are multinationals headquartered in 
Brazil, although, as mentioned earlier, the amounts of money invested are 
low in absolute terms. The top Brazilian mining corporation Vale do Rio 
Doce has large investments in China and other East and Middle Asian 
countries, as do Votorantim (a diversified group), WEG (metals) and 
Marcopolo (transport equipment), among other companies. However, 
according to Saslavsky and Rozemberg (2009) Brazil’s highest-profile 
investment in Asia may have been airplane manufacturing company 
7 While a relevant share of outward FDI from Latin American firms goes to tax havens, the 
final destination of some of those flows may be Asia.
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Embraer’s US$ 50 million investment in China in the early 2000s to 
produce (in joint venture with a Chinese company) a Chinese version of 
its successful ERJ 145 regional jet.
Table 7 provides a non-exhaustive list of Latin American 
companies with investments in Asia. The list includes firms with 
production facilities and those with trade and technical assistance 
activities or sales offices. These two types of investment do not have 
the same implications in terms of value added or global value chain 
logic, but both have been included in the list because they constitute 
an important step in the corporate internationalization process. Some 
of the projects are wholly-owned by the trans-Latins while others are 
joint ventures with Asian partners. Brazil is the country with more 
firms investing in Asia, although a number of Mexican, Chilean and 
Argentinean firms also have a presence there. As would be expected, 
China is the main investment destination country. Another Asian giant, 
India, is also an important host country for Latin American firms. 
Other East Asian countries at the receiving end of investments from 
Latin America include Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Hong 
Kong, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines. 
Although the pattern is somewhat diversified, the food and 
beverage industry clearly stands out as the largest recipient sector. 
Other major recipient sectors are engineering and construction, steel 
and metallurgy, auto parts and transport vehicles and oil and mining. A 
number of Brazilian and Chilean banks have opened branches in some 
Asian countries.
In almost all of these cases, investments in Asia are very recent, 
that is, they have emerged in the secondary stages of the trans-Latins’ 
internationalization process. This clearly suggests that Asia is not high 
on the agenda for the average Latin American company, which is more 
focused on expanding within the region and, eventually, in developed 
countries such as the United States or those that are part of the European 
Union. However, as Asia’s role in the global economy grows it is likely to 
attract more investments from Latin American firms.
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Table IV.2  





Trade and technical 
assistance activities  
or sales offices




Arabia, India, Republic 




IMPSA Metallurgy China, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Viet Nam
India,




Arcor Food and beverages China
Chemo Drugs China
Brazil Vale (CVRD) Mining China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Republic 





Petrobras Oil China, India, Japan Iran, Singapore
Votorantim Mining and metallurgy China
Embraer Aircrafts China Singapore
Odebrecht Engineering and 
construction
United Arab Emirates China
Sadia Food and beverages United Arab Emirates, 
China, Japan
Perdigão Food and beverages United Arab Emirates
Vicunha Textiles China
Marfrig Food and beverages China, Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia
Gerdau Steel India
Weg Electric equipment China, India Korea, United Arab 
Emirates, Japan, 
Singapore, Thailand
Banco do Brasil Banking China, Japan, Hong Kong 
(Special Administrative 
Region of China), 








Trade and technical 
assistance activities  
or sales offices
Itau Banking China, Hong Kong 
(Special Administrative 
Region of China), Japan, 
United Arab Emirates
Brazil Sabó Auto parts China, Japan
Marcopolo Transport vehicles India, China












United Arab Emirates, 





Chemicals and mining China, India, Thailand Japan
Molymet Chemicals China
Banco de Chile Banking China
BCI Banking Hong Kong (Special 
Administrative Region 
of China)
ENAP Oil Iran, Kuwait
Antofagasta Mining Pakistan
Viña Montes Restaurant Japana 
Luksic Wine China
Mexico CEMEX Cement Philippines, China, 
Bangladesh, United 
Arab Emirates, Israel, 
Malaysia, Thailand
Televisa Group Entertainment China 
Bimbo Group Food and beverages China
Gruma Food and beverages China, Malaysia
Alfa Auto parts China
Grupo Modelo Food and beverages Japan
Grupo Carso Auto parts, electric 
equipment
China
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of the companies’ websites.
a Franchise.
Table IV.2 (concluded)
The changing nature of Asian-Latin American economic relations 169
B. Case studies of Latin American firms 
internationalizing in Asia
This section takes a closer look at the Asian strategies of some Latin 
American companies chosen as case studies. Techint and IMPSA are 
business groups with companies that operate in diverse fields; Bimbo 
and Embraer operate in their own specific sector. The internationalization 
strategy followed by each firm is examined separately.
1. Tenaris (Techint Group)
The Techint Group was created in 1945 in Italy as Compagnia 
Tecnica Internazionale. Its  operations were transferred to Argentina 
the following year to pursue the opportunities the company’s founder 
(Agostino Rocca)  saw in providing the State-owned oil company YPF 
with seamless tubes for its rapidly increasing network of pipelines in 
southern Argentina.
Later on, Techint started diversifying its operations. In the 
1960s, it began to provide engineering and construction services to the 
Argentine government, which made large investments in infrastructure 
—principally power plants. This experience helped Techint enter the 
international construction business, focusing on building pipelines and 
major infrastructure projects in developing countries (Castro, 2008). 
Dalmine-Siderca, a Techint company related to steel production, 
began to internationalize in 1980 with its first exports to China and what was 
then the Soviet Union, countries out of the reach of seamless tube traders. 
By the end of the 1990s, Techint had become Argentina’s largest 
industrial group and was Argentina’s leading multinational corporation. 
The 2000s saw a deepening of Techint Group’s international strategy. 
In 2000, Siderca took control of the seamless tube business of NKK 
Corporation, one of Japan’s leading steelmakers. In 2001 Siderca (which had 
been operating as DST, Dalmine-Siderca-TAMSA) was renamed Tenaris, 
its present name. The firm started construction of a local manufacturing 
facility in Qingdao, China, expected to produce about 50,000 tons of 
premium connections and couplings. In 2009,when the government of 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela renationalized TAVSA (and Sidor), 
Tenaris expanded its operations to South East Asia by acquiring SPIJ, an 
Indonesian pipe producing company. Tenaris has a joint venture with 
Maharastra Seamless Ltd. in India, and four research and development 
labs, located in Argentina, Italy, Japan and Mexico.
Tenaris has deployed a strategy of complementary industrial plants 
that are specialized both in terms of products and in terms of regional 
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markets. This has gone hand-in-hand with the creation of a complex 
commercial network that provides not only goods but also associated 
services and can meet the needs of different customers and demand 
segments. The internationalization process also included implementing a 
sophisticated financial strategy.
Techint Group is now a multinational corporation that employs 
over 57,000 people worldwide and had revenues of US$ 24 billion in 2011. 
Apart from Tenaris, Ternium and Techint Engineering & Construction, the 
group owns Tenova (previously called Techint Technologies), a firm that 
provides technology for the metal and mining industries, and Humanitas, 
which provides medical services, both headquartered in Italy.
Siderca (now part of Tenaris) first entered the Asian market by 
selling seamless tubes to Chinese state companies in the early 1980s. These 
transactions were carried out without establishing a sales office in the 
importing country. In the early 1990s, the company opened an office in 
Beijing and another in Singapore. The first focused on the Chinese market (at 
that time, State-owned clients only). The second targeted the Indonesian and 
Malaysian markets —two oil-producing countries with a big demand for 
seamless tubes. In Indonesia the customers were mainly foreign companies; 
in Malaysia, local and State-owned firms were the big buyers. Siderca’s 
global growth strategy later led it to enter the Japanese market by signing 
a joint-venture agreement with JFE Corporation and creating NKKTubes, 
taking over the seamless tube division of NKK Corporation (Japan’s leading 
steel producer) in 1999. The new company was capitalized at 3.2 billion 
yen, with Siderca holding 51% and NKK the remaining 49%. In order to 
enhance its Asian presence, Tenaris later invested in the construction of a 
manufacturing plant in Qingdao that started operations in 2008. The plant 
carries out the last stages of tube production for the Chinese market. 
Tenaris now has 10% to 15% of its total production capacity in Asia. 
Its Asian operations are a net exporter for the entire corporation, accounting 
for about 6% of Tenaris’ total revenues of US$ 9.9 billion in 2011.  The main 
market in the region is China, with about 70% of Tenaris’ regional revenues. 
The company’s presence in the region consists of four manufacturing 
centres: two in Indonesia (one of which belonged to SPIJ, acquired in 2009 
after the global financial crisis provided the opportunity to acquire a major 
company for a low price), one in Japan (NKKTubes) and one in China (the 
Qingdao plant). Tenaris also has a joint venture with Maharashtra Seamless 
Limited in India and sales offices in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Beijing, 
Seoul and Saudi Arabia. Tenaris employs 1,500 people in the region —about 
6% of the total 26,980 employees the firm has around the globe. Just 28% of 
its employees are in Argentina. Table IV.3 shows Tenaris’ capital investment 
allocation in Asia as well as its share in the joint venture.
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Table IV.3 

















US$ 72.5 million 77% 120,000 tons 745 
(2011)
Local Oil Country Tubular 
Goods (OCTG) processing 





¥3.2 billion yen 51% 260,000 tons 614
(2011) 




US$ 35 million 100% 40,000 tons  150 
(2008) 
OCTG pipes and premium 
connections
Source: “Company information”, August 2012 [online] http://www.tenaris.com/default.aspx.
The main driver of Tenaris’ investments in Asia was —and still is— 
the company’s goal of being a world leader in the seamless tube market. 
To achieve this, the firm’s strategy has always been to expand; Asia is one 
of the last stages. As seen in the historical background, Tenaris’ business 
focus is not currently in Asia but in Europe and the United States.  
Tenaris’ deployment in Asia proceeded at a slow pace —in fact, 
it took almost 30 years for the company to go from remote exporting to 
its first greenfield project. Although the company had been producing 
in Asia since at least 1999, it was doing so in plants that were already up 
and running: namely, NKK plants in Japan. Company officials stressed 
that doing business in Asia is time-consuming, not because of red tape 
(except for India, where bureaucracy appears to be an issue according to 
the interviewees) but because of a different business culture. 
Any company investing in a foreign country needs to adapt to a 
different business culture, so it is natural for internationalization not to 
be a speedy process because it takes time to learn the different practices, 
rules, languages and other particularities of the host country. But in this 
case there is also another dimension: the Asian business culture itself. In 
our interviews, officials pointed out that business relationships in Asia 
depend on strong interpersonal relationships —a feature not common to 
business relationships in most Western countries. It takes time to build 
links of trust and loyalty between people, so operating successfully in Asia 
will take a longer time than usual for Western companies. This adds to the 
already lengthy process of adaptation mentioned above. Interviewees have 
indicated that, in order to make a deal with an Asian counterpart, Western 
businesspeople have to engage in extensive talks and non-business 
activities, such as playing golf, that usually take a long time. This happens 
not only to Westerners (it is a general attitude towards all strangers), but 
foreigners are usually met with more diffidence. 
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To deal with these issues, Tenaris opts for a strategy that consists of 
training senior staff extensively before sending them to Asian subsidiaries 
and stationing them there longer than is the case for staff in Western 
countries. This allows company officials to establish their own interpersonal 
relationships in Asia. As a result, there is little turnover in senior positions in 
Tenaris’ Asian subsidiaries. Another strategy the company used initially to 
narrow the culture gap and thus speed up its deployment in the region was to 
assign bicultural staff (for instance, a Chinese-Canadian director was assigned 
to the Chinese affiliate) who more easily adapted to the new environment and 
to doing business activities with local counterparts. The general feeling was 
that the company valued interpersonal relationships far more than formal 
contractual arrangements, which were nevertheless necessary. 
The company’s strong interest in building a stable and trusting 
relationship with local agents was also related to its intentions in entering 
the Asian market —that is, not using its Asian plants just as a base for 
exporting to other regions. The Qingdao plant opened in 2008 seeks to 
exclusively serve the premium portion of the Chinese tube market. To this 
end, the firm had already established strong relationships with its local 
customers, almost all of them State-owned companies. In the case of Japan, 
greenfield investments appeared to be unfeasible in light of the prevailing 
market conditions: foreign investment in Japan is severely restricted. The 
only possible way to access the market proved to be through a joint venture 
with a local company. Japan, per se, was not a very interesting market for 
Tenaris since it was already saturated. But the presence of a large and 
technologically updated steel industry made it the prime candidate for 
a regional base; in fact, having access to the Japanese industry enabled 
the company to later expand its product range to include new, high-tech 
products not being made at Tenaris’ other plants. The Qingdao plant is 
now supplied by both the Argentine and the Japanese subsidiaries of 
Tenaris. So, it may well be that a company that is not seeking to enter 
the regional market but rather to use it as an export base to other regions 
might not (for reasons discussed later) have to follow a long deployment 
strategy such as the one Tenaris used. “Rooting” the company in the host 
country might not be so necessary. 
Summing up, according to company officials Tenaris was successful 
in entering the Asian market because of its gradual, lengthy deployment 
strategy. But doing so requires a strong financial position because sunk 
costs are very high. In words of one of the interviewees, “to be successful in 
Asia you have to be successful back home”.  Asia cannot be an investment 
destination in the first stages of the international expansion of a Latin 
American company, but rather in the final stages. In order to overcome 
lack of brand recognition, a Latin American multinational should enter the 
Asian market not as a Latin company but as a multinational company.  
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An examination of Tenaris’ Asian strategy shows that some aspects 
are different across countries in the region. Concerning the issue of 
human resources, regulations in some countries (Indonesia, for instance) 
prohibit the appointment of foreigners to certain important positions 
at subsidiaries of foreign companies. In China, such restrictions are 
informal; in Japan there are no restrictions at all. Ownership regulations 
also vary widely; in Malaysia foreigners may not own more than 49% of 
a company’s shares. Differences in government policies across countries 
may also shape different deployment strategies. In Indonesia, for 
instance, the use of nationally-sourced inputs in the local oil industry 
is viewed positively, whilst in China the government subsidizes exports 
and not sales to local clients.
That said, Tenaris’ strategy does not mesh perfectly with the 
incentives Asian governments provide. Far from being an exporter, the 
company’s Chinese afliate is focused on the growing local market even 
though this may preclude the company from receiving short-term benets. 
Diagram IV.1 shows the current set-up of Tenaris’ operations in 
East Asia.
Diagram IV.1 
TENARIS’ OPERATIONS IN EAST ASIA
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
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A relevant difference the company observed across Asian countries 
was government attitude towards foreign investment, with Japan’s 
appearing to be the most reluctant and China’s quite the opposite, at least 
in the case of Tenaris. The Chinese State offered the firm a number of 
potential sites for its plant. Representatives from different regions made 
their offers in terms of tax exemptions and infrastructure, and Tenaris 
made the final decision. Income tax reduction was later granted. The 
company officials were positively impressed by the long-term investment 
in infrastructure the Chinese State carried out, a situation not found in 
other Asian countries. In India, for instance, investment in infrastructure 
is severely restricted by the activism of local residents, who are very 
aware of the potential negative impacts of large-scale public works on 
their communities. As Tenaris officials indicated, the Indian environment 
is often hardly receptive to any kind of large investment, even by local 
companies. They also pointed out that government attitude in the case of 
Thailand and Korea is more akin to that of China, i.e. more welcoming to 
foreign investment. 
Concerning human resource management in Asia, there are two 
relevant dimensions. One of them concerns the quality of the available 
human resources. The second one is related to their cost. As for the 
quality dimension, Tenaris officials underlined the personal drive found 
in individuals all across East Asia. This makes the Asian workforce very 
dynamic; it is quite usual for senior staff to receive suggestions from plant 
workers about possible productive improvements. This ambition also 
makes individuals more sensitive to differences in pay between companies 
and leads to large turnover in junior and plant staff, although all are fully 
committed to the company during their tenure.
Workforce education qualifications vary across Asia; Japanese and 
Koreans workers are far more educated than their Chinese and South-
East Asian counterparts. In all of the countries except for Japan there is 
a great deal of educational and job competition between individuals. 
This, coupled with strong personal drive among young Asians, results 
in a very dynamic job market. There are other differences that in some 
circumstances can be very important. For instance, Japan, as a country 
with a long industrial tradition, has a workforce that is used to stringent 
industrial security procedures. This is not so much the case in China 
because most of the workers come from a rural background. 
Concerning the cost of human resources8 in East Asia, company 
officials mentioned that wages across the region are converging with 
international levels and that cost-competitiveness is no longer a leading 
driver of investment in the region, at least not in the countries where 
8 Workforce cost is not a major component of the overall costs of capital-intensive industries 
like this one, so it is a secondary issue in terms of business strategy.
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Tenaris is present. India is an exception, but the regulatory environment 
there has limited the amount of investment the company has in India. In 
general, although wages are rising, productivity is, too, and these trends 
tend to offset each other. Tenaris now views cost-competitiveness in East 
Asia as similar to levels found in Latin America, at least in the area of 
human resources. 
To conclude, what emerges from the Tenaris case study is that 
investment in Asia should be a long-term decision and that establishing 
a low-cost base in most countries of that region is an increasingly difficult 
proposition, at least for capital-intensive industries. Adaptation is difficult, 
and cost-competitiveness may not be as strong as expected. Only well 
established and globally renowned companies are well-positioned to 
engage in strategic investments in Asia. Once a company manages to 
gain a firm foothold in the region, expansion will accelerate because local 
markets are growing rapidly and many premium market segments are not 
well served by existing competitors. Tenaris, in fact, focuses its Asian sales 
on high-end products although its industrial presence in the region covers 
all stages of seamless tube production.
2. IMPSA
IMPSA, the flagship of the Pescarmona Group, traces its origins 
back to 1907, when Enrique M. Pescarmona opened a metalworking shop 
in Mendoza, Argentina, to provide the province’s growing wine industry 
with machinery and spare parts. The company rapidly became successful 
and rose to the rank of industry leader in a few years.
In 1946, the Pescarmona family created Construcciones Metálicas 
Pescarmona (CMP) to design and build metal structures. In 1965, all the 
family’s assets and liabilities where merged into Industrias Metalúrgicas 
Pescarmona S.A. (IMPSA). The new company’s business focus became the 
supply of electrical turbines to hydroelectric power plants; its operations 
grew as the Argentine State built large hydropower plants in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
In 2002 IMPSA began to expand its international operations, 
driven in part by Pescarmona Groups’ decision to reconvert and 
Argentina’s economic crisis of 2001-2002. IMPSA Hydro (the division in 
charge of the hydroelectric machinery business) won several bids for the 
supply of equipment in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Viet Nam, the Philippines and Malaysia. In Maylasia, IMPSA 
established a factory in Lumut, where it now builds port cranes and 
other hydromechanical equipment. Another related business into which 
IMPSA has expanded is the wind power industry. The Pescarmona 
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holding presently employs more than 5,000 workers; its assets are worth 
some US$ 700 million. 
IMPSA’s internationalization process was based first and foremost 
on the engineering skills of its human resources. Second came the 
development of business models for delivering services associated with the 
sale of capital goods. Third came the company’s accumulated technology 
and innovation capabilities, especially as a supplier of nuclear stations and 
in partnership with leading foreign firms (Kosacoff, 1999; Barbero, 2010).
The Pescarmona Group first ventured into Asia as the corporation 
expanded abroad during the 1980s. As indicated above, the group’s 
investments in foreign countries were part of its diversification strategy. 
IMPSA’s first operations in Asia involved delivery of port cranes and the 
execution of hydroelectric projects in China around 1986. The opening 
of a regional headquarters in Malaysia resulted in a market expansion 
of operations in the 1990s, culminating in the establishment of a joint-
venture company with Malaysian investors and the installation of a 
manufacturing plant in the city of Lumut. The plant produces cranes and 
hydro components and is now the main production centre of the firm’s 
Asian operations. In addition to its businesses in Malaysia, the company 
has completed several hydroelectric projects in Indonesia, Thailand, India, 
China, the Philippines and Taiwan Province of China. Its port division 
has delivered more than 100 cranes along with related services such as 
operation and maintenance, retrofits and upgrades.
The relevance of Asia to IMPSA’s global operations grew steadily. 
By 2004, Asia accounted for about 30% of the company’s revenues. The 
following years saw, nevertheless, a change in the firm’s strategy in 
Asia. The company’s intention to position itself as a world-class player 
in the renewable energy business lead IMPSA to restructure, in 2008, its 
port systems division (IPS), which operated mainly in South-East Asia 
and Latin America. That division was spun off from IMPSA and now 
operates as a different company under the name of South Asia Logistic 
Services Limited. 
The change in the firm’s strategy is clear when analyzing information 
from its balance sheets. In 2007, 32% of IMPSA’s sales were from the Hydro 
division, 22% from port services and the rest from other operations. By 
2008, the share from the hydroelectric business had gone up to 47% while 
port services had dropped to 6%. In 2009 sales from the Hydro division 
accounted for 42% of total sales, while a new division (Wind, devoted 
to the wind power business) had a 36% share. Combined, the renewable 
energy business was 78% of the firm’s sales. The port services business 
accounted for only 4% of total sales. 
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According to company officials, the port and crane business was 
increasingly seen as unattractive, particularly because the products 
were becoming highly commoditized. Fierce competition from low-
cost Chinese suppliers became an obstacle to adequate profitability. 
However, the Pescarmona group has not abandoned this business; the 
new company is now building around 17 cranes, almost all of them 
for Malaysia.  
This restructuring resulted in a sharp drop in Asia’s contribution 
to IMPSA global revenues because the new firm, IPS, absorbed most of 
the business in that region. In 2009, sales in Asia represented around 2% 
of the company’s US$ 500 million in worldwide sales. This decline doesn’t 
mean that the firm has abandoned the region  —on the contrary, IMPSA 
is rebuilding its operations around the renewable energy business, in 
which it had already initiated operations in 2003 with investments in the 
Bakun hydroelectric dam project in Sarawak, Malaysia. In April 2010, 
IMPSA signed an agreement with PetroVietnam to manufacture wind 
turbines in Bin Thuang, Viet Nam for a value of around US$ 3 billion 
over a five-year period. 
The key factors that drive the continued interest of IMPSA in the 
region include (i) the large size and promising growth prospects of many 
Asian economies; (ii) the abundance of natural resources in the mainland; 
(iii) attractive manufacturing costs; (iv) the existence of well-developed 
financial and other support services; and (v) a large and growing 
population. All these factors will drive energy and infrastructure needs 
up. Arrangements facilitating trade among the region’s economies are 
another factor pushing IMPSA’s investments in Asia.
IMPSA’s structure in Asia includes the Lumut plant (where it has 
more than 500 employees and a network of over 300 subcontractors and 
vendors); the joint venture with PetroVietnam in Viet Nam; the Asian 
headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and offices in Jakarta, for commercial and 
operation activities; Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), 
for financial and administration activities; Shanghai, for outsourcing 
and sales; Delhi, for the same activities as Shanghai; and Manila, for 
administrative operations. 
The main geographic areas of strategic interest for the company 
(according to official documents) are South-East Asia (Malaysia, 
Thailand, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Cambodia, Laos and Brunei), South Asia (predominantly India, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh) and the Middle East. Far-East Asia (China, 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Japan) is not 
considered to be a strategic area because it is understood to be saturated 
and because there are well-established local companies that have some 
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sort of protection in their home markets. In turn, North-West Asia 
(the former Soviet republics) is far from IMPSA’s centre of operations 
in Malaysia, and competition from Russian and other European 
companies is tough.
The growth potential of the renewable energy business in South-
East Asia is the main driver for the company’s present investments in the 
region: almost all the power generated there comes from fossil fuels, and 
hydropower and wind power remain vastly underdeveloped. Hydropower 
installed capacity in South-East Asia, for instance, is expected to treble 
in the next ten years. IMPSA intends to gain an important share of that 
growing business.
IMPSA’s prospects in the region will also depend on competition 
trends in the renewable energy market. In the case of hydropower, 
the main competitors are two types of companies. On the one hand, 
local companies in China and India, often with strong support from 
their home government, compete on the basis of low prices and are 
particularly active in large-scale projects. These companies benefit mostly 
from intergovernmental agreements and from subsidized funding. 
On the other hand are established European players with world-class 
reputations that have set up low-cost production plants in the region and 
concentrate their business on equipment supply and not on power plant 
development. These firms usually offer high-quality products at high but 
still-competitive prices. In the case of wind energy, there is still no clear 
legislation in place for developing this industry, so there are windows 
of opportunity for companies like IMPSA to take the lead in countries 
such as Viet Nam. However, the main markets, China and India, are 
dominated by local companies that compete on the basis of prices and 
have local preferences.
The advantage of IMPSA in this context lies in the combination of 
business know-how and technology. The firm has experience spanning the 
entire process of design, production and implementation of hydroelectric 
projects and wind farms. Furthermore, the company has been present 
in the region for more than 20 years and is capable of carrying out the 
manufacturing process locally, thanks to its production centre in Malaysia. 
The firm’s broad footprint in the region has also opened the possibility for 
local-market funding —indeed, IMPSA is exploring the possibility of an 
Islamic bond issue in Malaysia. 
The company’s experience with human resource management in 
the region is quite positive, particularly in the case of Malaysia. Malaysia 
differs from other South-East Asian countries in that most university-
educated individuals speak at least three languages, owing to the 
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multiracial composition of Malay society. Malaysian universities —with 
whom the company has academic agreements—  are well placed in the 
Asian context, and a large number of foreigners study there. This is a 
big advantage for the country and partly explains why IMPSA has its 
regional headquarters in its capital, Kuala Lumpur. Furthermore, the 
Malay legal environment for labour matters is, according to the company, 
possibly the best adapted to industrial development and well-suited 
for the dynamics of labour-intensive projects. Fixed-term contracts 
are renewable without establishing a permanent tie with the worker, 
therefore limiting severance payments. 
Concerning the overall management of its subsidiaries in Asia, 
IMPSA has a policy of restricting the number of expatriate executives. 
The company’s intention is to promote local managers to take on key 
positions in its subsidiaries. For instance, when the firm first established its 
subsidiary in Malaysia, the number of Argentine executives working there 
was 17. That number has gone down to four. This policy seeks to ensure 
the company’s best possible adaptation to the local environment. For 
example, the decision-making process in Asia is very different from the 
Latin American one (which is certainly less concerned with interpersonal 
relationships —see the Techint case study). To narrow some of these 
business culture gaps, IMPSA trains its Asian executives in Argentina and 
in Brazil, its global headquarters. 
What is clear is that IMPSA intends to become firmly rooted in its 
subsidiaries’ countries. To do so, the company follows this management 
policy and builds academic and professional links with local universities 
—especially in Malaysia. Furthermore, the strategy of exporting to foreign 
markets from subsidiaries in Asia is seen by local governments as very 
positive, something that has strengthened the ties between the firm and 
host country authorities. 
In short, IMPSA is a company whose main strategy for insertion 
in the Asian market has changed radically over the years. It started as a 
provider of port system goods and services and is now focused on the 
renewable energy business. How successful this business strategy change 
will be is still to be seen.
3. Bimbo 
Grupo Bimbo, owned by the Servitje family, was established in 
Mexico in 1945 to produce bakery products. In only one generation, the 
company became one of the biggest Mexican multinationals. Currently, 
the firm operates in a multilevel environment, competes in domestic and 
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global markets and exhibits leadership in brand positioning, sales and 
production volume. It is the largest bread baker in the world (BCG, 2011). 
Through its many subsidiaries, the company produces and distributes 
over 8,000 products (among them, loaf bread, pastries, cupcakes, and sweet 
and salted snacks) and has more than 100 brands (Bimbo, Lara, Marinela, 
Oroweat, Arnold, Entenmann’s, Boboli, Ricolino, Colorado, Pullman, Plus 
Vita, among many others).
According to its 2011 annual report, the company has more than 
127,000 employees and 156 facilities distributed in 19 countries throughout 
Latin America and Asia, plus the United States (see table IV.4). The bulk 
of its plants are in Mexico (42 plants). The group has developed a vast 
distribution network throughout the Americas, comprising 39,000 routes 
and more than 1,800,000 points of sale.
TABLE IV.4 
BIMBO GROUP’S GLOBAL PRESENCE
Location Manufacturing plants Marketing companies Brands
Mexico 42 14
United States 75 1 25
China 2 1
Central and South America 30 1 36
Source: Bimbo group, annual report.
From the point of view of its industrial organization, the company 
is highly product-diversified and vertically integrated —including 
transport, packaging, raw materials production and machinery 
manufacturing (see diagram IV.2). The vertical integration strategy 
deepened in the 1980s, as a consequence of (or as a defensive reaction 
to) the Mexican inflation crisis. As a result, the company brought the 
production of moulds and display equipment (Moldex), security for 
trucks and vehicles (Proarce) and legal paperwork (Exbim) into its 
core activities. At the same time, Bimbo imposed on itself a minimum 
outside purchase requirement of 25% to maintain good relationships 
with the Mexico’s other agricultural and food companies (Moreno-
Lázaro, 2010). As a consequence of this strategy, the company cut the 
strong dependency on United States technology that had exhibited until 
mid-1970s and began a period of in-house technology development that 
includes manufacturing ovens and equipment under its own patents 
(Moreno-Lázaro, 2010).
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Diagram IV.2 

































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Moreno-Lázaro (2010). 
The 1980s crisis gave Bimbo the opportunity to buy out some 
food companies that were facing difculties. One of them was its main 
competitor, Wonder, which became part of the group in 1986 and allowed 
the company to denitively consolidate its monopoly position in the 
Mexican sliced bread market.
The internationalization of Bimbo appeared as a necessary step to 
cope with increasing competition from multinational food companies. It 
began in 19849 with the export of products to the nearest United States 
markets and continued with the creation, in 1989, of Bimbo Centroamérica. 
Nevertheless, the real international expansion of the group began in 1990 
with the launch of an expansion plan aimed at gaining positions beyond 
Mexico’s borders, following the steps of other Mexican companies such as 
9 Bimbo’s first investment abroad was in 1964 in Barcelona as part of a personal strategy 
of one of the (Spanish) owners of Grupo Bimbo. None of the other shareholders of 
Panificadora Bimbo participated in this new company. Unfortunately, Bimbo ran into 
serious problems due to strong competition from a new bakery (Panrico). Some years later, 
the company received support from Grupo Bimbo, and its board of directors became more 
directly involved in the Spanish hub. In 1978 the subsidiary was taken over by an American 
company (Campbell Tagart Inc) that started using the Bimbo brand (Moreno-Lázaro 2010).
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CEMEX, Alfa and Televisa (Moreno-Lázaro, 2010). As Franco-Navarrete 
(2010) points out, Bimbo is a first-class example of a Mexican company that 
perceived the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a good 
opportunity and, with aggressive mergers and acquisitions and a joint-
venture strategy, successfully penetrated the United States market. 
Investing in Asia is a strategy pursued by only a few companies; 
Grupo Bimbo is one of them. It succeeded in penetrating the Asian 
market through the US$ 18 million purchase of a subsidiary of its 
main competitor in Spain, Panrico. Bimbo Asia has 800 workers and a 
production plant in Beijing.
Before entering the Chinese market, the company had to adapt 
its processes and routines, especially in food safety matters. In regards 
to customer tastes, the company had to introduce several innovations in 
its know-how as well as in its range of products in order to satisfy local 
traditions. It developed a new line of wheat-based products and red bean 
paste. Today, the company markets 18 products in China through retailers 
(Carrefour, Walmart) and local supermarkets and plans to expand its 
operation beyond Beijing after consolidating its position in that city.
According to press releases, Grupo Bimbo has doubled its size in 
China since its establishment there, but its managers recognize that profit 
margins are very low due to fierce competition from local producers. 
According to its annual report, the company aims to acquire the Chinese 
firm Jin Hong Wei, which produces Chinese and Western-style baked goods.
Grupo Bimbo is one of the most interesting cases of 
internationalization of Latin American firms. The basis of this success 
might be found in some of the company’s qualities. Among them, 
according to Franco-Navarrete (2010), is the firm’s preference for financing 
expansion through reinvestment rather than credit. On the other hand, 
Moreno-Lázaro (2010) considers that the basis of successful expansion 
lies in organizing techniques, the policy of growth through vertical 
integration, the company’s good relationship with trade unions, economies 
of scale and a smart and patient internationalization strategy. In the same 
sense, Vargas-Hernández and Reza (2010) mention as a successful strategy 
Grupo Bimbo’s control of its logistics, physical distribution and supply 
chain throughout its history.
4. Embraer
Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica) was created in 1969 as 
a State-owned enterprise resulting from an alliance between public-sector 
technologists and the military. 
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During the 1970s, Embraer concentrated on designing aircrafts, 
producing fuselages and assembling the final product, shying away from 
manufacturing high-value, high-technology components. Production 
started in cooperation with foreign partners, under co-production and 
licensing arrangements designed to achieve rapid market penetration 
without excessive technological dependence (Goldstein, 2002). Since 
the beginning, Embraer followed a long-term strategy of knowledge 
accumulation in aircraft design and manufacture; a strong focus on the 
export market was set as a priority. By the end of the 1970s, Embraer 
owned two best-selling planes, the Bandeirante and the Tucano. 
The Tucano was the first Embraer military project of commercial 
significance. After signing a development contract with the Brazilian 
air force in 1978, Embraer launched this aircraft in 1980; it was first 
exported in 1983. The other military project of significance was the AMX, 
developed jointly with the Italian firm Alenia. With the AMX, Embraer 
left its traditional market niche (commuter and light trainer aircraft) in 
an attempt not only to supply the Brazilian air force but also to compete 
with American, French and Russian combat aircrafts in export markets 
(Frischtak, 1992). 
The second internationalization step Embraer embarked on was the 
unit based in Le Bourget, Paris, inaugurated in May 1983 and aiming to 
concentrate sales activities and provide technical support to Embraer’s new 
customers in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Embraer’s main product, 
the Brasilia (EMB 120), was presented in 1980. By the end 1990, Brazilian 
market share in the 20-45 seat aircraft category was 25% worldwide.
During the 1970s, funding came from the Government of Brazil 
in the form of commissions for the air force, along with sharp growth 
in export sales. However, growing development costs and intensifying 
global competition jeopardized Embraer’s sustainability due to financial 
difficulties. The worsening economic situation led the government, in 
January 1992, to include Embraer in the list of State-owned enterprises 
to be sold. 
In December 1994, a consortium bought a controlling 45% stake 
for US$ 89 million. The new controlling shareholder embarked on a 
sweeping business transformation: production methods and processes 
were improved, including substantial investment in IT systems; a 
new organizational chart was introduced; and services such as site 
maintenance, transportation, catering, security and machinery upkeep 
were outsourced. In subsequent years, by launching new products for 
the defense market and entering the executive aviation market, Embraer 
significantly increased its market share, resulting in growing revenues in 
diversified marketplaces. In 1999, Embraer entered into a 60%/40% joint 
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venture with Liebherr International AG to develop and manufacture 
landing gear and high-precision hydraulic equipment and provide related 
services for Embraer and other clients around the world. In connection 
with this joint venture, the company formed a new subsidiary, ELEB, 
to which it transferred all of its landing gear manufacturing activities, 
the employees and some liabilities related to those activities. In 2008, 
Embraer acquired, for US$ 20.0 million, Liebherr Aerospace SAS’s 40% 
interest in ELEB.
Embraer was Brazil’s largest exporter from 1999 to 2001 and the 
second largest in 2002, 2003 and 2004. The company is the world’s third-
ranked maker of commercial aircraft, after the United States giant Boeing 
and its European rival Airbus. With headquarters in São José dos Campos, 
Brazil, and ofces, subsidiaries and customer service bases in China, 
France, Portugal, Singapore and the United States (see diagram IV.3)., 
it currently employs more than 16,853 people (excluding its subsidiaries 


























































Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of information from Embraer.
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Embraer has become one of the largest aircraft manufacturers in 
the world by focusing on specific market segments with high growth 
potential in commercial, defense and executive aviation. Since the early 
2000s Embraer has expanded its global presence with several operating 
units around the world. With representative sales offices and distribution 
centres in China and Singapore, Embraer set foot in Asia. 
In 2008, the opening of the Melbourne facility, Embraer’s first 
industrial site in the United States, showed the company’s broader strategy 
of bringing operations closer to customers and to its largest market. That 
same year, the deployment of two new plants in Portugal, both based in 
the city of Évora, south of Lisbon, was announced for 2010. 
In May 2000, Embraer established its Beijing representative office, 
which handles sales and marketing, customer support and services, 
government relations and public relations for the Chinese-speaking world. 
Embraer also opened its Beijing distribution centre, which is jointly run with 
China Aviation Supplies Import and Export Corp. Embraer’s distribution 
centre is a 750-square-meter facility that inventories more than 6,000 
different aircraft spare parts and components. It is electronically connected 
to other storage centres in Brazil, Australia, England, France and the United 
States, enabling customers to place purchase orders in real time. Finally, in 
light of the steady growth of its customer base in China, Embraer created its 
wholly-owned subsidiary, Embraer China Aircraft Technical Services Co., 
Ltd., in July 2010. Its business scope covers logistics and spare parts sales, as 
well as consulting services regarding technical issues and flight operations. 
Embraer’s sales office in Singapore was established in December 
2000 to serve the Asia-Pacific region. In 2007, the company opened a 
regional distribution centre for round-the-clock Embraer spare part 
operations and to provide maintenance, repair and inventory services to 
its commercial aircraft customers in the region. That same year, a world-
class training centre for E-Jets was created and located at the Changi 
airport. In 2010, all logistical and part support for Embraer’s commercial 
aircraft in the region, as well as for executive jets, went on to be managed 
by the regional distribution centre in Singapore.
In December 2002, Embraer signed an agreement to build a 
production unit in China through a joint venture with HAIG (Harbin 
Aircraft Industry Group Co. Ltd.) and HAI (Hafei Aviation Industry 
Co. Ltd.); both are subsidiaries of AVIC II (China Aviation Industry 
Corporation II). This joint venture, Embraer’s first industrial initiative 
outside Brazil, was set up to cooperatively develop commercial regional jets 
and expand its presence in the flourishing Chinese market. The contract 
covered the manufacturing, assembly, sales and after-sales support of the 
ERJ 135/140/145 family of aircraft. Embraer contributed US$12 million in 
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cash, tooling and inventory to the joint venture; its joint venture partners 
contributed land use rights in Harbin, capital of Heilongjiang province, 
and they contributed US$ 11 million in cash and facilities to the joint 
venture. Embraer owns 51% of the equity of the company, called Harbin 
Embraer Aircraft Industry Company Ltd., whose production facilities 
occupy an area of 24,000 square meters. 
The roll-out of the first ERJ 145 manufactured by the joint venture 
occurred in December 2003. The joint venture entered into its first sales 
contract for six aircraft with China Southern Airlines in February 2004. In 
March 2005, Embraer entered into a second sales contract for five aircraft 
with China Eastern Airlines. As of March 31, 2009, Harbin Embraer 
Aircraft Industry Company Ltd. had secured contracts with ve Chinese 
airlines for a total of 71 ERJ 145 aircraft. In October 2007, the thousandth jet 
of the ERJ 145 family was delivered at Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry 
Co. Ltd. Embraer currently produces a 50-seat commercial jet in China 
with Aviation Industries of China and is waiting for a Chinese government 
permit to build a 120-seat model. The Asia Pacific Region represented 23% 
of the company’s revenue in 2011 (see gure IV.4).
Figure IV.4 














Throughout its history, Embraer has been involved in the design, 
development, manufacturing, sales and after-sale support of aircraft in the 
commercial aviation, executive aviation, defence systems and agricultural 
aviation segments. It has produced more than 5,000 aircraft that operate in 
92 countries on ve continents, and it is the market leader for commercial 
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jets with up to 120 seats. As a State-owned company, during the 1970s and 
1980s, Embraer showed special interest in expanding its global presence. 
This tendency was reinforced after privatization in the 1990s. As a result, 
Embraer has continued to internationalize, not only in terms of sales 
offices and distribution centres, located worldwide, but also in terms of 
its industrial facilities strategically located in United States and China to 
bring operations closer its largest markets.
C. Concluding remarks
The experiences of Latin American companies that have been operating in 
Asia during the last twenty years are similar in a number of ways. These 
companies were leaders in their business sector back home. Investing in 
Asia for firms coming from a culturally and geographically distant region 
such as Latin America requires the expertise and financial backing that only 
a solid position in home markets can offer. In other words, investment in 
Asia appears not to be a strategy fit for new and inexperienced companies. 
Furthermore, Asian markets cannot make up for a lack of success in 
regional markets. Investment in Asia comes only after the companies have 
successfully expanded in neighbouring countries. For  instance, it was not 
until 2008 that Tenaris opened its first manufacturing plant in Asia, more 
than twenty years after the company’s holding group (Techint) had set up 
its first plants outside Argentina. IMPSA opened its Lumut plant after it 
had well-established subsidiaries in Brazil. Investing in Brazil is an almost 
indispensable step for a firm seeking to expand its operations outside its 
borders. Brazilian companies have the advantage of being the incumbents 
in such a large market.
In none of the cases was deployment in Asia a rapid process. On the 
contrary, it was rather lengthy. Both Tenaris and IMPSA started their first 
commercial operations in Asia in the 1980s, but it was not until the 1990s 
they went beyond that stage, and manufacturing plants were only built in 
the last decade. However, there are some differences between the approach 
taken by the two companies. Tenaris first bought local companies and then 
carried out greenfield investments. IMPSA followed the opposite strategy, 
first building its own structure and then enlarging it by investing in other 
firms. Adaptation to the local environment is crucial. 
The cases of Tenaris and IMPSA prove that, in order to successfully 
adapt to the Asian market, it is not so much the deployment strategy 
in itself but how the firms adapt to micro business practices. All of the 
interviewees mentioned that strong interpersonal relationships are 
vital for a successful blending into Asian markets. The presence of local 
executives in top managerial positions at foreign subsidiaries is virtually 
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indispensable for any kind of operation in Asia. In some countries, such as 
Indonesia, there are legal restrictions concerning appointing foreigners to 
managerial positions; in others (such as Malaysia and China) there are no 
legal limits but having local people in key positions is positively viewed 
by both local governments and business partners. Moreover, even when 
there are no restrictions, local authorities particularly welcome export-
oriented investments and those that seek the development of linkages with 
domestic suppliers. Latin American companies need to understand the 
importance of these informal practices that are so different from Western-
style business practices, and adapt to them.
Host governments actively promote foreign investment; incentives 
range from subsidies and tax exemptions to infrastructure building. Both 
IMPSA and Tenaris have benefited from positive synergies with local 
governments in their deployment strategies. Any newcomer to the Asian 
market should consider establishing a good relationship with local authorities. 
Concerning human resources management, cost differences with 
Latin America are not as big as might be expected. All of our interviewees 
underscored that the idea of Asia as a low labour cost base is vanishing 
quickly in many countries. Wages are rising fast, and skills are improving, 
thus reducing the pool of cheap unskilled labour. The positive side of this 
is that labour productivity is also on the rise; Asian workers are described 
as being very willing to learn and to improve how they perform their 
daily tasks. The quality of labour is heterogeneous: some countries such as 
Malaysia and some regions of China fare better in terms of overall skills and 
education than other less developed countries of East and South-East Asia. 
Although most Asian countries have excellent growth prospects and 
hence attractive investment opportunities, they differ in many significant 
ways (such as legal environment, prevalent business practices, the 
availability of skilled human resources, existing business opportunities 
and the level and strength of competition from installed investors). All 
firms seeking to invest in the region must take these factors into account if 
they are to design an adequate business strategy.
The big picture that emerges from the Tenaris and IMPSA case 
studies is that investment in Asia cannot be handled in a simple and 
conventional manner. Adapting to the local business environment is a 
key factor. In general, Asia is not a region were local bureaucracies are an 
impediment to investment —on the contrary, local governments are very 
keen to attract foreign investors. The difficulties lie mainly in establishing 
successful links with local agents (like suppliers, workers and universities). 
To overcome them, companies should support their operations with 
policies oriented to building solid ties with the local environment both 
inside the firm (by hiring local executives and involving them in key 
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decision-making), and outside the firm (by investing time and resources 
in cultivating interpersonal relationships). It is clear that companies that 
enjoy a good position in their home market are best suited to carry out 
investments in Asia, not only because they may have more expertise in 
their business but also because the deployment strategy may take several 
years, something that requires a continuous flow of resources towards a 
project that will take several years to provide healthy profits.
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The changing nature of Asian-Latin 
American economic relations
German King 




The swift expansion of developing Asia is probably the most significant 
structural change in the world economy of the twenty-first century. For the 
remainder of this second decade of the twenty-first century, developing 
Asia will probably continue to be the growth engine of the world, in a 
context of weak growth prospects for the developed countries.
Latin America, and in particular South America, have strongly benefited 
from developing Asia’s surge. China has become one of the region’s 
main trade partners. Despite their benefits, strengthened trans-Pacific 
economic relations have also become a cause for concern in Latin 
America, due to major imbalances of different kinds. 
To shed more light on these issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MOFAT) of the Republic of Korea and the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) organized the joint research 
project “Changing nature of Asia-Latin America economic relations”. 
This book captures the outcome of the research project. Its purpose is 
twofold. On the one hand, it aims to document the growing investment 
and trade relations between Latin America and Asia, as well as some of 
their imbalances. On the other hand, it provides several examples on 
how to upgrade trans-Pacific economic relations. 
This book is offered to the Asian and Latin American policymaking, 
academic and business communities, as a contribution to bridging the 
gaps in our knowledge of economic relations between the two regions. 
